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Learning from Success
The world needs to greatly accelerate its progress in reducing poverty and hunger. At present, one in six 
people worldwide suffers from hunger and malnutrition—a tragically high proportion—and many more 
cannot afford a healthy diet. And as progress is being made, more challenges are on the way: the world’s 
population is projected to grow to 9 billion by 2050, climate change is raising risks for farmers, environ-
mental degradation is contributing to poor soils and scarce water, and we still face the same problems that 
led to devastating volatility in food prices in 2008.
It is also important to remember that the world has already achieved great successes in agricul-
tural development that have fed billions. After all, although a grim Malthusian world once seemed 
inevitable, some 5 billion people now have enough food to lead a healthy and productive life and the 
proportion of people who are hungry is falling. The experiences of success that led to this achievement 
may offer valuable lessons about how to put agriculture to work to solve hunger and malnutrition. Until 
now, however, relatively little evidence has been available on where, why, and how these interventions 
succeeded.
To identify and examine successes in agricultural development and draw out the lessons they offer, 
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) called upon the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) to assess the evidence on what works in agriculture—what sorts of policies, programs, 
and investments in agricultural development have actually reduced hunger and poverty. This project 
follows on another recent project supported by BMGF and led by the Center for Global Development 
called “Millions Saved: Proven Successes in Global Health.” 
The case studies of success were chosen through a rigorous process that included an open call for 
nominations, a wide-ranging literature review, and expert consultations. More than 250 candidate case 
studies were winnowed down using a comprehensive set of criteria that took into account such issues 
as scale, impact, and sustainability. A committee of recognized international experts provided valuable 
insights and advice to this process. Ultimately, a total of 20 proven successes were identified.
The project leaders commissioned research studies on these successes, each one based on a synthesis 
of peer-reviewed literature, along with other relevant knowledge, that documents an intervention’s impact 
on hunger and malnutrition and the pathways to food security. Each study brings the evidence together, 
examines the rigor with which the evidence was generated, and assesses the pros and cons of each success. 
All these studies were in turn reviewed by scholars and experts commissioned by Millions Fed project 
leaders. In addition, the individual studies and the book as a whole were subjected to rigorous peer review 
by IFPRI’s independent Publications Review Committee. The detailed studies, listed in Annex F, are 
available at www.ifpri.org/millionsfed. This book captures the highlights of these detailed studies.
The successes presented in this book range from interventions that enhance productivity to those that 
combat diseases and pests, conserve natural resources, expand market opportunities, improve human 
nutrition, and improve the policy environment. While each success is distinct from the others, a common 
thread running through many of these success stories is the confluence of science, policy, and leadership.
Until hunger and malnutrition are eradicated, success cannot be truly claimed. Our hope is that this 
effort will direct more attention to sound agricultural development investments that cut hunger and to 
facilitate the scaling up and replication of successes.
Joachim von Braun          Prabhu Pingali
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development has contributed significantly to these gains, while also fostering economic 
growth and poverty reduction in some of the world’s poorest countries.
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to rusts, one of the oldest and most devastating threats facing that crop; China’s grand 
experiment with shifting from collective agriculture to individual household farming; 
West African farmers’ rediscovery of management practices for soil, water, crops, trees, 
and livestock in the arid Sahel; and Bangladesh’s homestead food-production initiative 
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provide both lessons and inspiration for continued efforts to eradicate hunger and 
malnutrition among the one billion people still facing this scourge.
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I
n the late 1950s around a billion people—
about one-third of the world’s population—
were estimated to go hungry every day. 
Famines were threatening millions, in Asia 
and Africa in particular, and prospects for feeding 
the world’s booming population looked bleak. 
In response to this alarming picture, scientists, 
policymakers, farmers, and concerned individuals 
initiated a concerted push to boost agricultural 
production and productivity in developing 
countries. Developing and industrialized 
countries, together with development agencies 
and civil society organizations, pursued a range 
of interventions in agriculture: they applied 
modern science to crop and livestock production, 
constructed irrigation systems, developed new 
cultivation practices to conserve natural resources, 
introduced policies to encourage farmers to grow 
and sell more food, and launched many other 
programs in agricultural development.
The result? About a billion people now go 
hungry every day.1 
This result may look like failure, and in one 
sense it is. The fact that 1 billion people remain 
hungry and malnourished is a tragedy on a grand 
scale. Looked at another way, however, the present 
situation reflects astounding success. While 
the absolute number of people who are hungry 
has remained the same, the relative figure—the 
proportion of the world’s population that has 
remained hungry—has declined dramatically. 
In the mid-1960s, when the global population 
was about 3.3 billion, only about 2 billion people 
were getting enough to eat. Today’s population 
has burgeoned to more than 6 billion—and some 
5 billion people now have enough food to live a 
healthy and productive life.
Clearly, progress has been made. China and 
India, once viewed as dire cases, have experienced 
agricultural booms. China slashed the number 
of hungry people from 303 million in 1979–81 to 
122 million in 2003–05, singlehandedly making 
a significant dent in world hunger because of its 
sheer size. In the face of rapid population growth, 
India also cut the number of people suffering from 
chronic hunger from 262 million in 1979–81 to 
231 million in 2003–05.2 Efforts to increase the 
global availability of food have led to enormous 
gains in agricultural productivity and food produc-
tion, with yields of many staple crops multiplying 
severalfold. Great strides also have been made in 
improving the quality of food so that it contributes 
to good nutrition, and in improving the ability of 
the most vulnerable groups— most significantly, 
women and children—to access food needed for 
survival. 
Importantly, these efforts have done more 
than just feed millions. The interventions of the 
past half century have also demonstrated that 
agriculture can be a key driver of growth and 
development for many of the world’s poorest 
countries. Where scholars and leaders once viewed 
the agricultural sector with disdain—as a drag on 
their attempts to promote growth and modern-
ization—they now recognize that agriculture can 
be a leader in the process of economic and social 
development.3
Yet the 1 billion hungry remain. In fact, 
progress in overcoming hunger has reversed in 
the face of the recent food price crisis and global 
economic downturn. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 45 million people still go hungry. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of chronically 
hungry people has almost doubled, from 125 
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million in 1979–81 to 212 million in 2003–05. In 
South Asia, while the declines in hunger are com-
mendable, the sheer size of the population that 
remains hungry—314 million—is overwhelming.4 
In short, more remains to be done. 
While the causes of chronic hunger and 
persistent malnutrition are complex, the experi-
ences of the past 50 years show that the solutions 
are by no means beyond our reach. But what do 
we really know about what works in agricultural 
development, and where, when, and why some 
interventions succeed? Which policies, programs, 
and investments in agricultural development 
can substantially reduce hunger and malnutri-
tion? And which of these interventions can do so 
within a changing global landscape characterized 
by growing natural resource scarcities, climate 
change, global market volatility, and major health 
and demographic changes?
This book looks to identify and describe 
successes in agricultural development that have 
made substantial contributions to reducing hunger 
and malnutrition. It is not an exhaustive compila-
tion of all successes that have occurred during the 
last 50 years. Rather, it is an in-depth analysis 
based on 20 case studies (see Annex F) that aims 
to give readers a better understanding of what 
worked and why (see box below and Annex B). 
By drawing key insights and lessons from past 
successes, this book intends to inform future poli-
cymaking and leverage future investments in ways 
that will contribute to overcoming hunger and 
malnutrition.
What Worked?
Successes in developing-country agriculture are 
extremely rich and diverse in nature, varying 
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Successes were chosen from about 250 submissions received in response to a global call for nominations posted 
in late 2008, feedback from experts in the field of agricultural development, and information garnered from 
scholarly literature, project documents, websites, and other sources.   
The first qualifying criterion was that the intervention must have been operational in at least one developing 
country. The second qualifying criterion was that the intervention must have engaged agriculture directly—that is, 
it must have operated on constraints that are specific to agriculture. Once these criteria were met, the potential 
success had to meet five evaluative criteria:
•	Importance—the	intervention	should	have	tackled	an	important	food-security	problem	by	addressing	the	
needs of a vulnerable group;
•	Scale—the	intervention	should	have	operated	at	scale,	measured	in	terms	of	whether	the	number	of	
beneficiaries exceeded several hundred thousand individuals or whether the intervention was, at a 
minimum, national in coverage; 
•	Time	and	Duration—the	intervention	should	have	been	(1)	fully	operational	at	scale	long	enough	to	
generate	significant	reductions	in	hunger	or	improvements	in	food	security	and	(2)	implemented	in	the	
past 50 years; 
•	Proven	Impact—the	intervention	should	have	been	supported	by	documented	and	rigorous	evidence	of	a	
clear and measurable impact on individual or household hunger or nutritional status; and 
•	Sustainability—the	intervention	should	have	been	sustainable,	whether	in	financial	terms	(cost-
effectiveness)	or	in	broader	social,	political,	or	environmental	terms.	
For complete details of the methodology used to identify and examine proven successes in agricultural 
development, see Annex B.
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in time, space, and character (Annex A). Some 
successes have emerged for just a few short years 
to trigger long episodes of growth and develop-
ment. Some have resulted from years of dogged 
persistence that yielded returns despite substan-
tial risks, uncertainties, and doubts. Others were 
achieved because communities took action to 
ensure their own survival under difficult envi-
ronmental conditions. Still others were inspired 
by leaders and organizations who marshaled the 
resources needed to contain the spread of crop and 
livestock diseases that know no boundaries.
The pathways to success are also extremely 
varied. Some cases demonstrate how an improved 
crop variety or cultivation practice contributed to 
improving food security by increasing crop output 
per hectare of land, lowering production costs, 
or reducing crop losses caused by pests, diseases, 
drought, or soil erosion. Others demonstrate 
how new agricultural technologies improved the 
sustainable use of scarce resources like fertile soil 
and water, or enhanced the nutritional quality 
of food that people both cultivate and consume. 
Still others illustrate how changes in incentives—
whether public policies, commercial regulations, 
or socioeconomic norms—encouraged farmers 
to produce more food, pursue more sustainable 
cultivation practices, and participate more actively 
in the marketplace. 
But these pathways to success are not simply 
about increasing the physical supply of food. 
Rather, they are about reductions in hunger 
that result not only from an improvement in the 
physical availability of food, but also from a change 
in an individual’s ability to secure quality food.5 
This change may result from any number of situ-
ations: an improvement in an individual’s ability 
to produce food within the farm household; an 
increase in income that provides a consumer with 
greater purchasing power in the market; or a shift 
in norms that reduces the impact of practices and 
behaviors that limit an individual’s entitlement to 
food within the household, community, or society. 
Here, we examine these pathways by looking 
at successes in six different areas: 
1. intensifying staple food production; 
2. integrating people and the environment; 
3. expanding the role of markets; 
4. diversifying out of major cereals; 
5. reforming economy-wide policies; and 
6. improving food quality and human 
nutrition.  
Intensifying staple food production
A loose timeline of recent successes in agricultural 
development begins somewhere in the mid-20th 
century, when the menace of war, hunger, 
and disease loomed large for many developing 
countries that had just gained independence from 
colonial control or influence. Crisis—whether the 
result of human actions such as conflict, oppres-
sion, or complacency, or the result of natural 
causes such as drought or pests—was a key driver 
in these early successes in agriculture.
During the late-1940s and early-1950s, astute 
political leaders keenly recognized that hunger 
was a threat to long-term security, development, 
and prosperity. In India, for example, then Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru put agriculture at 
the forefront of the national agenda following 
independence in 1947 by allocating substantial 
attention and public resources to building rural 
roads, expanding irrigation systems, generating 
rural power, establishing state agricultural univer-
sities and research centers, constructing fertilizer 
plants, and promoting land reform. The real and 
perceived threat of famine ushered in an era in 
which policymakers’ key priority was to increase 
the output (greater production) and yields (greater 
production from a given area of land) of staple 
foods.
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One of the first major successes came from 
a global effort to fight wheat rusts—a plague that 
has been known to humanity for thousands of 
years but had never been effectively contained.6 
Wheat rusts are actually fungi that can rapidly 
decimate wheat as it matures in the field, and are 
thus a threat to food security in industrialized 
and developing countries alike. The late Nobel 
Prize Laureate Norman Borlaug, with the eventual 
backing of policymakers, scientists, and philan-
thropists, catalyzed a global effort to combat the 
scourge by bringing modern science to bear on 
the problem—by breeding rust-resistant wheat 
varieties in Mexico with the help of innovative 
research methods. As a result of this global effort, 
about 117 million hectares of land under wheat 
cultivation were protected from wheat rusts, 
directly ensuring the food security of 60 to 120 
million rural households and many more millions 
of consumers. Importantly, it also secured a place 
for science and technology in developing-country 
agriculture and gave rise to a global agricultural 
research system, including the Consultative Group 
on International Agricultural Research, dedicated 
to finding scientific solutions to ending hunger and 
food insecurity.
The wheat rust success evolved into a much 
larger and more multidimensional series of 
successes that began in the 1960s and came to be 
known as the Green Revolution.7 In Asia, this revo-
lution started with the introduction of improved 
rice and wheat varieties for irrigated land that 
could be cultivated twice a year instead of once. 
The process continued into the 1990s as successes 
expanded to lesser-known staple crops such as 
millet and sorghum and more marginal areas 
dependent on rain rather than irrigation. The 
investments in science and technology—along with 
complementary investments in irrigation systems, 
road networks, fertilizer production, and food 
price stabilization policies—that underwrote the 
Green Revolution paid off handsomely. Farmers 
rapidly adopted the new farming practices and 
technologies to such a massive extent that between 
1965 and 1990, cereal output and yields doubled, 
pulling India and other Asian countries back from 
the brink of famine. Between 1970 and 1990, 
an estimated 1 billion people benefited from the 
Green Revolution in terms of improved access to 
food, increased earnings from agriculture, or both. 
A recent estimate suggests that without a Green 
Revolution, about 30 million children would have 
died in the developing world between 1970 and 
2000, with more than two-thirds of these children 
being in Asia alone.8
Successes in Sub-Saharan Africa were smaller 
in magnitude but no less important in address-
ing the persistent threat of hunger in the region. 
In East and Southern Africa, applications of 
modern science to improve maize led to growth in 
both maize output and yields among the region’s 
primarily small-scale, resource-poor farmers.9 
Between 1965 and 1990, maize yields in Kenya, 
Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe increased annually 
between 1 and 5 percent—rates that compare 
respectably with yield and production growth 
rates in countries such as the United States—while 
annual maize production increases ranged from 1.8 
to 3.3 percent in these same countries. 
In West Africa between 1971 and 1989, the 
application of modern science similarly helped 
contain the spread of a cassava mosaic virus (a 
disease) and mealybug (an insect). Both threats 
can generate major losses in cassava, a crop that 
is central to the sustenance and incomes of the 
region’s poorest farmers, particularly in times of 
drought or crisis.10 By breeding cassava varieties 
that were resistant to the mosaic disease and by 
introducing a parasitic wasp to destroy mealybug 
in countries such as Nigeria and Ghana, the 
potential damage posed by these two threats was 
effectively contained. The introduction of disease-
resistant cassava varieties is estimated to have 
contributed to making an additional 1.4 million 
tons of gari (a granular, fermented cassava flour 
commonly used in cooking) available per year, 
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enough to feed 29 million people in the region. 
Similarly, the mealybug control program is 
estimated to have reduced losses from infestations 
by an estimated 2.5 tons per hectare.
Integrating people and  
the environment
By the 1970s, concerns emerged about the equity 
and environmental implications of rapid agri-
cultural development.11 These new concerns 
encouraged a move away from a strictly yield-
increasing outlook on food staple productivity to 
a more complex perspective on agriculture and 
rural development. Sustainable development issues 
came to the forefront of the development discourse, 
partly in response to issues accumulated during 
the Green Revolution such as the overuse of agri-
cultural chemicals, the depletion of scarce water 
resources, and the neglect of farmers’ input into 
policymaking. New policies, programs, and invest-
ments were specifically designed to integrate rural 
communities into decisionmaking processes about 
their own development as a way of addressing sus-
tainability along with equity issues. The idea that 
agricultural development could work if driven by 
direct community participation, environmentally 
sustainable cultivation practices, and supportive 
public policies gained a global following. 
Experiences in Nepal that began in the 1970s 
illustrate this change in perspective. During this 
period, a series of prescient legislative reforms 
and innovative forestry programs contributed to 
a transformation of the country’s strictly conser-
vation-focused approach to its natural forests into 
a more broad-based strategy that encompassed 
forest use, enterprise development, and liveli-
hoods improvement with direct benefits for the 
rural poor.12 Partly as a result of these reforms 
and programs, an estimated one-third of Nepal’s 
population is participating in community forestry 
activities and directly managing over one-fourth 
of Nepal’s forest area as a means of improving 
household food security and livelihoods. 
In Burkina Faso and Niger during the 1980s, 
the rediscovery of community-based knowledge 
in the form of traditional agricultural manage-
ment practices helped to transform the Sahelian 
region’s arid landscape into productive agricultural 
land.13 In the wake of repeated droughts, farmers 
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began innovating on simple practices: protect-
ing and managing indigenous trees and shrubs 
among crops to provide fodder and firewood, and 
to improve soil fertility; digging pits on barren, 
degraded land to concentrate organic manure and 
rainwater for planting; and constructing stone 
contour bunds to control rainfall and runoff and 
combat erosion. With technical support from 
charismatic community leaders and nongov-
ernmental organizations, the dissemination of 
these practices helped Sahelian households to 
intensify and expand the cultivation of essential 
food staples such as sorghum and millet, and to 
earn more income from the sale of crop surpluses, 
fodder, firewood, fruit and other products. In 
Burkina Faso’s Central Plateau, the rehabilitation 
of between 200,000 and 300,000 hectares of land 
translated into roughly 80,000 tons of addi-
tional food per year, or enough to sustain about 
a half million people in the region. In southern 
Niger, similar efforts are estimated to have trans-
formed approximately 5 million hectares of land, 
improving food security for at least 2.5 million 
people. 
In Argentina, large-scale farmers adopted a 
different set of resource-conserving cultivation 
techniques, resulting in a significant increase in 
the global production of soybean in particular.14 
During the 1980s, farmers, researchers, extension 
workers, and private companies worked together 
to promote zero-tillage cultivation—a crop man-
agement technique in which farmers essentially 
plant seeds in unplowed fields to maximize the 
gains from intensive double cropping and to 
lower production costs, with the added benefits of 
reducing land degradation, conserving soil fertility, 
and economizing on scarce water resources. By 
2008, the area of land under zero tillage reached 
nearly 22 million hectares. The use of zero tillage, 
along with the introduction of herbicide-resistant 
soybean varieties and other factors, improved soil 
fertility by reversing decades of erosion, created 
an estimated 200,000 new agricultural jobs, 
and provided the international market with new 
supplies of soybeans that contributed to keeping 
global food prices low.
During roughly the same period in the 1980s, 
small-scale farmers in the Indo-Gangetic Plains—a 
vast region that encompasses parts of India, Nepal, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh—began experimenting 
with similar zero-tillage techniques.15 An estimated 
620,000 wheat farmers have adopted some form 
of zero-tillage cultivation since these experiments 
began, accounting for about 1.8 million hectares of 
land in the region and generating average income 
gains of US$180–340 per household, particularly 
in the Indian states of Haryana and Punjab.
Expanding the role of markets
In spite of these successes, many developing 
countries still suffered from slow growth, general 
economic malaise, and persistent food insecurity 
through the 1980s. A shift to more market-driven 
development took hold in many countries during 
this period. In some countries, this shift came in 
the form of structural adjustment programs that 
sought to rein in public deficits, improve national 
balances of payments, liberalize markets, and 
encourage private investment in the economy.16 
In other countries, this shift occurred after the 
recognition that efficient supply chains played 
an important role in improving the production 
incentives for farmers, increasing incomes from 
farming, and improving food security. Market 
forces were expected to contribute to agricultural 
development, for example, by freeing up seed and 
fertilizer markets from state-owned monopolies, 
by removing price-setting policies in agricultural 
commodity markets to encourage more vibrant 
trading, and by closing the supply chain gaps that 
link farmers to markets through traders, proces-
sors, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers. 
In Bangladesh, government moves to liberal-
ize agricultural input markets in the 1980s led to 
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an easing of restrictions on the importation and 
sale of irrigation equipment, such as low-lift power 
pumps and shallow tube wells.17 These seemingly 
minor reforms stimulated the rapid growth of 
irrigated dry-season rice farming, which sub-
sequently grew to account for 90 percent of the 
increase in rice production in Bangladesh between 
1988 and 2007. And with this growth in rice pro-
duction came a decline in the real rice prices facing 
food-insecure households, and ultimately, signifi-
cant reductions in poverty in the country. 
In China, policy reforms that promoted 
private investment in agriculture, along with 
breakthroughs in rice research, fostered the 
growth of a vibrant seed industry for hybrid rice.18 
Hybridization, first demonstrated in maize by 
scientists in the United States in 1918, is a process 
in which inbred parent lines of a crop are crossed 
to create seeds that are characterized by greater 
yield potential than either parent, an outcome 
known as “hybrid vigor.” This vigor tends to 
decline with each generation of seed that is saved 
and replanted, so farmers need to purchase new 
seed each season to realize the full yield gains of 
these hybrids. In China, as in the United States 
and other industrialized countries, this character-
istic of hybrid seed supported the rapid emergence 
of an entirely new industry—one that distributes 
good quality hybrid seed to farmers. Hybrid rice 
in China spread so quickly that between 1978 and 
2008, it had grown to account for 63 percent of all 
land under rice cultivation. Importantly, its yield 
advantages helped China to feed an additional 60 
million people per year during this period. 
In India, similar policy reforms and scien-
tific advances in the mid-1990s encouraged the 
growth of private investment in the marketing 
of improved seeds for pearl millet and sorghum, 
including hybrids.19 These two crops are essential 
sources of sustenance and income for some 14 
million poor households in India. Although 
together they account for just 10 percent of the 
total cropped area in India, they are cultivated 
in the country’s arid and semiarid regions where 
nearly 60 percent of the rural population lives. The 
emergence of private seed companies, combined 
with good public research, has not only provided 
an estimated 6–9 million farmers with access to 
improved seeds that have increased yields by up 
to 85 percent in recent decades, but also served as 
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Reforms in Burkina Faso’s cotton sector 
that began in 1992 brought together experiences 
from both market liberalization and cash crop 
development as drivers of success in agricultural 
development.20 Saddled with a state-led cotton 
development strategy that was branded as ineffi-
cient, inequitable, and destabilizing to the national 
economy by the late 1980s, Burkina Faso pursued 
a reform path that combined efforts to strengthen 
the role of cotton farmers’ groups before partially 
liberalizing input and output markets. Partly as a 
result of these reforms, and even despite consis-
tently low world prices for cotton, Burkina Faso 
has emerged as the leading African exporter of 
cotton based on a threefold increase in production 
since the early-1990s. The cotton sector’s growth 
has absorbed more than 200,000 new farmers 
who were either engaged in the cultivation of other 
crops or were return migrants from neighboring 
countries experiencing civil strife. 
In Kenya, policy reforms in the early-1990s 
contributed to the rapid growth of private invest-
ment in fertilizer and maize marketing, the 
outcome of which has been a dramatic reduction in 
time, effort, and costs associated with purchasing 
fertilizer and selling surplus maize production.21  
The average distance that small farmers had to 
travel to purchase fertilizer decreased by half 
between 1997 and 2007, with similar decreases 
observed in the distances traveled to sell maize. 
The proportion of small-scale farmers using fertil-
izer on maize rose from 56 percent in 1996 to 70 
percent in 2007, contributing to an increase in 
both yields and availability of this vitally important 
staple crop for Kenyan consumers.
Diversifying out of major cereals
The emphasis on markets also opened up new 
opportunities for cultivating and marketing non-
staple crops—commodities such as legumes, fruits, 
and vegetables as well as dairy, livestock, and 
fish—as a means of increasing farm incomes and 
improving food security among the poor. Each 
success offers a different angle on how small-
scale farmers, entrepreneurs, and policymakers 
responded to growth in market opportunities. 
Across a range of Asian countries—Bangla-
desh, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Thailand—the move 
away from food staples was exemplified by the 
diffusion of improved mungbean, a little-known 
pulse crop that is high in protein, iron, and other 
micronutrients, and particularly useful in main-
taining soil fertility. Thanks to an international 
research program and active farmer participation 
in the research process, a wide range of mungbean 
varieties was released beginning in the mid-1980s 
with traits such as higher yields, shorter maturity 
times, and other qualities that targeted a variety 
of agroecological conditions in the region.22 These 
improvements contributed to yield gains of 28 
to 55 percent among an estimated 1.5 million 
farmers, and were key factors in the 35 percent 
increase in Asian mungbean production between 
1985 and 2000. 
Closely related to these successes are advances 
made in the area of livestock and fisheries—
commodities that sometimes receive much less 
consideration relative to food staple and high-
value crops but are of no less importance to 
millions of small-scale, resource-poor farmers and 
pastoralists, and to consumers who depend on 
milk, meat, and fish as key sources of sustenance 
and nutrition. 
Global efforts to control and eradicate 
rinderpest—a livestock disease that, in its severest 
form, is capable of killing 95 percent or more of 
the animals it infects—reiterate the importance of 
livestock to rural livelihoods and food security.23 
Concerted global, regional, and national efforts in 
recent decades to control the spread of rinderpest 
through cattle vaccination, quarantine measures, 
and disease surveillance have played an important 
role in securing the livelihoods of small-scale 
farmers who keep livestock, as well as pastoralists 
whose livelihoods depend primarily on the health 
of their herds. Programs operating in Asia and 
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Africa have helped to avoid potentially massive 
financial losses in terms of milk, meat, animal 
traction and, for many pastoralists, their main 
livelihood assets, and have brought rinderpest to 
the edge of eradication, the first time an infectious 
disease has been eradicated since smallpox in 
humans.
In India, Operation Flood, an innovative 
national program that ran from 1970 to 1996, 
helped create a national dairy industry that 
integrated small-scale farmers—many of them 
women—with village-level dairy cooperatives, 
commercial dairy processors and distributors, 
and new technologies to modernize the industry.24 
With the backing of a supportive policy environ-
ment that ensured the dairy industry’s steady 
growth and development, India went from being 
a net importer of dairy products to a major player 
in the global dairy market. Between 1970 and 
2001, dairy production in India increased at the 
respectable rate of about 4.5 percent per year, with 
estimates during 2007–08 indicating that dairy 
production has exceeded 100 million tons per year. 
As a result, millions of consumers now have better 
access to milk and other dairy products, while 
India has become a top global producer of buffalo 
and goat milk, the sixth largest producer of cow 
milk, and an exporter of milk powder.
In the Philippines, the Genetic Improvement 
of Farmed Tilapia (GIFT) project that ran 
from 1988 to 1997 played an important part in 
enhancing the role of fish as a source of income 
and protein for many farmers and consumers.25 By 
breeding a tilapia strain that originated in Africa, 
the project developed a new strain that is faster 
growing and more resistant to environmental 
stresses than other strains. These improvements 
significantly boosted fish yields and output, thus 
increasing the availability of fish for consumers, 
reducing market prices, and providing a cheaper 
source of protein for the country’s poor. 
Reforming economy-wide policies
As the emphasis of agricultural development 
evolved and diversified over recent decades, the 
role of the agricultural sector in the wider economy 
has similarly changed. Economic policy reforms 
in recent decades have contributed significantly 
to changing the traditional urban biases that 
historically discriminated against farmers and, 
ultimately, against the poor.26 In some cases, 
trade and fiscal policy reforms have changed how 
both trade and aid are leveraged for development, 
transforming dependencies on food aid into more 
effective, long-term opportunities for develop-
ment financing. In other cases, monetary policy 
reforms have reduced the distorting effects of 
exchange rates and lending policies on the agricul-
tural sector, allowing for more rapid growth and 
development. 
The most dramatic case in point comes from 
China. Between 1978 and 1984, China undertook 
a series of policy reforms that transformed 
the country’s food and agricultural sector and 
reduced hunger on a scale unrivaled in history.27 
The reforms effectively reintroduced household 
farming after more than 30 years of collective 
agriculture. This new approach to agriculture—the 
Household Responsibility System—gave farmers 
the incentive to sell their surplus farm production 
at a market. By returning more than 95 percent 
of China’s farmland to some 160 million farm 
households, the reforms directly contributed to 
an increase in rural incomes by 137 percent, a 
reduction in rural poverty by 22 percent, and an 
increase in grain production by 34 percent. Gains 
in on-farm efficiency also led to a substantial 
increase in the rural labor force available for non-
agricultural employment, a shift that fueled a rapid 
process of industrial growth in rural China, and 
more broadly, China’s remarkable march to indus-
trialization during the past three decades.
In Vietnam, a series of similar reforms 
between 1987 and 1993 fundamentally shifted the 
country’s economy to a greater market orientation, 





























immediately transforming the agricultural sector.28 
During the period 1989–92, the agricultural sector 
emerged from its stagnation and grew at a rate of 
3.8 per year, while the country shifted from being 
a net food importing country to the world’s third 
largest exporter of rice in 1989. Within a decade, 
more than 10 million households—representing 
about 87 percent of peasant households—had 
received land use certificates for about 78 percent 
of Vietnam’s agricultural land. These reforms, 
together with other market liberalization policies, 
encouraged farmers to produce food staples, 
livestock, and high-value crops far more produc-
tively, and for substantially greater market gain, 
than in previous eras. The reforms contributed 
substantially to Vietnam’s dramatic reductions in 
poverty and contributed to both economic growth 
and industrialization.
Improving food quality and  
human nutrition 
While massive gains in improving the availabil-
ity of and access to food were achieved in China, 
India, and many other developing countries as a 
result of these successes, far less has been achieved 
in improving the quality of food. Scholars have 
argued that the decades-old effort to raise people’s 
incomes to boost their calorie consumption and 
protein intake should be refocused to include 
improvements in people’s micronutrient intake and 
dietary diversity.29 With this shift comes the recog-
nition that the pathways through which agricultural 
development affects hunger and food security are 
more complex than previously understood. 
Taking aim at this challenge is an innova-
tive program in Bangladesh that promotes home 
gardening, small livestock production, and 
nutrition education.30 Helen Keller International, a 
nongovernmental organization, worked in part-
nership with more than 70 local organizations 
and the Government of Bangladesh to encourage 
food-insecure households to grow their own 
micronutrient-rich foods for both home con-
sumption and the market. These homestead food 
production programs have reached an estimated 5 
million individuals and contributed to combating 
micronutrient deficiencies that can be major 
causes of diseases such as night blindness, particu-
larly among women and children.
Caveats
Five decades of investment in agricultural devel-
opment have contributed significantly to feeding 
billions of people. Early interventions were 
critical to improving the availability of food by 
bringing modern science, rural infrastructure, 
public policy, and international collaboration to 
bear on the challenge of enhancing yields and 
output to feed millions. Many later interventions 
sought to integrate community participation and 
environmental sustainability into agricultural 
development, with important repercussions for 
the use of local knowledge resources and natural 
resources in combating hunger. Other interven-
tions worked to strengthen the role of markets and 
agricultural incomes by encouraging the com-
mercialization of small-scale farmers’ production, 
improving supply chain efficiencies, and loosening 
the state regulation of both input and commodity 
markets. Still other interventions have focused 
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on addressing the nutritional aspects of hunger, 
particularly the issues of micronutrient deficiency, 
dietary diversity, and food quality. But a few 
caveats are in order.
First, successes are rarely a progression of 
standalone events; rather, many are closely related 
in scope and intertwined over time. In China, the 
impact of the Household Responsibility System 
(1978–84) on rural food security was partly driven 
by the introduction of hybrid rice and other agri-
cultural technologies. In Kenya, early successes in 
breeding improved maize provided the productivity 
gains needed to leverage subsequent liberaliza-
tion of both fertilizer and maize markets. In the 
Indo-Gangetic Plains, the promotion of zero-tillage 
cultivation techniques is partly an attempt to reduce 
the dependence on chemical inputs that were 
heavily promoted during Asia’s Green Revolution in 
previous decades. In short, the interrelatedness of 
these episodes of success demonstrates how inter-
ventions in agricultural development are solidly 
couched in what comes before. 
Second, successes have not occurred or 
accumulated at a consistent pace over the past 
five decades. Instead, the historical record has 
been peppered with starts and stops. In Malawi, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe, for example, the gains 
that came with the dissemination of improved 
maize (1965–90) came to a halt in the 1990s due to 
unsustainable fiscal burdens, erratic reforms, and 
bad weather. The benefits of community forestry 
in Nepal from 1978 to the present have similarly 
been disrupted by civil strife and political crises 
in the country. And the global effort to combat 
wheat rusts has been renewed by the emergence of 
UG99, a rust race that can overcome the resistance 
conferred by breeders during the last 50 years. 
Finally, many successes that are important to 
reducing hunger and malnutrition exist beyond 
the ones presented in detail here. Some are briefly 
mentioned in the chapters that follow: the spread 
of community forestry programs in Cameroon, 
India, Mexico and Tanzania; the development of 
Brazil’s Cerrado region; the diffusion of insect-
resistant cotton in China and India; and the 
introduction of pro-poor regulatory reforms in 
Kenya’s dairy industry. Others have not accumu-
lated sufficient evidence to prove impact, but may 
intuitively be successes. Still others may be smaller 
in size and scale, or have yet to capture the world’s 
attention, but are no less important. 
Why Did It Work?
These successes in agricultural development 
provide valuable insights for the future—insights 
that are important to those directly involved in 
policy, programs, and investments in agriculture. 
They include policymakers designing progres-
sive legislation, donors investing in projects 
and programs, nongovernmental organizations 
working with vulnerable farm communities, 
scholars studying growth and development, scien-
tists breeding new crops in labs and fields, farmers’ 
associations promoting their members’ voices and 
interests, and people wanting to help ensure that 
agricultural development translates into reduced 
hunger. In all, eight key elements emerge from 
these successes.
Science and technology 
Sustained investment in agricultural research and 
development is vital to developing-country agricul-
ture. The application of science and technology to 
agricultural development—whether by developing 
advanced techniques for crop breeding or updating 
farmers’ traditional soil and water management 
practices—is a common determinant of success. 
The critical role of long-term public investment in 
science and technology plays out across the entire 
developing world, from Asia to Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and a range of successes from 
major food crops such as rice, wheat, and maize, 
to lesser-known crops such as millet, sorghum, 
cassava, and mungbean, and to livestock and 
fisheries.
These successes also demonstrate just how 
difficult it is to sustain public investment in 






















agricultural science and technology in the face of 
competing demands for public resources. Often, 
policymakers and donors are put off by the long 
lead times in developing new technologies for 
small-scale farmers, or by the unending need to 
continuously develop new technologies in an effort 
to stay ahead of co-evolving pests and diseases, 
changes in market preferences, and new environ-
mental stresses such as global climate change. 
Nonetheless, sustained significant public invest-
ment is vital to assuring and maintaining successes 
in agricultural development that address chronic 
hunger and persistent malnutrition.
 
Complementary investments 
Still, science and technology are not enough: 
hunger and malnutrition are complex phenomena 
and there are no silver bullets in the struggle 
against them. To improve the chances that science 
and technology will make a real contribution to 
improving food security, sustained public invest-
ment in the hardware and software of agricultural 
development is also critical. This includes public 
investment in irrigation schemes, rural road 
networks, rural education, market infrastruc-
ture, and regulatory systems. All of these are 
areas that the private sector tends not to invest in 
directly because they seemingly offer little oppor-
tunity for profit, despite their value to society 
as a whole. Long-term public investment in the 
building blocks of agricultural development is a 
necessary condition for success, and is evident 
in each and every success case—from building 
and improving irrigation systems in India and 
Pakistan, to providing extension and education 
services on zero-tillage cultivation techniques for 
Argentinean farmers. Conversely, the absence 
of sustained investments in infrastructure, sup-
portive policies, and robust markets after 1993 in 
many East and Southern African countries stalled 
the gains in agricultural productivity growth and 
hunger reduction that had been achieved with 
the introduction of improved maize in the region. 
Clearly, sustained public investment can pay high 
dividends in terms of addressing chronic hunger 
and persistent malnutrition.
Private incentives
But even with sustained public investment in 
science, technology, and complementary invest-
ment areas, little can be achieved without the 
right incentives. By putting policies in place that 
encourage farmers, entrepreneurs, and companies 
to invest in agriculture, and by ensuring that 
markets provide accurate and timely price signals 
to these private sector actors, the likelihood of 
success in agricultural development increases. 
China demonstrated this with the return to 
household farming, where a change in incen-
tives encouraged farmers to invest in their 
land’s productivity and grow more food. Kenya 
demonstrated something similar by loosening 
state control over fertilizer and maize markets, 
dramatically reducing the smallholder’s costs of 
purchasing inputs and marketing surplus pro-
duction. And, as Burkina Faso demonstrated by 
strengthening the role of farmers’ organizations 
as cotton sector reforms heightened the competi-
tiveness of the cotton sector, private incentives 
work best when market participants can respond 
effectively to these incentives, collectively or 
individually.
Cooperation and collaboration 
Many successes are built around the notion of 
cooperation and collaboration. Partnerships 
among diverse actors in the agricultural sec-
tor—research institutes, community-based 
organizations, private companies, government 
agencies, and international bodies—are evident in 
almost all successes. But collaborative interven-
tions are a tricky business and require know-how 
in effectively managing public and private 
resources, orchestrating foreign assistance and 
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community resources, and managing relationships 
among sometimes disparate interest groups. 
Still, partnerships underscore many successes 
in agricultural development. Examples of suc-
cessful partnerships include the scientific 
collaborations that went into developing rust-
resistant wheat strains and semi-dwarf rice and 
wheat varieties; the grassroots-level partnerships 
to improve forestry management in Nepal and 
land management in the Sahel; the global and 
regional cooperation that helped eradicate rinder-
pest; and the public–private partnerships that 
brought improved sorghum and millet hybrids to 
Indian farmers.
Timing and planning 
Many successes result from good timing, whether 
by chance or design. In some cases, the time was 
simply right for the intervention—the technological, 
economic, social, and political elements were all in 
place. In other cases, the intervention was adjusted 
to ensure that the timing was right: gradual reforms 
were undertaken step-by-step, calculated mea-
surements of the potential gains and losses were 
undertaken, and a strong degree of support was 
provided to those affected by the reforms. 
Burkina Faso’s experience with the develop-
ment of its cotton sector has proceeded relatively 
smoothly partly because of its staged effort to 
strengthen farmers’ organizations before liberal-
izing the cotton sector. China’s experience with a 
return to household farming has generated such 
significant gains in food security partly because of 
the carefully sequenced introduction of localized 
experiments in land tenure rights to the country as 
a whole. 
Experimentation and evolution 
Often, successes emerge from localized experi-
ments that allow participants to learn from their 
mistakes, adapt to changes in the landscape, 
evolve as the playing field becomes more complex, 
and pursue incremental, step-by-step approaches 
to scaling up. Creating space for local experi-
mentation and innovation is a critical means of 
generating big bangs from incremental changes. 
For example, China’s land tenure reforms began 
as a local experiment undertaken by administra-
tors in just one poverty-ridden county, but evolved 
rapidly into a national-level reform program. 
The homestead food production program in 
Bangladesh integrated a learning process into 
its activities to ensure that the intervention 
could be improved with the accumulation of new 
evidence from the sciences and new experiences 
at the grassroots level. By encouraging farmers to 
improve on their traditional soil and water man-
agement practices in the Sahel, or by involving 
farmers in the breeding of improved mungbean in 
Asia, long-term investments in agricultural devel-
opment paid off handsomely.
Community involvement 
Similarly, by vesting communities with a stake in 
ownership of a development process, grassroots 
participation contributes much to the long-term 
sustainability of a success. Involving communi-
ties and smaller groups in local consultations, 
policy deliberations, scientific research, and 
experimentation is all part of building from the 
bottom up to achieve success. Similarly, involving 
local practices, customs, and knowledge in an 
intervention are the seeds of big successes. The 
successes in community forestry in Nepal, inten-
sification of dryland cultivation in the Sahel, and 
homestead food production in Bangladesh, among 
many others, are all testaments to the value of 
community involvement and engagement.
Leadership and dedication 
Often, the solutions needed to address agricul-
tural development challenges require dedicated 
individuals to make the difference—champions 
to push the issue to the forefront of the public’s 
consciousness, demonstrate what can be done in 
the face of seemingly insurmountable challenges, 
or mobilize the political and financial capital 
to overcome inertia. Some of these individuals 
are well known, such as Norman Borlaug, who 
received the Nobel Prize for his contributions to 
agricultural development. Others may be less well 
known, such as Yacouba Sawadogo, a farmer from 
Gourga in Burkina Faso who contributed signifi-
cantly to the spread of soil fertility management 
techniques in the barren fields of the Sahel. Still 
others—the unsung heroes whose efforts have fed 
millions—include the extension agents with good 
ideas about how to improve local crop production 
and marketing, the credit officers who disburse 
and collect on small loans to small farmers, or 
the community organizers who help their fellow 
farmers find new ways of combating crop pests and 14  
diseases. These champions, both renowned and 
anonymous, are essential ingredients of success. 
Creating an environment that encourages leader-
ship on such issues and rewards individuals based 
on their merit is important to creating success.
What Can We Learn?
Looking to the future, the changing realities of 
the global food and agriculture system, and the 
persistence of hunger in the developing world, 
indicate that more and more frequent successes 
are needed. Agriculture is increasingly driven by 
market demand forces, consumer preferences, 
regulatory scrutiny, and ethical considerations. 
Agriculture is far more commercial and far more 
globalized through domestic market growth, inter-
national trade, and global finance than ever before. 
Emerging information, communications, and 
biological technologies are providing new oppor-
tunities for farmers and consumers, while climate 
change is imposing new constraints on agricultural 
practices, rural livelihoods, and the resilience 
of agroecological systems. New demographic 
concerns are emerging with the continuing HIV/
AIDS pandemic, changing age structures in some 
developing countries, rapid urbanization and rural 
flight, and growing regional and global migration. 
The tools needed to address these evolving 
realities have changed during the past five decades. 
But how can the successes of the past help inform 
and influence agricultural investments that will 
contribute to substantially reducing hunger in the 
future? A few reflections are offered here.
Success is not a substitute for strategy. 
Individual successes of any size or scale must 
stimulate broader and more sustained processes 
of national and global success building. But these 
processes are feasible only if countries pursue 
good strategies, create supporting policies, and 
encourage appropriate levels of investment and 
experimentation needed to accumulate successes 
that eventually add up to a sustained success. 
Without these necessary conditions, successes will 
likely be scattered, occasional events—outcomes of 
an unexpected scientific breakthrough or a one-off 
policy correction. Rather than generating these 
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types of short-lived successes, decisionmakers 
should design and implement strategies that take 
a comprehensive approach to raising agricultural 
productivity, increasing incomes, and reducing 
poverty. Comprehensive strategies along these 
lines can encourage many intertwined successes in 
agriculture to emerge with a frequency that adds 
up to a national or regional success story, rather 
than a fleeting, intermittent, or serendipitous set 
of successes.
Success is a process. Agricultural development 
must address a range of ever-changing priorities 
and challenges—containing the transboundary 
movement of new diseases and pests, strength-
ening ecosystem resilience in the face of climate 
change, improving the governance of global trade 
in food and agricultural products, encouraging 
both public and private investment in developing-
country agriculture, and articulating grassroots 
voices on global and local issues more effectively. 
As such, successes are generated and sustained 
through experiential processes. This means dis-
covering by doing, learning from mistakes, and 
adapting to change. The importance of designing 
an intervention that allows for learning and adap-
tation can increase the likelihood of success. 
Success is recognizable. Sometimes successes 
emerge only in retrospect, once a substantial 
amount of time has passed to allow for reflection. 
But for successes in agricultural development to 
be recognized as such, they need to be sufficiently 
supported by strong evidence (see box below).31 
Such evidence comes in many shapes and sizes, 
ranging from first-hand accounts of individual par-
ticipants to large-scale impact evaluation studies 
that combine both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence at the highest levels of academic rigor. 
Regardless of the type and level of evidence, the 
key point is that successes in agricultural develop-
ment—and failures too—need to be systematically 
documented, examined, and shared so that others 
can learn lessons, adapt them to different circum-
stances and contexts, and avoid similar pitfalls. 
Success can be ambiguous. In many cases, 
it is immediately obvious that there is no such 
thing as an “unequivocal success.” Many successes 
are often accompanied by some type of trade-off. 
Increases in food production may depend on the 
intensive use of harmful chemicals. Productivity 
gains may generate price collapses that hurt 
farmers but benefit consumers. Scarce public 
resources allocated to rural infrastructure may be 
funds that could be used for other investments. 
Assessing the impact of investments in agricultural development has long captured the interest and attention 
of	policymakers,	donors,	and	practitioners	as	a	means	of	proving	the	effectiveness	of	development.	Impact	
assessments come in many different forms, use many different methods, and are conducted at different points 
of an intervention. But irrespective of the approach taken, impact assessments are meant to provide a systematic 
analysis of the significant or lasting changes in people’s lives attributable to an intervention and in relation to the 
counterfactual, or what may have occurred had an intervention not been taken.
In	the	last	decade,	policymakers	and	donors	have	increasingly	emphasized	the	use	of	impact	assessments	
to ensure accountability for results and to search for evidence of what works in agricultural development. This 
trend has led to an increasing focus on a more formal, systematic, and rigorous approach to assessing, evaluating, 
estimating,	and	analyzing	impacts	of	investments	in	this	area.	To	this	end,	rigorous	approaches	based	on	a	
common framework, along with the requisite resources, are needed. 
With the right tools and sufficient funding in place, subjecting as many development interventions as 
resources allow to rigorous impact assessments based on a common framework can help build a critical body of 
evidence	on	the	impacts	of	development	interventions.	This	body	of	evidence	can	then	be	synthesized	to	build	a	
knowledge base on what works and what does not.
For further details, see Annex C.
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In fact, many successes are characterized by 
a mix of pros and cons. The continued central 
role of the state in Burkina Faso’s cotton sector is 
criticized because of the public resources required 
to sustain the system. Difficulties in extending the 
gains from community forestry in Nepal to under-
represented social groups are cited as a source of 
concern for the policy’s long-term outlook. And 
the excessive and inappropriate use of fertilizers 
and pesticides that damage waterways and natural 
ecosystems, irrigation practices that lead to salt 
buildup on good farmland, and water scarcities 
resulting from the overuse of water from major 
river basins and groundwater, are similarly noted 
as major shortcomings of the Green Revolution.
Unfortunately, this ambiguity may be one 
reason why agricultural development became such 
an unpopular topic among both governments and 
donors in the 1980s, along with other reasons such 
as fatigue over the extensive lag times needed to 
demonstrate impact, frustrations with moving 
large government bureaucracies into action, and 
tendencies among investors and entrepreneurs to 
steer clear of all but the most low-risk investments 
in the agricultural sector. As a result, public invest-
ment and donor assistance declined precipitously 
during this period: agricultural research spending 
stagnated while rural infrastructure development 
came to a halt in many developing countries.32
But investments in agricultural development 
have generated sizable dividends for society, 
demonstrating that agriculture is not only an 
important means of reducing poverty, but also a 
worthwhile investment portfolio.33 For example, 
the research that culminated in the development 
and release of disease-resistant, high-yielding 
cassava varieties in Nigeria during the 1970s is 
estimated to have achieved an annual economic 
rate of return of 55 percent over a 31-year period. 
Similar estimates of the returns on investments in 
research indicate similarly high figures: 19 to 66 
percent for wheat rust resistance; 43 to 64 percent 
in the case of hybrid maize research in East and 
Southern Africa; 50 percent and higher in the case 
of the modern varieties introduced during Asia’s 
Green Revolution; and 70 percent in the case of 
tilapia improvement in the Philippines. 
Returns to agricultural development projects 
are also comparable. In Burkina Faso and Niger, 
projects designed to bring degraded or new land 
under cultivation yielded returns ranging from 
20 to 147 percent depending on the location and 
natural resource management technique being 
applied. The global control and eradication of 
rinderpest is estimated to have generated returns 
ranging from 11 percent in Cote d’Ivoire to 118 
percent in Burkina Faso, while Operation Flood in 
India generated an estimated return of 45 percent.
These pros and cons mean that success in 
agricultural development requires careful consid-
eration of difficult trade-offs. While interventions 
that increase the availability, access, and quality 
of food are all desirable, the resources available to 
undertake these interventions are limited, suggest-
ing the need to weigh the benefits against costs in 
terms of economic and financial gains, environ-
mental impacts, and sociopolitical importance. But 
the repercussions of failing to invest in agricultural 
development are clear: continued and persistent 
hunger among the rural poor and food-insecure 
households. And the precipitous rise in global food 
prices and hunger in 2008 makes these repercus-
sions even more visible and urgent.
Looking ahead
Decisions have to be made on where, when, and 
how to invest in agricultural development. Without 
the Green Revolution, millions of households in 
Asia would still be facing the threat of hunger and 
famine today. Without hybrid maize in East and 
Southern Africa, hybrid millet and sorghum in the 
arid and semiarid tropics of India, or improved 
cassava varieties in Ghana and Nigeria, food-
insecure farm households and consumers would 
have far fewer opportunities—and less food and 
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income—than they have today. Similarly, without 
policy changes that strengthened the market 
incentives facing Chinese farmers or that improved 
the availability of seed and fertilizer to Kenyan 
farmers, agriculture in these countries might have 
been far less productive, and far less sustainable as 
a livelihood, than it is today. 
Progress in feeding the world’s millions has 
slowed, while the challenge of feeding its future 
millions remains enormous and subject to new 
uncertainties in the global food and agricultural 
system. Rapid degradation of the world’s natural 
resource base, changes in rainfall and moisture 
availability due to global climate change, and 
volatility associated with closely integrated inter-
national markets suggest that learning from 
successes in agricultural development is now more 
urgent than ever. 
Ultimately, the essentials remain unchanged: 
increasing the production of, access to, and quality 
of food to end hunger and feed millions. All of the 
lessons learned here must be applied and adapted 
for the future, but with a greater sense of urgency 
and commitment.  n18  
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W
heat, one of the world’s staple food 
crops, is under constant attack 
in farmers’ fields from diseases, 
insects, and weeds. Rust diseases, 
which have plagued wheat since ancient times, are 
among the most destructive plant pathogens in the 
world, especially to cereals. 
Rust was found on specimens of wheat from 
the Late Bronze Age, around 3300 BC, and ancient 
Romans described rust damage to their crops. In 
19th century Prussia, the losses for all cereal crops 
from rust diseases were estimated to be almost 
one-third of the total value of the crops.1 In India, 
estimated losses on occasion reached 50 percent 
or more, exceeding the losses from all other pests 
and diseases. Under epidemic conditions, they 
can cause crop losses of 60–100 percent, trigger 
famines, and even ruin whole economies.2   
During the past 50 years, an international 
effort to identify and breed wheat varieties that not 
only have high yields, but also are resistant to rust, 
has helped protect and improve wheat yields and 
feed millions. The success of the effort depended 
on a remarkable network of national and interna-
tional agricultural research centers, gene banks, 
and nursery programs, underpinned by a free and 
open worldwide system of exchanging information 
and plant genetic materials.   
The Threat to Wheat 
In 2003, wheat was consumed in 175 countries 
and met more than one-third of the minimum food 
requirements of the average adult. Wheat is a par-
ticularly important crop in many poor countries 
in terms of both production and consumption: in 
2007, farmers in 76 developing countries produced 
wheat, while consumers in 52 developing countries 
consumed more than 50 kilograms per capita.3   
Diseases are an ever-present threat to this 
essential crop, and rusts, a group of fungi species, 
are among the most virulent. Wheat is suscep-
tible to three types of rust: stem (black) rust, leaf 
(brown) rust, and stripe (yellow) rust. Although 
infection may occur on any part of the plant that 
is above ground, cereal rusts generally attack 
the stem and leaves and thus reduce yields. Rust 
disease has many stages, but its most obvious one 
is indicated by rust-colored spots that contain 
millions of infectious propagules, or spores of the 
fungus, that aid in the dispersal of the disease. 
Rust pathogens can produce billions of wind-borne 
spores that are then carried thousands of miles, 
and they have an excellent ability to vary through 
mutation or sexual reproduction; in this way, 
they overcome any resistance that a wheat variety 
might have. 
Although the frequency and severity of rust 
epidemics have been reduced with the widespread 
use of modern wheat varieties, losses can still be 
severe (see Table 2.1). Dozens of rust epidemics 
occurred in Africa and Asia between 1970 and 
1995.4 Notable ones include the Pakistan rust 
epidemic of 1977–78, which caused losses of more 
than 1 million metric tons; epidemics in India 
between 1970 and 1973, losses from which are 
valued at US$118–222 million; a wheat leaf rust 
epidemic in 1976–77 in a region of Mexico that 
was responsible for more than 70 percent of the 
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country’s wheat crop; and a stem rust epidemic in 
one part of Ethiopia in 1993–94 that contributed 
to severe food shortages for more than 300,000 
people.5 
In Pursuit of  
Rust-Resistant Wheat
In the summer of 1950, a virulent type of stem rust 
known as race 15B began to spread in the wheat 
fields of Mexico and the United States. Concern 
immediately arose in the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and similar agencies in 
Canada, Mexico, and several other Latin American 
countries. Representatives from these agencies 
held a conference in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 
November 1950 to address what they saw as a real 
threat to food security in the region.
Although countries had informally exchanged 
genetic materials for breeding wheat for years, 
during the St. Paul meeting participants decided 
to formalize the search for rust-resistant wheat 
varieties through an international nursery 
program—that is, they decided to collect a set of 
genetic materials from a variety of countries with 
the specific purpose of finding improved rust 
resistance. 
Initially seven countries—Argentina, 
Chile, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
and the United States—participated in the 
new International Spring Wheat Rust Nursery 
(ISWRN) program.6 Testing immediately got 
underway on a sizable scale: the ISWRN screened 
more than 1,000 wheat lines a year for rust 
resistance in each participating location, sharing 
germplasm (plant genetic material) and informa-
tion freely with all interested parties. The spread 
of stem rust race 15B culminated in a wheat rust 
epidemic in North America in 1953–54, but thanks 
to the rust-resistant varieties identified by the 
ISWRN and distributed to farmers, the disease 
was brought under control by the mid-1950s.
A great deal of the wheat-breeding work that 
contained the epidemic took place through the 
Mexico-Rockefeller Foundation International 
Agriculture Program, a leading center of wheat 
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Wheat infected with stem rust
Rust type
Yield losses in susceptible varieties Endemic areas 
as proportion 













Stem rust 40 Up to 100 50 7 Highlands of Kenya and 
Ethiopia; Parana State, Brazil; 
South India
Leaf rust 15–20 Up to 50 90 8 Mexico; India; Pakistan; 
Bangladesh; China
Stripe rust 40 Up to 100 33 18 Highlands of South America 
and East Africa; North Africa; 
Middle East; Indo-Gangetic 
Plains of India and Pakistan
Source: Adapted from Hanson, H., N. E. Borlaug, and R. G. Anderson. 1982. Wheat in the Third World. Boulder, Colo., U.S.A.: Westview 
Press; Saari, E.E., and J.M. Prescott. 1985. World distribution in relation to economic losses. In The cereal rusts, vol. II, Diseases, distribu-
tion, epidemiology, and control, ed. A.P. Roelfs and W.R. Bushnell. Orlando: Academic Press.
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research (see box above) led by plant breeder 
Norman Borlaug. It was here that Borlaug and 
his team developed new breeding techniques 
that helped bring about rapid advances in wheat 
breeding. 
In the mid-1940s, for example, Borlaug 
realized that Mexico’s traditional wheat-growing 
highland areas could not produce enough wheat to 
make the country self-sufficient in wheat produc-
tion. Scientists at the Mexico-Rockefeller program 
looked to areas of northern Mexico where irriga-
tion systems were being used—such as the Yaqui 
Valley in the state of Sonora—to accelerate the 
breeding process with a system called shuttle 
breeding. They planted test crops in May in the 
highlands around Mexico City and harvested the 
wheat in October. Then in November they planted 
the crops in the Yaqui Valley and harvested the 
wheat in April. Despite the prevailing dogma of  
the time that said shuttle breeding could not work, 
the technique succeeded. By allowing scientists 
to grow two crops a year, shuttle breeding cut the 
time required to breed rust-resistant varieties in 
half, from 10–12 years to 5–6 years. With the use 
of shuttle breeding, promising varieties were made 
more rapidly available to wheat farmers than was 
previously thought possible. As a result, when race 
15B became epidemic in North America, it was 
conquered within a few short years, mitigating a 
true food crisis. 
However, the story did not end here. Genetic 
resistance to wheat rust can take one of two 
main forms: race-specific resistance, which 
generally does not last long, and non-race-specific 
resistance, which is longer lasting or durable. 
Rust can overcome specific resistance in about 
5–6 years, causing boom and bust cycles in wheat 
production.7 This unpredictability accelerated 
the search for more long-lasting, non-race-
specific resistance. Under the Mexico-Rockefeller 
program, researchers used materials from the 
United States, Kenya, and South America, where 
resistant varieties were known to exist. During the 
1970s, scientists were able to release new varieties 
with non-race-specific resistance in Mexico that 
soon spread to other countries.
Rust resistance was only one of the charac-
teristics that scientists were pursuing in their 
wheat-breeding efforts. Once plant scientists in 
the Mexico-Rockefeller program released the new 
rust-resistant varieties of wheat, they continued to 
look for ways to produce better yields. They found 
The	Mexico-Rockefeller	program	was	an	international	agricultural	development	program	founded	in	1943	to	help	
Mexico increase food production. Under the leadership of Norman Borlaug, the wheat program began employing 
















became the hallmark of this international network of centers.
The Birth of the International Agricultural Research Systemthat with good soil fertility and irrigation, tall wheat 
varieties fell down under the weight of their heavy 
grains. Borlaug had heard about dwarf wheat being 
developed at Washington State University and 
the USDA using Japanese materials and thought 
it a good approach for the growing conditions in 
northern Mexico. In the 1960s, Borlaug and his 
team released new high-yielding, semi-dwarf wheat 
varieties that were short and sturdy enough to 
hold up their grains. Several varieties were sent to 
India and Pakistan, where they launched the Green 
Revolution (see Chapter 3). These modern, high-
yielding, semi-dwarf varieties were the vehicle for 
delivering improved rust resistance to farmers, 
and they were widely and rapidly adopted. By 
2002, nearly 95 percent of the developing world’s 
wheat was planted with modern varieties.8
Worldwide Benefits for 
Wheat Farmers and 
Consumers
As wheat is one of the world’s most significant 
crops—with total production in 2005 of 607 million 
metric tons—the benefits of wheat rust resistance 
have also been global in scale.9
About half of the world’s population living 
in poverty is located in the large irrigated areas 
of South Asia alone; these irrigated areas have 
received the overwhelming proportion of the 
benefits of rust resistance.10 Many of these 
farmers, as well as millions of others in developing 
countries, rely heavily on wheat for their liveli-
hoods and nutrition. For them, the benefits of rust 
resistance include higher yields, more stable yields, 
and better grain quality. 
Moreover, rust resistance inherently favors 
low-income and small-scale farmers, who are less 
able to use fungicides because they are unavailable 
or expensive in local markets. Indeed, evidence 
suggests that for every 1-percent increase in the 
productivity of wheat, the extent of poverty has 
been reduced by 0.5–1.0 percent.11 The availability 
of effective rust-resistant wheat varieties in devel-
oping countries, especially those with food deficits, 
has also reduced the need for food aid imports. 
One dimension of the benefits of modern semi-
dwarf varieties incorporating rust resistance is the 
gain in per capita calorie consumption in develop-
ing countries, and the reduction in the percentage 
of malnourished children. Researchers estimate 
that calorie consumption per capita in develop-
22  
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ing countries increased by about 13–14 percent 
between 1960 and 2000. That improvement led to 
corresponding gains in health and life expectancy, 
reducing the share of malnourished children by 
about 7 percent, or more than 30 million children.12 
Researchers have also attributed a wheat price 
reduction of 35–66 percent to the increased 
production resulting from semi-dwarf varieties.13 
If rust resistance was responsible for 30 percent 
of the increase in global wheat production from 
semi-dwarf varieties, then it has made a significant 
impact on both nutrition and lower food prices.14
Several studies have tried to put a dollar 
figure on the benefits of wheat rust resistance, 
but it is difficult to untangle its impact from the 
impact of modern, semi-dwarf varieties of wheat 
and the Green Revolution. One study estimates 
that the value of leaf rust resistance to developing 
countries is equivalent to $0.92 billion a year in 
2006 dollars.15 Another study estimates that the 
additional worldwide production resulting from 
international wheat-breeding research is equiva-
lent to $2.24–6.84 billion in 2006 dollars.16 Thus, 
if rust resistance accounts for 30 percent of the 
value of all wheat varieties, then the benefits of all 
rust resistance would be $0.67–2.05 billion a year. 
Similarly, it is difficult to determine the cost of 
rust resistance for developing countries as distinct 
from the cost of the rest of their breeding activi-
ties; however, it is estimated that the total cost for 
rust resistance is $59–98 million in 2006 dollars.17 
Because rust resistance is essentially embedded 
within high-yielding wheat seeds, the direct cost to 
farmers has been low.
Lessons Learned
The effort to breed rust-resistant wheat offers a 
number of important lessons. First, germplasm 
and information were exchanged openly and 
freely, and this spirit of collaboration informed the 
development of the international nursery system. 
Without the free exchange of germplasm and 
information, and the nursery system as the vehicle, 
the worldwide incorporation and distribution 
of durable rust resistance would likely not have 
happened.  
Second, the practice of testing wheat in 
multiple locations has broadened the gene pool 
of the wheat program. This approach began with 
shuttle breeding in Mexico and then expanded to 
testing in more than 100 sites around the world. 
Third, the training and development of young 
scientists was an important component of the 
effort. An undertaking this large requires many 
well-trained, field-oriented scientists.
Fourth, regional programs and partnerships 
played an important role. International staff 
members lived in the relevant regions and fre-
quently interacted with national staff members, 
who were consequently able to participate in 
selecting national and international germplasm.
Fifth, the wheat program kept a clear focus 
on food production, despite pressures to take on 
tangential activities.
Sixth, the long-lasting support of agricultural 
research in developing countries by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, which allowed many breeding 
programs to bear fruit, was another factor for 
success in wheat rust resistance. This long-term 
commitment was essential to achieving an impact 
in agricultural research and development. 
Fighting New Rust Diseases 
with Less Funding
Because rust continually evolves to overcome 
existing genetic resistance, no form of resistance 
lasts forever. Today, a new threat from wheat rust 
looms. In 1998, William Wagoire, a scientist in 
Uganda, found that rust-resistant wheat in the 
country had become susceptible to a new race 
of stem rust. This new race, known as Ug99, has 
now become endemic in Kenya and Ethiopia. In 
2005, an expert panel report declared Ug99 to 
be a threat to world wheat production because it 
was predicted to migrate to areas that produce 19 


















Spercent of the world’s wheat.18 Scientists are now 
testing new germplasm in many key areas, but 
the new race is mutating and spreading as feared. 
Wind currents or inadvertent transport may even-
tually carry Ug99 to North Africa, Europe, West 
Asia, China, Australia, and the Americas. 
A large effort is needed to achieve resistance 
to Ug99, but official international development 
support for agriculture has fallen drastically since 
1980. In addition, donor fatigue in funding agri-
cultural research has shifted funds for agricultural 
development away from work on breeding and rust 
resistance. Many national agricultural research 
systems have also let their systems for producing 
and distributing seeds deteriorate. 
Conclusion
The collaborative international effort that suc-
cessfully developed rust resistance in wheat had 
a tremendous impact on world food supplies. It 
is estimated that modern rust-resistant wheat 
varieties account for about 30 percent of the 
increase in wheat production worldwide, with 
consequent benefits for food production, poverty 
reduction, and food security. These varieties now 
account for 95 percent of the wheat in developing 
countries.
This impressive achievement came about 
through a system of extensive research based on 
free and open exchange of information and genetic 
material that was followed by a system for deliver-
ing rust-resistant, high-yielding wheat varieties to 
farmers. The lessons of this experience are criti-
cal as the world faces new threats from Ug99 and 
other evolving diseases.  n
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A
sia in the mid-1960s was on the brink of 
disaster. Hunger and malnutrition were  
  widespread after decades of neglected  
    food production compounded by rapid 
population growth. Back-to-back droughts in 
India, combined with similar episodes of food 
insecurity in neighboring countries, drew attention 
to the region’s potentially enormous food deficit. 
Western powers grew concerned that escalating 
hunger and poverty would lead to the spread of 
communism (or red revolution). The effort to 
increase food production that followed—the Green 
Revolution—is a crucial chapter in the story of 
agricultural development in the 20th century.
In response to repeated calls for action, the 
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations took the lead 
in creating an international agricultural research 
program to help adapt new agricultural technolo-
gies to conditions in developing countries. Work 
started with research on rice and wheat, two of 
the most important food crops for developing 
countries. The breeding of improved rice and 
wheat varieties, combined with the expanded use 
of fertilizers and other chemical inputs, irriga-
tion, and public policies that were supportive of 
agriculture, led to dramatic yield increases in Asia 
beginning in the late-1960s.1 Agricultural yields 
and output doubled over a period of only 25 years, 
from 1965 to 1990. 
The Green Revolution spread rapidly across 
Asia, and the resultant increases in food pro-
duction pulled the region back from the edge of 
famine. Within 25 years, the region was producing 
food surpluses. At the same time, the Green 
Revolution lifted many people out of poverty; 
made important contributions to economic 
growth; and saved large areas of forest, wetlands, 
and other fragile lands from conversion to 
cropping. This story focuses on the years 1965 to 
1985, a defining period for the Green Revolution in 
Asia, one that dramatically changed the fortunes of 
billions of people.
A Package Deal
The Green Revolution was, at its most basic level, 
the introduction of a package consisting of modern 
inputs—improved seeds, fertilizers, and pesti-
cides—that together dramatically increased crop 
production. Its implementation also depended, 
however, on strong public policies and invest-
ments in agricultural research and development, 
rural infrastructure such as irrigation and rural 
roads, credit provision to farmers, systems to 
supply the input packages, and price stabilization 
mechanisms. 
Attempts have been made to assess separately 
the contributions of the different components of 
the Green Revolution package, but in practice it 
was the powerful interactions among these indi-
vidual components that made the difference. Only 
with all of these components in place did farm-
ers—particularly small farmers—have the right 
economic incentive to adopt the new packages. 
Irrigation, fertilizer, and  
improved seeds
Asian countries had invested heavily in irrigation 
before the Green Revolution, and by 1970 around 
one quarter of the agricultural land was already 
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	 	 25irrigated. India had 10.4 million hectares of canal-
irrigated land in 1961 and 4.6 million hectares of 
tank-irrigated land.2 But the Green Revolution era 
brought large additional investments across Asia, 
and, between 1967 and 1982, irrigated area grew 
by 2.1 percent a year (see Figure 3.1). 
Like irrigation, fertilizer use across Asia 
was also growing before the Green Revolution. 
In 1970, Asian farmers applied an average of 
23.9 kilograms of plant nutrients per hectare 
of farmland. The Green Revolution, however, 
bumped fertilizer use way up. From 1967 to 1982, 
average use grew by a remarkable 10.75 percent a 
year (see Figure 3.1).
Irrigation and fertilizer helped raise cereal 
yields, but their full impact was only realized 
after the development of high-yielding varieties. 
Scientists sought to develop cereal varieties that 
were more responsive to plant nutrients and had 
shorter and stiffer straw that would not fall over 
under the weight of heavier heads of grain. They 
also wanted tropical rice varieties that could mature 
more quickly and grow at any time of the year, 
thereby permitting farmers to grow more crops 
each year on the same land. Varieties also needed 
to be resistant to major pests and diseases that 
flourish under intensive farming conditions and to 
retain desirable cooking and consumption traits. 
Borrowing from rice-breeding work under-
taken in China, Japan, and Taiwan, the fledgling 
International Rice Research Institute in the 
Philippines developed semi-dwarf varieties that 
met most of these requirements and that could 
be grown under a wide range of conditions. 
Similar achievements were made for wheat after 
Norman Borlaug (later awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize for his work) crossed Japanese semi-dwarf 
varieties with Mexican wheat varieties at what is 
now known as the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center in Mexico.
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Source: Rosegrant, M. W., and P. B. R. Hazell. 2000. Transforming the rural Asian economy: The unfinished revolution. Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press.
Figure 3.1—Growth of irrigation and fertilizer use during the Green Revolution  
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These high-yielding varieties that 
powered the Green Revolution were 
not developed overnight. Rather, 
they were the product of a long and 
sustained research effort. Moreover, 
many of the initial varieties that were 
released had to be constantly improved 
and adapted to meet the challenges 
posed by continually evolving pests, 
changing environmental conditions, 
and local consumer preferences. 
Nor were the high-yielding 
varieties limited to rice and wheat: 
high-yielding varieties have since been 
developed for a number of other major 
food crops important to developing 
countries, including sorghum, millet, 
maize, cassava, and beans. 
The adoption of high-yielding 
varieties occurred quickly (see Figure 
3.2), and by 1980 about 40 percent 
of the total cereal area in Asia was 
planted with modern varieties.3 By 
2000 this figure had increased to 
about 80 percent of the cropped area. 
Public investment  
and policy support
The Green Revolution was more than 
a technology fix. It was also the result 
of a supportive economic and policy 
environment. Farmers were educated 
about the new technology. Systems 
for delivering inputs and credit were 
rapidly expanded to allow farmers to 
adopt and profit from the technolo-
gies. Processing, storage, trade, and 
marketing capacities were ramped 
up to handle the surge in produc-
tion. Accomplishing these tasks was 
considered too large a challenge for 
the private sector on its own at the 
time, especially if small farmers were 
not to get left behind. So, to achieve 
these ends, governments across Asia 
actively intervened in launching and 
implementing the Green Revolution. 
Some—but not all—public inter-
ventions were market-mediated, 
and all were backed by substantial 
public investments in agricultural 
development. 
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Source: Gollin, D., M. Morris, and D. Byerlee. 2005. Technology adoption in 
intensive post-Green Revolution systems. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 87 (5): 1310–16.
Figure 3.2—Share of harvested area under 
modern varieties, 1965–200028	 	
The high levels of public investment necessary 
to launch and sustain the Green Revolution 
were impressively met. Asian countries not only 
invested heavily to launch their Green Revolution, 
but continued to invest in agriculture to sustain 
the gains that were achieved. On average, Asian 
countries were spending 15.4 percent of their 
total government spending on agriculture by 1972 
(about 7 percent of agricultural gross domestic 
product), and they doubled the real value of 
their agricultural expenditures by 1985.4 These 
sustained investment levels were particularly 
critical for agricultural research and development, 
where long lead times in developing new products 
and the continuously changing conditions facing 
farmers require long-term commitment. 
Governments also shored up farm credit 
systems, subsidized key inputs—especially fertil-
izer, power, and water—and intervened in markets 
to stabilize farmgate prices. Many governments 
used their interventions to ensure that small farms 
did not get left behind. Substantial evidence at 
the time showed that small farms were the most 
efficient producers in Asia, and land reform and 
small farm development programs were imple-
mented to create and support large numbers of 
small farms. Small-farm-led agricultural growth 
proved to be not only more efficient, but also more 
pro poor, a win–win proposition for growth and 
poverty reduction. The approach taken in India 
(see box below) is indicative of what happened in 
many other Asian countries.
A Boom in Food Production 
Average cereal yields grew impressively in Asia: 
wheat yields grew by 4.1 percent a year between 
1967 and 1982 and rice yields by 2.5 percent (see 
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Immediately after independence in 1947, the Indian government made agricultural development its top priority. 
Realizing that India would have to develop the physical and scientific infrastructure necessary to support modern 
agriculture, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his government poured resources into the effort, allocating 
31 percent of the country’s budget to agriculture and irrigation. Massive irrigation projects, power plants, state 
agricultural universities, national agricultural research systems, and fertilizer plants sprang up across India. These 
steps were accompanied by land reform designed to create a more equitable distribution of land.
In the mid-1960s, drought and population growth made India more dependent on U.S. food aid, despite its 
own agricultural potential. Following a study by the Ford Foundation in the early-1960s, the Indian government 
set up the Intensive Agricultural District Program to invest heavily in agricultural extension and distribution 
of subsidized inputs. The government also established the Food Corporation of India, which bought excess 
production at a guaranteed price in order to provide stability to farmers. The government also took an active role in 
coordinating interventions from donors and development partners, who financed agricultural extension as well as 
research and development. All of this came on top of India’s considerable existing infrastructure, including roads 
and irrigation systems—the Indian government coordinated interventions all along the market chain to enable the 
entire agricultural system to function. 
As a result, most rural small-scale farmers could profitably obtain and use inputs such as high-yield seeds, 
fertilizers, irrigation, and credit. Despite the heavy government involvement in the production, dissemination, 
and adoption of these inputs, the private sector also had a key role. The dual private and public marketing 
system actually helped improve the efficient distribution of inputs to farmers. The success of India’s Green 
Revolution arose from the combination of subsidized inputs, public investments in infrastructure (roads, power, 
and irrigation), research and extension, and, later, marketing policy interventions that assured farmers’ access to 
market outlets at stable prices.
Early breakthroughs in productivity were concentrated in Punjab and Haryana in northwestern India, which 
became breadbaskets for the entire subcontinent. This agricultural growth cut poverty in the Punjab region 
significantly, partly because land distribution was relatively equal and the benefits of agricultural productivity 
improvements reached a large share of the population. In neighboring states like Bihar, where the land system was 
more feudal, poverty reduction was more limited and growth slowed down sooner.
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Table 3.1). Higher yields and profitability also 
led farmers to increase the area of rice and wheat 
they grew at the expense of other crops. And with 
faster-growing varieties and irrigation, farmers 
grew more crops on their land each year. This 
change led to even faster growth in cereal produc-
tion. All these gains were achieved with negligible 
growth in the total area planted to cereal—just 
0.42 percent a year. 
On average, total Asian cereal production 
grew by 3.6 percent a year between 1967 and 1982, 
with average annual growth rates of 5.4 percent, 
3.3 percent, and 4.6 percent for wheat, rice, and 
maize, respectively (see Table 3.1). The growth 
rates were considerably higher in the breadbasket 
areas (such as Punjab and Haryana in India and 
Central Luzon in the Philippines) where the Green 
Revolution was launched. 
Thanks to this rapid growth, cereal production 
in Asia virtually doubled between 1970 and 1995, 
from 313 to 650 million tons per year. Although 
the population increased by 60 percent, food pro-
duction rose faster, with the result that cereal and 
calorie availability per person increased by nearly 
30 percent and wheat and rice became cheaper.5
Nutrition Improves,  
Poverty Declines
By increasing the supply of food and reducing 
prices of food staples in Asia, the Green Revolution 
benefited poor people’s nutrition. Higher yields 
typically led rural households in adopting regions 
to consume more calories and protein. One study, 
for example, found that over a 10-year period the 
spread of high-yielding rice in the North Arcot 
district of Tamil Nadu in southern India led 
farmers and landless workers to consume substan-
tially more energy and protein.6 About one-third 
of the calorie increase could be attributed to 
increased rice production.7 
Some evidence shows, however, that other 
nutritionally rich foods like fruits and vegetables 
have become more expensive as the price of cereals 
has fallen. A study of Bangladesh showed that a 
downward trend in the price of rice over the periods 
of 1973 to 1975 and 1994 to 1996 was accompanied 
by upward trends in the real prices of other foods 
that are richer in micronutrients, making these less 
accessible to the poor.8 As a result, micronutrient 
deficiencies are more common today than calorie 
and protein deficiencies.
Although the primary goal of the investments 
underlying the Green Revolution was to increase 
food production, evidence suggests that it also 
helped slash poverty. Reliable poverty data are not 
available for the early Green Revolution period, but 
in 1975 nearly three out of every five Asians still 
lived on less than US$1 a day. This share declined 
to less than one in three by 1995.9 The absolute 
number of poor people declined by 28 percent, from 
1,149 million in 1975 to 824 million in 1995. These 
reductions in poverty would have been even more 
impressive if the total population had not grown 
by 60 percent over the same period.10  The vast 
majority of the poor who were lifted out of poverty 
were rural and obtained at least part of their liveli-
hood from agriculture and allied activities.
The relationship between the Green Revolution 
and poverty alleviation is complex, and there are 
a number of pathways through which the Green 
Revolution benefited the poor. By allowing poor 
farmers to increase their own production, it directly 
provided them with more food and nutrients and 
increased the output they could sell to raise farm 
income. Small farmers and landless laborers gained 
additional agricultural employment opportunities 
and higher wages within adopting regions. The 
Green Revolution also benefited the poor in less 
direct ways. Soaring agricultural growth in the 
Green Revolution regions created jobs for migrant 
workers from other regions. It also indirectly 
stimulated growth in the nonfarm sector of the 
economy, both rural and urban, benefiting a wide 
range of rural and urban poor people. Also, greater 
food production led to lower food prices for all 
types of poor people. 
Crop Area Yield Production
Wheat 1.30 4.07 5.43
Maize 1.09 3.48 4.62
Rice 0.70 2.54 3.25
Other grains -1.76 1.63 -0.15
All cereals 0.42 3.13 3.57
Source: Rosegrant, M. W., and P. B. R. Hazell. 2000. Transforming 
the rural Asian economy: The unfinished revolution. Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press.
Table 3.1—Annual growth rates in 
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Environmental Challenges
Cereal yields have continued to rise on average 
across Asia since the Green Revolution era, but 
annual growth rates are slowing. There are several 
possible reasons for this slowdown: displacement 
of cereals from better farmlands by more profit-
able crops like groundnuts; diminishing returns to 
modern varieties when irrigation and fertilizer use 
are already at high levels; and the fact that cereal 
prices have until recently been low relative to input 
costs, making additional intensification less profit-
able. But there are concerns that the slowdown 
also reflects a deteriorating crop-growing environ-
ment, and this is supported by growing evidence 
on the degradation of soils and build up of toxins 
in intensive paddy systems. 
Broader worries have also arisen about 
the environmental sustainability of the Green 
Revolution. These wider issues include excessive 
and inappropriate use of fertilizers and pesticides 
that pollute waterways and kill beneficial insects 
and other wildlife; irrigation practices that lead to 
salt buildup and eventual abandonment of some of 
the best farming lands; increasing water scarcities 
in major river basins; and retreating groundwater 
levels in areas where more water is being pumped 
for irrigation than can be replenished by the rains. 
Environmental concerns have led to new 
research and a wider array of more sustainable 
technologies and farming practices. A number 
of approaches are now being tried to make 
intensive Green Revolution farming sustainable. 
More careful and efficient management of soil 
nutrients, including new ways of applying fertil-
izer, can increase the efficiency of fertilizer use, 
thereby reducing production costs and environ-
mental problems. Low- or zero-tillage farming 
can save labor, fertilizer, and energy, minimize 
planting delays between crops, conserve soil, 
reduce irrigation water needs, increase tolerance 
to drought, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Researchers have shown the potential for raising 
yields in irrigated farming while saving substan-
tially on water use. Integrated pest management 
combines pest-resistant crop varieties, natural 
pest control mechanisms, and the judicious use 
of some pesticides to give farmers significant cost 
savings on pesticides and improve farmers’ health. 
Still, far too few farmers use these more sustain-
able technologies and farming practices. Reasons 
include the high levels of knowledge required for 
their practice; problematic incentives caused by 
input subsidies; labor constraints and insecure 
property rights; difficulties of organizing collective 
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action; and preverse incentives that arise when 
most of the environmental damage occurs off-site. 
These constraints require more calibrated policy 
responses, and developing these remains a major 
challenge for the future management of Green 
Revolution areas.
Lessons of the Asian  
Green Revolution 
The Green Revolution was a continuing process 
of change rather than a single event, and even 
today scientists and farmers are constantly making 
improvements to cereal varieties and management 
practices to help support and advance high levels 
of productivity. Several important lessons can be 
drawn from this dramatic period of history.
First, technological barriers to expanded food 
production among small and large farmers in 
developing countries can be alleviated. Second, 
green revolutions do not just happen, but require 
considerable and sustained nurturing by the state. 
Third, green revolutions are not necessarily pro 
poor or environmentally benign, and achieving 
favorable outcomes requires appropriate support-
ing government policies. 
Overcoming technological barriers 
to food production
Asia was able to break out of its food production 
constraint by bringing the force of the 20th-century 
scientific revolution in agriculture to its farmers. 
Governments and their international partners 
invested heavily in agricultural research and 
development, irrigation, and fertilizer supplies, and 
farmers made major changes to their traditional 
and well-honed farming systems. The switch from 
low-input/low-output farming to high-input/high-
output farming was not without its critics, but it 
sufficed to provide the needed productivity break-
throughs that had otherwise failed to materialize. 
The initial Green Revolution technology package 
worked best for wheat and rice in the best-irrigated 
areas, but within 10 to 15 years the technologies 
had evolved to accommodate the challenges of 
many poorer regions growing a wider range of food 
crops under less-assured irrigation conditions. 
Making green revolutions happen
Market forces alone are insufficient for launching 
green revolutions. Asia’s Green Revolution was not 
a single intervention or a silver bullet, but a set of 
initiatives and preconditions that came together to 
ensure that farms of all sizes could participate in 
a fully functional market chain. These lessons can 
usefully be divided into a number of preconditions 
that existed (or were established) and a series of 
interventions that were implemented to create an 
enabling and sustained economic environment.
First, if farmers are to adopt Green Revolution 
technologies, they need access to a holistic package 
of affordable inputs (fertilizer, improved seed, 
pesticides, and irrigation water), seasonal credit 
to buy them each season, and assured access to 
markets at stable prices. A green revolution takes 
off only if all these things come together in an inte-
grated way. Achieving these preconditions requires 
critical accumulated levels of investment in 
agricultural research and development, extension, 
roads, irrigation, power, and other infrastructure, 
as well as effective public and private institutions 
that serve agriculture. In Asia, these things were 
built up over several decades in an integrated 
way—guided by national agricultural develop-
ment plans—and were already advanced before the 
Green Revolution.
Second, an enabling economic environment is 
needed. Although Asian countries discriminated 
against agriculture in their macroeconomic, tax, 
and industrial sector policies, they offset many of 
these biases by subsidizing inputs and adopting 
price support policies for farmers. The net result 
was that farmers found it profitable to adopt Green 
Revolution technologies. Moreover, although the 
Asian Green Revolution was initiated and driven 
by governments, the private sector was given an 
important role, and this helped reduce marketing 
inefficiencies and corruption.
Third, Asian countries not only invested 
heavily to launch the Green Revolution, but 
continued to invest in agriculture to sustain the 
gains that were achieved. 
Making green revolutions pro poor
Green revolutions need to be led by small farmers 
to be pro poor, but this does not automatically 
happen without supportive government policies. 
In Asia, the conditions under which the Green 
Revolution proved pro poor included (1) a tech-
nology package that could be profitably adopted 
on farms of all sizes; (2) an equitable distribution 
of land with secure property rights; (3) modern 
input and credit systems that served small farms at 32	 	
prices they could afford; and (4) product markets 
and price support policies that ensured small 
farms received stable and fair prices. Meeting 
these requirements typically required proactive 
efforts by governments in the form of land 
reforms, small farm development programs, and 
input and credit subsidies. 
Making green revolutions 
environmentally sustainable
Too often, green revolutions have led to environ-
mental problems that impose high off-site costs 
and undermine the long-term sustainability of 
the farming system. Deficient management of 
modern inputs is the primary cause—a problem 
exacerbated by inadequate extension and training, 
ineffective regulation of water quality, and input 
pricing and subsidy policies that made modern 
inputs too cheap and encouraged excessive use. 
More intensive agriculture is not necessar-
ily inconsistent with good management of the 
environment—technologies like precision farming, 
integrated pest management, and improved water 
management practices can increase yields even 
while reducing water and chemical use. Reforming 
policies and institutions so they give farmers 
incentives to manage inputs sustainably rather 
than unsustainably remains an unfinished agenda.
Conclusion
In spite of the limitations and criticisms of the 
Green Revolution, its success in heading off 
famine in Asia and ensuring the region’s long-term 
food security is undeniable. The increases in food 
production pulled the region back from the edge 
of famine. Over the course of 25 years, the region 
went from suffering food deficits that threatened 
the lives of millions to producing more food than 
it could consume. The Asian Green Revolution 
lifted many people out of poverty, jump-started 
economic growth, and saved large areas of forest, 
wetlands, and other fragile lands from conver-
sion to cropland. In short, the investments and 
policies that underpinned the Green Revolution 
were highly successful in achieving the objectives 
of the time. They are a testament to the vision and 
determination of the many farmers, scientists, and 
policymakers worldwide who made this “revolu-
tion” a reality.  n
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aize is the world’s most widely grown 
cereal, cultivated in the tropics and 
in temperate zones, at high and low 
altitudes, in dry climates and wet 
ones, on slopes and fields, and in a range of soil 
types. Large-scale commercial farmers grow it 
using equipment worth hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, while poor farmers with small plots, such 
as those in East and Southern Africa, grow it using 
little more than a hoe. Given maize’s enormous 
versatility and popularity, when scientists in 
East and Southern Africa were able to develop 
more productive maize seeds through innovative 
breeding programs, their success translated into 
better livelihoods for millions of farm households.
This story begins on the eve of independence 
for Kenya, and several decades before the indepen-
dence of Zimbabwe, with colonial maize-breeding 
programs geared primarily to the needs of 
European settler-farmers. In Kenya, the products 
of these early scientific efforts were as promising 
as the hybrids that swept across midwestern 
farmlands in the United States beginning in the 
1930s. They served as the basis for generations of 
new maize hybrids and other improved varieties 
that spread rapidly among smallholders in newly 
formed African states from 1965 to 1990. With the 
spread of modern maize, farmers’ yields multi-
plied several-fold and contributed significantly to 
improving food production and food security in 
the region. The experiences of four countries in the 
region—Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—
demonstrate just how influential improved maize 
and maize breeding were during this period in 
history.
A New World Import
Maize arrived in Africa relatively recently. During 
the 1500s, traders introduced maize and cas-
sava—New World crops—into Africa, where they 
supplemented indigenous staples like sorghum, 
millet, and yams. Initially, most African farmers 
adopted maize as a niche crop tucked in their 
already complex farming systems. But because 
maize was so well suited to growing conditions in 
the region, by the end of the 19th century it had 
become widely cultivated as a secondary food crop.
Between 1900 and 1965, maize pushed aside 
other crops to become the dominant food crop in 
Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Between 
2000 and 2005, maize covered more than three-
quarters of the land under cereal cultivation in the 
four countries, and most of the maize being grown 
consisted of modern (improved) varieties (see 
Table 4.1). 
The initial spread of maize during the colonial 
era is attributed to several factors. First, it could 
be grown by newly arrived European settlers—who 
were novices at farming in the tropics—because it 
required less capital and technical skill than cotton 
and tobacco. Second, it could yield higher returns 
than indigenous cereals and was both easier to 
process and more marketable, particularly as an 
export to the British starch market. Third, maize 
became a form of in-kind wage payment for 
African workers who left their farms to work on 
settler-owned farms, mines, and industrial plants, 
particularly in Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. 
As a result of this close link between maize, 
European settlers, and colonial governments 
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in the region, state-directed marketing systems 
emerged that tied grain marketing to the delivery 
of seeds, fertilizer, and credit on beneficial terms 
for settler farmers. Yet in spite of this system, 
which favored settlers over indigenous farmers, 
maize cultivation still managed to spread rapidly 
among smallholders. Following independence, as 
newly independent governments tried to support 
smallholder farmers, maize was elevated to the 
center of the “social contract” between these 
new states and their 
citizens. Maize thus 
became the corner-
stone of the modern 
states of Kenya, 
Malawi, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe.1
Scientific Achievements in 
Maize Improvement
The investments in maize research made by 
colonial governments and settlers, and eventually 
by independent governments, radically trans-
formed maize production in the region from the 
1930s through about 1990. A major element of this 
success story was the introduction of maize hybrids 
in East and Southern Africa. Maize hybridization, 
first demonstrated by scientists in the United States 
in 1918, is a process in which inbred parent lines of 
maize are crossed to create seeds with greater yield 
potential than either parent, an outcome known as 
“hybrid vigor” (see box next page).2 The downside is 
that this vigor tends to decline with each successive 
generation of seed saved and replanted by farmers. 
To realize the full gains conferred by hybridization, 
farmers need to purchase new seed each season.
Zimbabwe’s maize breeders were the first 
outside the United States to produce double-cross 
hybrids for commercial use (see box), releasing a 
hybrid called Southern Rhodesia-1 (SR-1) in 1949. 
In 1960, the maize-breeding program released the 
first commercially grown single-cross hybrid in 
the world, SR-52, which boasted a greater yield 
advantage and greater uniformity despite seeds 
that were more costly to produce. SR-52 spread 
rapidly and widely among commercial farmers, 
becoming one of the most popular hybrids in the 
region and a parent of many others. Farmers who 
grew SR-52 seed using fertilizer and improved 
agronomic practices increased their yields by 46 
percent more than yields from the most common 
improved local variety.3 
Following independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s 
maize breeders continued to chalk up successes. 
Independence saw the rapid adoption of R200, 
R201, and R215—fast-growing maize hybrids 
that were originally bred for European settlers 
seeking to diversify from tobacco exports; they also 
provided smallholders with maize seed suitable 
for cultivation in sandy soils in low-rainfall areas. 
Although these hybrids were all three-way crosses, 
which are generally intended for the annual 
seed purchase and high levels of management 
typically associated with large-scale commercial 
farmers, they still performed well for smallhold-
ers who could only afford relatively low levels of 
management.
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used in human 
consumption
Kenya 2,597 79 86 96
Malawi 1,770 95 121 79
Zambia 868 82 86 94
Zimbabwe 1,076 80 89 72
Note: Consumption data refer to 1997–99. All other data are averages for the period 2000–05.   
Source: Aquino, P., F. Carrion, R. Calvo, and D. Flores. 2001. Selected maize statistics: Part 4. In Meeting world maize needs: Technologi-
cal opportunities and priorities for the public sector, ed. P. L. Pingali. Mexico City: International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center; FAO 
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2009. FAOSTAT statistical database. Rome.
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Maize	is	predominantly	a	cross-	or	open-pollinating	crop	rather	than	a	self-pollinating	crop	like	rice.	In	cross	
pollination,	genetic	material	is	exchanged	as	pollen	flows	among	neighboring	plants.	Unless	cross-pollination	is	
carefully controlled, the progeny resulting from it in a given field will differ from the preceding generation—and 
from	each	other—in	terms	of	yield,	size,	shape,	and	other	characteristics.
When maize does self-pollinate, its progeny often have undesirable traits. This is called inbreeding, and after 
successive generations, it leads to weakened plants called inbred lines. These inbred lines produce small plants, have 
small cobs, and result in lower yields. 
By	interbreeding	or	crossing	different	varieties	of	maize,	breeders	can	create	“modern”	maize	that	overcomes	
some of the disadvantages of unimproved and inbred varieties. When two inbred lines are crossed, for example, 
the	progeny’s	yield	can	be	significantly	greater	than	their	parents’	yield.	This	“hybrid	vigor”	results	from	the	
interaction between the sets of genes in the two different inbred lines. The effect of some of the harmful genes 
expressed	in	one	of	the	inbred	lines	is	masked	by	more	beneficial	ones	found	in	the	other	parent	plant.	Maize	













operations, such as harvesting, at the same time.
•	The	uniformity	of	the	grain	harvested	from	hybrids	can	have	marketing	advantages	when	sold	to	buyers	










Source: Authors; Morris, M. L. 1998. Maize in the developing world: Waiting for a Green Revolution. In Maize seed industries in develop-
ing countries, ed. M. L. Morris. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
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These breeding successes in Zimbabwe 
spread rapidly to neighboring Zambia, where 
studies suggest that they doubled commercial 
farmers’ yields from 1.3 metric tons per hectare 
between 1949 and 1953 to 2.7 tons per hectare 
between 1959 and 1963.4 Following independence 
in 1964, Zambia’s maize breeders introduced an 
impressive array of both hybrids and improved 
open-pollinated varieties. Farmers found that 
these hybrids out-yielded most other available 
varieties, even without fertilizer, in all but the most 
difficult growing environments. They also had 
other advantages: unlike the single cross SR-52, 
these double- and three-way crosses lost little 
yield advantage when farmers saved and replanted 
seeds from one season to the next. Meanwhile, the 
improved open-pollinated varieties offered their 
own distinct advantages to smallholders—ears of 
these early-maturing, drought-tolerant varieties 
could be consumed green as a source of food during 
the hungry period preceding harvest. 
Kenya’s maize breeders were also successful in 
breeding improved maize that eventually spread to 
its large smallholder population. Kenya’s program 
began in 1955 in Kitale, the center of maize pro-
duction in the highlands, which were then heavily 
populated by European settlers. In 1961, the 
program released an improved, open-pollinated 
maize variety called Kitale Synthetic II. 
After crossing Kitale Synthetic II with dozens of 
germplasm samples collected from Latin America, 
Kenya’s maize scientists released their first varietal 
hybrid—Hybrid 611, made from Kitale Synthetic II 
and Ecuador 573. This hybrid became the basis of 
all subsequent hybrids developed by the national 
breeding program.5 The yield advantage of Hybrid 
611 over Kitale Synthetic II was 40 percent, with 
the added advantage of having lower seed costs 
than conventional hybrids and less loss of yield 
advantages when replanted in successive seasons, 
Hybrid 611 diffused among large- and small-scale 
farmers in the high-potential areas of western 
Kenya at rates comparable to those in the U.S. Corn 
Belt during the 1930s and 1940s.6
Malawian smallholders waited much longer 
for suitable hybrids, for two main reasons. First, 
Malawi, unlike Zimbabwe or Kenya, did not have a 
large settler population with an interest in high-
yielding maize or the political clout to establish 
a research system. Unlike Zambia, Malawi had 
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no rich mineral deposits with dense urban popu-
lations to feed. Malawi’s real maize research 
clients have always been smallholder farmers, 
the majority of whom lacked the formal organiza-
tion and supporting institutions to articulate their 
needs. These farmers preferred flint maize types 
that processed and stored well on their farms. 
Second, regional breeding efforts were too focused 
on dent maize types, and flint breeding materials 
from outside Malawi were not easy to identify. 
This supply problem was compounded by staffing 
and funding discontinuities in the national maize 
breeding programs, and shifting emphasis between 
efforts to breed hybrids as compared to improved, 
open-pollinated varieties.  
Malawi’s first semi-flint hybrids were released 
in 1990—top-crosses of Malawian lines derived 
from SR52 and a flint population from the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center. They had several features small farmers 
were looking for.7 Most important was that they 
satisfied smallholder demand for the flint maize 
types that processed and stored well on farms.8 
Also important, given the high cost of fertilizer, was 
the fact that the hybrids grown without fertilizer 
still yielded more than local maize grown without 
it, even during the severe droughts that occurred 
in Malawi during the early-1990s. In particular, 
MH18 was an early-maturing variety that was more 
likely to “escape” drought. As top-cross hybrids, 
they were more likely to retain some of their yield 
advantage when seed was saved for a season. 
The Rapid Spread of 
Improved Maize
The episodes of success in maize production in 
the four countries overlapped somewhat, but 
they varied because of the different conditions 
and policies within each country. These growth 
episodes were from 1965 to 1980 in Kenya, 1970 to 
1989 in Zambia, 1980 to 1989 in Zimbabwe, and 
1983 to 1993 in Malawi.
During these episodes, yields began a steady 
advance, and overall maize production surged in 
the four countries at rates that compare respect-
ably with yield and production growth rates in 
countries such as the United States (see Table 4.2). 
The share of smallholder farmers growing hybrid 
maize rose to 43 percent in Malawi, 65 percent 
in Zambia, and 87 percent in Kenya. It jumped 





























Kenya, 1965–80 1.44 3.30
Malawi, 1983–93 1.18 3.10
Zambia, 1970–89 4.92 1.85
Zimbabwe, 1980–89 2.21 1.77
Source: FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2009. FAOSTAT statistical database. Rome.
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Zimbabwe, while total smallholder maize produc-
tion tripled between 1980 and 1988. 
In each country, the growth in maize yields 
and production was accompanied by the expansion 
of state marketing infrastructure to smallholder 
areas, making it easier for government agencies 
to distribute credit and subsidized inputs like 
seed and fertilizer, purchase smallholder maize 
surpluses, and collect loan repayments. Parastatal 
marketing boards would supply farmers with 
maize seed and fertilizer on credit then buy the 
resulting maize harvest from farmers at a fixed, 
nationwide price, subtracting the cost of any loans. 
Malawi’s Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation, for example, assumed total responsi-
bility for delivering inputs like seeds and fertilizer 
to farmers, marketing maize output, maintaining 
storage facilities, stabilizing maize prices, and 
transporting maize into food-deficit areas during 
the hungry season. 
In addition, farmers could obtain credit and 
inputs for growing maize at reduced rates, thanks 
to government subsidies. For example, Zambian 
fertilizer subsidies in 1982 averaged 60 percent of 
the cost of the fertilizer itself, cutting the cost to 
farmers by more than half.9 
These state interventions generally benefited 
smallholders during this 25-year period. On the 
production side, even when the full costs of seed 
and fertilizer were taken into account, small 
farmers growing maize hybrids could earn returns 
on their land and labor that were nearly twice as 
much as what they could earn for the local seed 
varieties cultivated without fertilizer. On the 
marketing side, smallholders in even the remotest 
areas profited from policies that set a single 
purchase price for maize across the entire country. 
Yet the effectiveness of the marketing and 
input credit policies in promoting maize produc-
tion growth contained the seeds of their own 
demise. Treasury costs ballooned as small farmers 
produced more maize than the country could 
consume and massive stocks accumulated in state 
warehouses or were exported at a loss. In some 
cases these costs accounted for 15 percent or more 
of total government spending and contributed 
to macroeconomic instability; hence, the maize 
support prices offered by the marketing boards 
could not be sustained. As support prices were 
reduced or withdrawn in many areas farmers 
opted to sell their grain in illegal parallel markets. 
The rise of parallel markets also enabled farmers 
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to avoid repaying the loans they had taken out to 
buy inputs. These policies eventually led to fiscal 
crisis and, in some cases, hyperinflation. The 
maize-breeding programs literally helped to feed 
millions while also providing a source of income 
for many smallholder farmers in the region, but 
the package of policies that accompanied them 
could not be sustained in the long term.10
Ingredients for Success
The main ingredient in each country’s episode of 
success was an innovative breeding program that 
produced high-quality materials needed to provide 
smallholders with modern maize. In Kenya, 
success was partly attributable to the continuity 
of the breeding program’s staff and leadership, 
and to the fact that the program actually consisted 
of four separate research stations—one for each 
of the nation’s agroclimatic zones—that released 
a succession of improved maize varieties suited 
to each zone. Moreover, the program was backed 
by consistent and constructive support from aid 
donors: during these initial years, the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) facilitated the 
exchange of germplasm between continents as well 
as the sharing of new research on hybrid genetics. 
Similarly, Zimbabwe’s program succeeded because 
of its dedicated (and well-paid) scientists who 
devoted their entire careers to maize research, 
with the added advantage of being backed by the 
revenues earned and contributed by commercial 
farmers. 
But good breeding programs are just some 
of the factors that contributed to the growth 
and spread of modern maize in Kenya, Malawi, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. All four countries also 
made complementary investments in agronomic 
research, extension, seed distribution systems, 
and rural infrastructure, and all four countries 
also operated institutions to coordinate grain 
marketing with seed, fertilizer, and credit delivery. 
In short, these four countries recognized that 
smallholder agriculture was an integrated system 
and, accordingly, they invested heavily in many 
different ways to promote modern maize as a 
means of boosting maize yields and production.
The Kenya Maize Research Program, for 
example, was backed by a larger national maize 
program that included a dense transport network, 
marketing boards, preferential pricing policies 
for farmers, extension services, and a national 
seed company. Modern maize spread throughout 
Kenya as a result of thousands of farming dem-
onstrations carried out by extension agents, seed 
sales and credit disbursements managed by rural 
seed stockists, and a supportive policy regime (see 
Chapter 14). 
In Zimbabwe, the government also supported 
smallholder maize cultivation through input 
delivery, credit, and marketing programs that 
had previously served only large-scale European 
settlers. One of the hallmarks of Zimbabwe’s 
success story was the Seed Maize Cooperative—
known in the colonial era as the Seed Maize 
Association of Southern Rhodesia—that was 
designed as an autonomous body to transfer 
monitoring and inspection costs from the govern-
ment to its maize-producing members, arrange tax 
breaks, secure exclusive commercial rights over 
the sale of some seed types, and provide access 
to subsidized credit. As a result of these interven-
tions, credit allocated to smallholders between 
1979 and 1986 rose eightfold, stimulating fertil-
izer use, increasing maize yields, and encouraging 
the growth of private investment in input supply. 
As mentioned above, however, the model could 
not be financially sustained. By the late-1980s, 


























the government had dramatically scaled back 
credit disbursement and marketing board collec-
tion points, reduced the real prices offered by the 
marketing board, and faced pressure to legalize 
parallel private markets. 
In Malawi, several factors other than modern 
maize contributed to small farmers’ rapid adoption 
of maize from the mid-1980s until 1993. During 
the late-1980s farmers could get hybrid seed and 
fertilizer at favorable prices. At the same time, 
improvements were being made in the marketing 
and distribution of high-quality commercial 
seed.11 These improvements began in 1978 when 
the National Seed Company of Malawi (NSCM) 
took responsibility from Malawi’s Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation for 
producing, procuring, and marketing improved 
maize seed. In 1988 Cargill, a multinational 
company, acquired most of the NSCM’s equity 
and began aggressively producing, procuring, and 
marketing seeds in Malawi. 
Lessons from East  
and Southern Africa’s  
Maize Programs
Despite the spread of modern maize among small-
holders in East and Southern Africa immediately 
following independence, the growth in maize yields 
and production has slowed since about 1990. 
Unstable weather in the 1990s is much to blame, 
but the withdrawal of state subsidies and market 
support in all four countries has also shifted culti-
vated area from maize to other crops, with unclear 
effects on total agricultural growth. Ultimately, the 
fiscal burden associated with state-led marketing 
and credit policies rendered these systems unsus-
tainable. Subsequent efforts to liberalize the maize 
sector and maize seed industry in the region 
have been uneven, erratic, and often ensnared by 
populist political pressures, leaving national seed 
research systems chronically underfunded and 
creating uncertainties that discourage investment 
throughout the maize production chain.
Conclusion
In spite of the shortcomings and occasional criti-
cisms that accompanied the growth and spread 
of maize in East and Southern Africa, there is 
little doubt that the period from 1965 to 1990 
represents a success story in agricultural develop-
ment. A combination of factors—primarily the 
sustained investment in research and develop-
ment, dedicated scientists, and supportive public 
policies—all contributed to maize-driven improve-
ments in rural livelihoods and national food 
security in the region.  n 
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assava has long played an important role 
in ensuring food security, particularly 
among the poor. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where food security is a concern for 
many, about 95 percent of the cassava produced 
is used for human consumption. It was initially 
adopted by farmers as a famine reserve crop 
because it provided a reliable source of food during 
drought, locust attack, and during the “hungry 
season,” the period before seasonal food crops are 
ready for harvest.1 Cassava appeals to millions of 
rural and urban households because it is a cheap 
source of calories. More generally, cassava is also 
appealing because it is useful as a livestock feed 
and industrial starch.
Cassava is largely taken for granted today, yet 
in the 1960s and 1970s it was under severe threat 
from the twin occurrences of the mosaic virus 
disease and the mealybug pest. The International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria 
led a global research effort to combat these two 
problems. The two interventions resulting from 
this research were resoundingly successful and 
have revitalized cassava production, which has 
nearly tripled from 33 million tons per year in 
the early-1960s to 90 million tons per year in the 
early-2000s.2 Those additional 1.4 million tons per 
year are enough to feed 29 million people.3 
While the food benefits alone are notewor-
thy, these interventions have had an additional 
unanticipated impact: they have contributed to 
overcoming the generations-old perception that 
cassava is only valuable in Sub-Saharan Africa 
as an inexpensive calorie source for the poor and 
as an emergency crop in case of famine or other 
food crises. With sharply declining prices that 
accompanied cassava’s production boom, the 
commensurate uptick in demand for cassava has 
broadened its appeal as a cash crop, providing an 
additional source of revenue to producers, espe-
cially via sales in urban centers. This dramatic 
shift in production can be attributed in large part 
to interventions that controlled the mosaic virus 
and the mealybug.
A Cassava Primer
Cassava, also commonly known as yucca, manioc, 
or tapioca, is a perennial shrub from South 
America that was introduced into West Africa 
in the 16th century and into East Africa in the 
18th century.4 Cassava is grown principally for its 
swollen roots though its leaves, which contain a 
significant amount of protein and other nutrients, 
are also eaten in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is currently cultivated in around 40 African 
countries, covering a wide belt from Madagascar 
in southeastern Africa to Cape Verde in the 
northwest. 
In Africa, there are four common groups 
of cassava foods: fresh root, dried root, pasty 
products, and granulated products. Dried cassava 
root flour is widely prepared and consumed 
throughout Africa, especially in rural areas.5 Gari, 
a common toasted cereal-like cassava food product 
that is especially popular in Nigeria, is appreciated 
for its convenience as a ready-to-eat food. 
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Overcoming Mosaic Disease
Transmitted by a white fly and the planting of 
contaminated cuttings, mosaic disease has been 
known to reduce cassava yields by an estimated 30 
to 40 percent.6 This disease has been prevalent in 
East Africa since the 1890s, and efforts to combat 
it began as early as the 1920s when much of the 
region was under colonial rule. However, it was 
not until IITA in Nigeria started breeding special-
ized cassava in 1971 that serious headway was 
made. Researchers drew on a rich stock of genetic 
resources that had been developed during the 
previous several decades in an effort to combat the 
disease. In particular, they improved on an already 
developed but poor performing mosaic-resistant 
cassava variety by cross-breeding it with genes for 
high-yielding, good-quality roots and low toxin 
levels (the latter of which is important because raw 
cassava can contain toxic levels of cyanide). 
By 1977—after just six years of research and 
development—IITA achieved its goal. The high-
yielding, mosaic-resistant cassava varieties that 
IITA developed are resistant not only to the mosaic 
disease, but also to other common cassava afflic-
tions including bacterial blight, the mealybug, 
and the green mite. The mosaic-resistant varieties 
improved cassava yields by a full 40 percent, from 
13.6 to 19 tons per hectare of land.7 By the turn 
of the century, Nigeria was producing 32 million 
tons of cassava per year and became the largest 
producer worldwide, outpacing Brazil, Indonesia, 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo.8  
While the disease-resistant cassava quickly 
took off in Nigeria, its adoption was slower in 
neighboring countries mostly due to a lack of 
political will and perceived need. However, 
disease-resistant cassava did eventually get picked 
up in Ghana, sparked by a two-year drought in the 
early-1980s, and in Uganda upon a major outbreak 
of a serious form of mosaic disease in 1988. In 
Uganda, mosaic-resistant cassava increased from 
20 percent of the total cassava area under cul-
tivation in 1993 to 80 percent in 1998, and the 
incidence of the disease declined from more than 
90 percent on the local varieties to less than 20 
percent on the mosaic-resistant varieties.9
A Global Effort Defeats the 
Mealybug
The mealybug is a pernicious pest that feeds on 
the cassava plant, injecting a toxin that causes 
the plant leaf to curl and eventually wither. The 
cassava mealybug was accidentally introduced in 
the Congo on infested planting materials brought 
over from South America in the early-1970s. It 
soon spread to other African countries and sharply 
reduced cassava yields. Yield loss in infested plants 
is extreme, estimated to decimate up to 60 percent 
of the root and 100 percent of the leaves.10 Within 
10 years of its introduction, the cassava mealy-
bug—especially when coupled with the mosaic 
virus—threatened to wipe out cassava entirely 
throughout the continent.11
Not only farmers, but also scientists, agricul-
tural policymakers, and political leaders became 
increasingly alarmed by the scope of losses to 
cassava wrought by the mealybug. In 1973, an 
international conference was convened in the 
Congo to discuss how to manage this problem. 
Researchers and policymakers reviewed the 
options and decided that the classical biologi-
cal control solution—reuniting predators with 
prey—was the most expedient approach to pursue. 
Therefore, researchers returned to the source 
























cassava and the cassava mealybug evolved together 
in South America, starting in the late-1970s a 
systematic search for the cassava mealybug and 
its natural enemies was undertaken in much of 
Central and South America. Although huge areas 
were scanned, the mealybug was found only in a 
very restricted area of South America. Eventually, 
scientists found a natural enemy, a small parasitic 
wasp that uses the mealybug as the site for laying 
its eggs; the mealybug ultimately succumbs to the 
wasp’s developing larvae.
After the wasps were collected and then 
quarantined in England for a sufficient period 
of time to ensure that they would not endanger 
indigenous plants and animals, they were released 
over a 13-year period (1981 to 1994) in more 
than 120 locations in 30 African countries. Seven 
years after the release of the wasp, the mealybug 
population declined substantially.12 According to 
a large-scale survey in Ghana, yield losses due to 
cassava mealybug were reduced by 2.5 tons per 
hectare of land.
While simple on paper, the undertaking to 
control the cassava mealybug in fact required a 
massive global collaborative effort. At the regional 
level, based on an agreement among several 
African countries, the Africa-Wide Biological 
Control Program was established in 1980, with 
its headquarters at IITA in Nigeria. IITA, under 
the auspices of the Africa-Wide Biological Control 
Program, then organized a network of collabora-
tors in Africa, Europe, and North, Central, and 
South America to put all the pieces together to 
tackle the mealybug. This effort included iden-
tifying, collecting, rearing, and quarantining 
the predatory wasp; preparing for its controlled 
release in Africa; conducting field and labora-
tory studies; monitoring and conducting studies 
on impact; and raising awareness about this new 
solution to the mealybug problem.13
Cassava’s Production Boom 
Boosts Food Security and 
Incomes among the Poor
The control of the cassava mosaic disease and 
cassava mealybug together resulted in a tremen-
dous increase in production and, subsequently, 
decreased prices for cassava and products derived 
from it, such as gari. In fact, after accounting for 
























inflation, the price of gari dropped by a full 40 
percent after the mosaic disease and mealybug 
were brought under control. This dramatic price 
reduction represents a significant savings for 
the millions of rural and urban households who 
consume cassava as their staple food. In terms 
of fighting hunger, the disease-resistant cassava 
varieties alone contributed an extra 1.4 million 
tons of gari per year compared with what would 
have been available from local varieties—enough 
to feed an extra 29 million people.14 
Low-income households benefited not only 
from more affordable cassava products for con-
sumption, but also from increased income from 
cassava sales. With the production boom that came 
with the control of mosaic virus and mealybug 
afflictions, cassava has become a major source of 
cash income for farm households in many African 
countries. Studies conducted in the early- to 
mid-1990s in nearly 300 villages across six African 
countries revealed that cassava accounted for 25 
percent of farm household food crop income, as 
compared with 15 percent for yam, 14 percent for 
maize, and 10 percent for rice, with numerous 
other food crops accounting for the remaining 36 
percent.15
What Does the Future Hold 
for Cassava in Africa?
The main question of sustainability that arises 
with the advent of disease-resistant cassava 
ironically is borne out of its success. Though 
increased productivity is yielding a higher gross 
income, farmers are also facing increasing labor 
costs because high yields demand a substantial 
increase in work, especially at the harvesting stage 
as cassava is an especially heavy and bulky crop. 
When cassava was produced as a famine reserve 
crop or as a rural food staple, harvesting could be 
done piecemeal and as such was not a particularly 
labor-intensive task. But farmers who produce 
cassava as a cash crop for urban markets are more 
compelled to move their product and consequently 
are straining under the burden of high cassava 
harvesting labor and refinement costs, which are 
increasing in direct proportion to yield. Taken 
together with the declining prices that have come 
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with the production increase, this extra cost may 
well serve as a disincentive for farmers to sustain 
production at current levels. 
These constraints indeed appear to have 
dampened production somewhat. From the early-
1990s to the early-2000s, after the period of rapid 
diffusion of disease-resistant varieties in Nigeria, 
cassava production per capita declined while prices 
to consumers increased. Progressive farmers who 
were planting the high-yielding, mosaic-resistant 
varieties were planting less cassava because of 
the high labor costs and bottlenecks. However, 
labor-saving devices such as mechanized methods 
of cassava-grating for gari preparation, are being 
developed and already spreading throughout 
Nigeria and Ghana.
The sustainability of the mealybug control 
effort appears to be more promising. Without 
question, control of the cassava mealybug using a 
biological control agent—in this case, its enemy in 
nature, a particular breed of wasp—is an important 
scientific success story in African agriculture. The 
speed of the dispersal of the wasps after their 
release was high, with wasps observed in a wide 
area beyond each original release site just two 
years after their release.16 There is no reason to 
expect that wasps will one day disappear from 
cassava fields unless there are no mealybugs on 
which their larvae can feed.
Keys to Success
Although these two interventions were quite 
different in their approach to protecting the 
cassava crop from near extinction, they share a 
number of common features. First, their success 
can be attributed to the collaborative, global 
approach to problem solving. Cassava is Africa’s 
most significant global commodity. It was brought 
to Africa some 300 years ago from Latin America 
and it is rapidly replacing maize as Africa’s most 
important food crop. The research for controlling 
cassava mosaic disease originated in Tanzania 
in the 1930s and 1940s under colonial rule. 
Thirty years later in Nigeria, IITA’s research on 
cassava mosaic virus drew on earlier findings and 
developed the high-yielding, mosaic-resistant 
cassava varieties. 
The defeat of the mealybug similarly featured 
a global effort. To tackle the mealybug problem, an 
Africa-wide biological control center was estab-
lished at IITA in Nigeria. IITA brought together 
an international group of scientists and donors 
who crisscrossed Central and South America 
and eventually found a parasitic wasp that kills 
mealybugs in the process of reproduction. Both 
the cassava mosaic and the mealybug control 
programs demonstrate the critical role played by 
global partnerships and cooperation in tackling 
complex problems that involve multiple players 
and countries.
Research was another key component of 
success, not only in the discovery of solutions 
to the problems plaguing cassava, but also in 
providing an understanding of the impacts of 
these solutions. For example, research analysis 
documents how the rapid adoption of cassava 
varieties with improved resistance to cassava 
mosaic disease led to dramatic increases in cassava 
production in the 1980s and 1990s in Nigeria, 
Ghana, and Uganda, and how a surge in demand 
for food products such as gari has sparked further 
expansion of cassava production. That said, 
more research is needed to further maximize the 
potential benefits of cassava’s booming productiv-
ity, for example, in terms of its possible use for 
industrial purposes and as an export crop.
Both interventions also have benefited from 
sustained human and financial investments. 
Strong and committed leadership for more than 
two decades provided an enabling environment in 
which hundreds of cassava specialists were suc-
cessfully trained through graduate degree and 
other specialized programs. The continuity of 
scientific leadership is also important in pinpoint-
ing and addressing second-generation problems, 
such as the harvesting labor bottlenecks that arose 
from planting the high-yielding, mosaic-resistant 
varieties. 
Conclusion
The mosaic and mealybug control programs have 
been successful and they reinforce each other. 
The achievements of both control programs in 
contributing to the high yield of cassava have been 
sustained for a period of about 25 years. Although 
these programs appear to have stood the test of 
time, research efforts on the mosaic and mealybug 
controls should continue to ensure success in 
cassava production throughout Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  n 46	 	
Chapter	5		Resisting	Viruses	and	Bugs
1.  Jones, W. O. 1959. Manioc in Africa. Stanford: Food Research 
Institute, Stanford University. 
2.   FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations). 2009. FAOSTAT statistical database. Rome.  
3.  CGIAR (Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research). 1996. Report of the fourth external program and 
management review of the IITA. Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
4.  Jones 1959. 
5.  Idowu, I. A. 1998. Private sector participation in agricultural 
research and technology transfer linkages: Lessons from 
cassava gari processing technology in southern Nigeria. In 
Post-harvest technology and commodity marketing, ed. R. S. 
B. Ferris. Proceedings of a postharvest conference, November 
2–December 1, 1995, in Accra, Ghana. Ibadan, Nigeria: 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture. 
6.  Thresh, J. M., G. W. Otim-Nape, J. P. Legg, and D. Fargette. 
1997. African cassava mosaic virus disease: The magnitude of 
the problem. African Journal of Root and Tuber Crops 2 (1 and 
2): 13–19. 
7.  Nweke, F. I., D. S. C. Spencer, and J. K. Lynam. 2002. The 
cassava transformation: Africa’s best kept secret. East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
8.  FAO 2009.
9.  University of Greenwich. 2000. Uganda: Saving a nation 
besieged by cassava mosaic disease epidemic. Application 
nominating the National Agricultural Research Organization 
(NARO) of Uganda for the King Baudou in International 
Development Prize, University of Greenwich, Kent, United 
Kingdom. 
10. Herren, H. R. 1981. Biological control of the cassava mealybug. 
In Tropical root crops research strategies for the 1980s, ed. E. 
R. Terry, K. O. Oduro, and F. Caveness. Proceedings of the first 
triennial symposium of the International Society for Tropical 
Root Crops, September 8–12, 1980, in Ibadan, Nigeria. 
Ottawa: International Development Research Center.
11.  Norgaard, R. B. 1988. The biological control of cassava 
mealybug in Africa. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 70 (2): 366–371.
12. Alene, A. D., P. Neuenschwander, V. M. Manyong, O. Coulibaly, 
and R. Hanna. 2005. The impact of IITA-led biological 
control of major pests in Sub-Saharan African agriculture: A 
synthesis of milestones and empirical results. Ibadan, Nigeria: 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture.
13. Wodageneh, A., and H. R. Herren. 1987. International 
cooperation: Training and initiation of national biological 
control programs. Insect Science and Its Application 8: 
915–918.
14. CGIAR 1996. 
15. Nweke, Spencer, and Lynam 2002.
16. Neuenschwander, P., and T. Haug. 1992. New technologies for 
rearing Epidinocarsis lopezi (Hym., Encyrtidae), a biological 
control agent against the cassava mealybug Phenacoccus 
manihoti (Horn., Pseudococcidae). In Advances in insect 
rearing for research and pest management, ed. T. E. 
Anderson and N. C. Leppla. Boulder: Westview. 
NOTES	 47
F
orests are critically important in Nepal 
because more than 70 percent of the 
country’s population derives some part of 
its livelihood from them. Farmers depend 
on forests for green fodder to feed their livestock, 
particularly during the dry season when forests 
are often the only available source of fodder. They 
depend on forests for firewood, both as energy for 
cooking and heating, and as a source of income 
from sales to others. And they depend on forest 
products such as wild edibles and medicinal plants 
for both sustenance and income. 
In Nepal, innovative approaches to policymak-
ing, combined with novel methods for organizing 
community action, have played a critical role in 
improving and diversifying forest-dependent 
rural livelihoods during the past three decades. 
Community forestry programs have been so 
successful that today, one-third of Nepal’s popula-
tion participates in community forestry, directly 
managing more than 1 million hectares of natural 
forest, or one-fourth of Nepal’s forest area.
Community forestry, at its most basic level, 
implies that the state cedes forest land under its 
control to rural communities. These communities 
become the primary caretakers and beneficiaries 
of the natural forests, with the state providing 
varying degrees of guidance and support through 
public policies and programs. The key to making 
these programs work is the active engagement of 
local communities in the day-to-day and long-term 
management of forests in a sustainable manner.
While community forestry programs in 
Nepal have directly contributed to improving 
rural welfare by increasing household access to 
both food and income sources, it is the indirect 
impact of these programs that is the underlying 
success. Community forestry in Nepal illustrates 
the vital importance of “getting governance right” 
or providing the poor with the capacity to own 
and manage their natural resources. By elevating 
communities to the role of custodians, managers, 
and beneficiaries of the country’s bountiful forests, 
and by supporting this effort with a strong legal 
and regulatory framework and robust civil-society 
networks, Nepal has strengthened the contribu-
tion of communities to both local development 
efforts and to the country’s national development 
discourse.
The Emergence of 
Community Forestry  
in Nepal
For centuries, many rural communities in Nepal 
have relied on the country’s forests for their 
livelihoods, using the forest’s resources in ways 
that ensured continued availability for future 
generations. But by the 1970s, things had begun 
to change. Population growth, along with govern-
ment mismanagement, was putting new pressures 
on the forests, and the global environmental 
movement was drawing attention to the plight of 
the world’s dwindling forests. In Nepal, the forests 
were in the midst of a double crisis affecting both 
the sanctity of the Himalayas and the livelihoods 
of its inhabitants.
Seeing the Forest 
Through the Trees












This chapter is based on Ojha, H., L. Persha, and A. Chhatre. 2009. Community forestry in Nepal: A policy innovation for local 
livelihoods. IFPRI Discussion Paper. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
	 	 4748	 	
In response to this crisis, technical and 
financial support began to pour in from interna-
tional agencies to establish forest plantations as 
a quick fix to the problem of degradation in the 
Himalayas. But in 1978, the Government of Nepal 
introduced new regulations that provided local 
government bodies known as panchayats with 
limited rights to manage designated forest areas. 
Community forestry programs—initially driven by 
international agencies, but later taken over by local 
organizations—began to emerge rapidly in Nepal.
Community forestry gained momentum 
throughout the 1980s, and in 1993, Nepal 
introduced the Forestry Act, a radical piece of 
legislation that allowed forest-dependent com-
munities to directly participate in and take control 
of forest management at the local level. Nepal’s 
forest-management strategy soon evolved from 
a traditional protection-ori-
ented, conservation-focused 
agenda to a much more broad-
based strategy for forest use, 
enterprise development, rural 
governance, and livelihoods 
improvement. 
At the heart of Nepal’s 
system of community forestry 
were organizations known 
as “community forest user 
groups” (see Table 6.1). These 
user groups are officially 
recognized under the 1993 
Forestry Act, and provide 
members with the right not 
only to use the forest’s resources for their own 
livelihoods, but also the responsibility to manage 
the use of the forest sustainably. Because they 
are legal entities, user groups can operate with a 
high degree of autonomy from arbitrary bureau-
cratic actions, and they can collaborate with any 
civil-society or private-sector organization of their 
choice, rather than relying solely on the govern-
ment’s forest department for services and support.
A user group may include all members of a 
village, a select subgroup of households, or people 
from another village or district. The main idea 
is that the group should be inclusive rather than 
exclusive of households in the village. In practice, 
all households of one or more villages become 
members of a user group, thus representing a 
range of people with different interests in using the 
forest’s many resources—such as fodder, firewood, 
wild edibles, spices, medicinal plants, resins, irri-
gation water, and drinking water.
A user group is led by executive commit-
tees that are selected and supervised by annual 
assemblies of group members. With assistance 
from forest officials or nongovernmental organiza-
tions, user groups develop management plans that 
outline the goals, activities, and rules governing 
the use of forest products. Beyond these common 
structures and procedures, however, user groups 
have substantial flexibility in defining their own 
structures and roles. Some operate on the basis 
of tole or hamlet-based decisionmaking, while 
others are managed by subgroups with their own 
common interests. Given the diversity of rural 
Nepal, this flexibility means that each group can 
tailor itself to local needs, while also nurturing 
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Indicator Number Share
Community forestry user groups 14,439
Districts with community forestry 
operations
75 100 percent  
Households engaged in community 
forestry programs
1.7 million 32 percent of total 
population
Area (hectares) of forest under 
management by community forestry 
user groups
1.2 million 25 percent of total 
forest area
Source: Nepal Department of Forests. 2009. Community forestry database. Kathmandu, Nepal.
Table 6.1—Community forestry impacts in Nepal, c. 2008




















cultures of democratic governance at the  
local level.
User groups may also raise money from the 
forests that they manage. Their revenues may 
come from a variety of sources, including fees 
collected from members or outsiders in exchange 
for permission to collect forest products. Under the 
1993 Forest Act, while user groups can retain 100 
percent of the revenues generated collectively from 
their forests, they must designate 25 percent of 
this income for community-development activities. 
Revenues vary among user groups depending on 
the size and quality of their forests, and range from 
US$50 per year in the high hills to $1,200 in the 
Terai region.1
The area of forest managed by any given user 
group varies substantially, ranging from less than 
1 hectare to more than 4,000 hectares, with an 
average size of 79 hectares.2 Similarly, the size of 
each user group can range from less than a dozen 
to more than 10,000 households, with the average 
user group having 111 households.3 
Local Impact, Local 
Empowerment
Today, though the state retains ownership of 
forests in Nepal, its role has shifted from policing 
forest use to assisting community forest groups 
in the management of their precious natural 
resources. The handoff of forestry management 
in 1993 to communities helped rural households 
expand and diversify their livelihood options. 
While poor households had little to gain from 
using the forests as a source of commercial timber 
because of the high upfront costs associated with 
this business, they had much to gain from other 
uses of the forests. Poor households benefit from 
the consumption and sale of fodder, firewood, wild 
edibles, and medicinals, as well as from the income 
generated through relatively new activities like 
nursery management, spice cultivation, and resin 
tapping.4 Several studies have found that members 
of user groups in Nepal have gained substantially 
from forest-based incomes, while other studies have 
demonstrated that these groups have yet to harness 
the full revenue potential of their community 
forests, although more in-depth analysis of these 
impacts is required.5 Importantly, forests have also 
proven to be an important safety net for many of 
the poorest households, especially those without 
access to land for agricultural cultivation.  
The benefits of community forestry are not 
limited simply to what individuals and households 
can consume or sell. Revenues generated by user 
groups have also been used for community invest-
ments. This includes investments in improving 
irrigation canals, expanding water-distribution 
systems, supplementing teachers’ salaries, 
providing small loans for community members, 
and building schools or other public buildings.6 
There are also several less tangible benefits of 
community forestry in Nepal. While user groups 
play an important role in managing forests, 
they have also been central to promoting social 
inclusion and grassroots democracy throughout 
Nepal.7 These aspects were given a boost in the 
1990s with the formation of a network of user 
groups established to represent local interests 
at the national level. Known as the Federation 
of Community Forestry Users (FECOFUN), this 
nationwide network emerged as a key player in 
forest-sector policy debates and brought civil-
society perspectives into the policymaking process 
that were previously overlooked and unheard. This 
effort was no small feat given the prolonged insur-
gency and political upheavals that have plagued 
Nepal in recent decades. 
Challenges and Remedies
Ensuring that marginalized groups are benefiting 
equally from community forestry has proven to be 
a challenge. In some communities, traditionally 
disadvantaged groups—the poorest households, 
women and female-headed households, lower caste 
and Dalit (outcast) households, and certain ethnic 
minorities—have not benefited equally nor enjoyed 
the same level of participation that would be 
expected in a community-managed effort. Often, 
wealthier households and male leadership not only 
control forest management decisions, but also 
impede poor households’ access to forest products 
or infringe on the forest areas allocated to them.8
Efforts have been made to introduce explicit 
provisions to protect and support marginalized 
groups in the community, and to designate forest 
resources and community revenues to the margin-
alized. Among women, despite the enduring social 
norms that discourage women’s political partici-
pation, greater participation has been observed 
in recent years, while women-only user groups, 
though few in number, have been operating 
successfully. But it is likely that these equality 50	 	
issues, many of which are being articulated on the 
national policy agenda, will take time to resolve.
A Good Prognosis for 
Sustainability
Three decades of innovation in community 
forestry indicate that the intervention is a highly 
sustainable one. Politically, community forestry 
is supported by a strong legal and regulatory 
framework and has won the confidence of many 
national policymakers, civil-society organizations, 
and the international development community. 
The continuing popularity of community forestry 
can be seen in the increased number of user groups 
that have formed over time (for example, from 
10,969 user groups in 2002 to 14,439 in 2009), the 
area of forest handed over for community manage-
ment, and the number of households and families 
involved.9 And while support from a variety of 
stakeholders is needed to sustain community 
forestry, ultimately its long-term success depends 
most importantly on the strong interests of local 
communities in forest governance, their capacity 
to do the job, and their adoption of a sustainable 
approach to forest management. So far, communi-
ties appear to be up to the task, and user groups 
have become durable institutions supported by an 
active and vibrant network of user-group fed-
erations, all contributing to the sustainability of 
community forestry in Nepal.
In economic terms, the prospects are 
promising, although more needs to be done. Since 
community forestry began about 30 years ago, 
the level of donors and government contributions 
has decreased while the involvement of nongov-
ernmental organizations and user group networks 
has expanded. User groups currently absorb a 
little more than 70 percent of their own operating 
costs (primarily in terms of labor costs and small 
financial outlays), with donors and the government 
each contributing the remaining 15 percent.10
From an environmental and ecological stand-
point, there is strong evidence indicating that 
community-forestry practices have improved 
forest conditions. Forest coverage has increased 
in some areas under community management 
according to measures drawn from satellite 
imagery and aerial photography.11 Forest condi-
tions, as measured by such indicators as sapling 
densities and diameters, also have improved.12 
To further promote sustainable forestry manage-
ment, the government and other stakeholders 
are exploring the possibilities of forest carbon 
marketing from community forestry.
Keys to Success: An Enabling 
Political Environment and 
Strong Civil Society
Three decades of operational innovations, leg-
islative developments, and evolving practice 
have clearly demonstrated success in terms of 
enhancing access to forest products, improving 
livelihoods opportunities for forest-dependent 
people, and strengthening local organizational 
capacity. Community forestry appears to have 
stood the test of time, contributing to the improve-
ment of livelihoods, civic strengthening, and the 
engagement of Nepal’s large rural population. The 
experience offers several lessons.
•	 Learning	through	experience	is	the	
key	to	success. Community forestry 
has evolved into a complex institutional 
network that requires actors to work col-
lectively in a learning mode. Even when 
there is an absence of political consensus 
or a well-defined legal framework, 
collaborative learning has allowed for con-




success. Civil-society networks have played 
a central role in influencing the development 
of community forestry, especially in terms of 
safeguarding community rights and ensuring 
the autonomy of community action from 




arrangements.	Although conceived as 
a unified program of community forestry, 
diverse modalities have emerged in 
practice. User groups vary from a dozen 
households to several thousand, and the 
group structure varies from informal 
sharing and coordination mechanisms to 
highly formalized organizations. These 
are important adaptive responses to the 





development of community forestry was in 
part triggered by the open and responsive 
attitude of government officials, and was 
followed by the gradual development and 
institutionalization of a multistakeholder 
process of collaboration. Community forestry 
is no longer a government program alone or 
a foreign aid-driven activity, but a complex 
governance regime for forest-dependent 
communities.  n 
During the past decade, more than 22 countries in Africa, Asia, and South America reformed their national forest 
policies to expand community forestry rights.a In fact, by 2008, an estimated 27 percent of the total forested area 
in developing countries was designated for administration or ownership by communities, and this trend continues 
to grow.b
Most of these policy reforms aim to improve livelihoods for forest-dependent people and achieve more 
sustainable forest management. They typically provide communities with harvesting rights over forest products, 
and management responsibilities such as forest monitoring. Governments and communities typically share forest-
related revenues based on a predetermined profit-sharing metric. 
Nepal stands out as a notable success in being able to move beyond several of the early implementation 
hurdles that stymie many other countries. For instance, Nepal successfully developed a strong policy and 
institutional framework, and provided relative autonomy for communities to harvest forest products and undertake 
a wide range of forest management and enterprise-based activities. Other countries with notable community 
forestry programs include Cameroon (1.1 million hectares or 5.7 percent of total forest area), Mexico (38.7 million 
hectares or 59 percent of total forest area), and Tanzania (2.35 million hectares or 6.5 percent of total forest 
area), where there has also been substantive transfers of forest-resource tenure rights over to communities.c  India 
is another country that stands out because of its sheer quantity of forest under collaborative management between 
communities and government—17 million hectares or 25 percent of the country’s forest area.
In spite of its increasing popularity, community forestry has been slow to get off the ground in many other 
countries. Critiques often focus on a perceived reluctance by governments to cede control to communities, as well 
as the limited scope for communities to benefit in this system of forestry governance. With continued research 
on the public policies and grassroots action necessary to make community forestry succeed on a large scale, 
including research on its impact on a range of indicators at the household and community levels, this intervention 
is likely to play an increasingly important role throughout the developing world. It may be particularly important in 
the context of growing global concerns over climate change, where a new emphasis on linking community forestry 
and carbon markets potentially offers a valuable means of mitigating carbon emissions while generating revenues 
for poor rural communities.
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T
he Sahel—the belt of land that stretches 
across Africa on the southern edge of the 
Sahara—has always been a tough place 
to farm. Rainfall is low and droughts 
are frequent. The crust of hard soil is, at times, 
almost impermeable, and harsh winds threaten 
to sweep away everything in their path. Over 
the past three decades, however, hundreds of 
thousands of farmers in Burkina Faso and Niger 
have transformed large swaths of the region’s 
arid landscape into productive agricultural land, 
improving food security for about 3 million 
people. Once-denuded landscapes are now home 
to abundant trees, crops, and livestock. Although 
rainfall has improved slightly from the mid-1990s 
relative to earlier decades, indications are that 
farmer management is a stronger determinant of 
land and agroforestry regeneration.
Sahelian farmers achieved their success by 
ingeniously modifying traditional agroforestry, 
water, and soil-management practices. To improve 
water availability and soil fertility in Burkina 
Faso’s Central Plateau, farmers have sown crops 
in planting pits and built stone contour bunds, 
which are stones piled up in long narrow rows that 
follow the contours of the land in order to capture 
rainwater runoff and soil. These practices have 
helped rehabilitate between 200,000 and 300,000 
hectares of land and produce an additional 80,000 
tons of food per year. In southern Niger, farmers 
have developed innovative ways of regenerating 
and multiplying valuable trees whose roots already 
lay underneath their land, thus improving about 5 
million hectares of land and producing more than 
500,000 additional tons of food per year. While 
the specific calculations of farm-level benefits are 
subject to various methodological and data limi-
tations, the order of magnitude of these benefits 
is high, as evidenced by the wide-scale adoption 
of the improved practices by large numbers of 
farmers.  Today, the agricultural landscapes of 
southern Niger have considerably more tree cover 
than they did 30 years ago. These findings suggest 
a human and environmental success story at a 
scale not seen anywhere else in Africa. 
The re-greening of the Sahel began when 
local farmers’ practices were rediscovered and 
enhanced in simple, low-cost ways by innovative 
farmers and nongovernmental organizations. An 
evolving coalition of local, national, and interna-
tional actors then enabled large-scale diffusion and 
continued use of these improved practices where 
they benefited farmers. 
A History of Drought and 
Land Degradation 
The Sahel, one of the poorest regions in the world, 
has long been plagued by droughts. The 1968–73 
drought caused the deaths of not only many people 
but also large numbers of animals and trees—a 
human, economic, and environmental crisis with 
effects that lasted for years. Groundwater levels 
plummeted, yields for staple crops—sorghum 
and millet—declined, and families began leaving 
the region en masse. Most farm households were 
unable to satisfy half of their annual food needs 
through their own production nor could they meet 
the deficit through food purchases.1
Re-Greening the Sahel
Farmer-led innovation in Burkina Faso  
and Niger
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During the 1960s and 1970s, foreign aid 
donors carried out two major projects in Burkina 
Faso’s Yatenga Province—the heart of the 
country’s densely populated Central Plateau—to 
build earthen bunds designed to reduce soil 
erosion over thousands of hectares. Conceived 
without the involvement of local people, however, 
the projects did not meet farmers’ needs. Indeed, 
farmers failed to maintain the bunds or delib-
erately destroyed them, and the bunds soon 
disappeared. Meanwhile, the surface of barren 
land on the Central Plateau expanded inexorably, 
and empty, encrusted fields extended across signif-
icant parts of the region. Useful tree species were 
lost, and little natural regeneration occurred. As 
the landscape was denuded and exposed to severe 
water erosion, the land and the people became 
increasingly vulnerable to drought. 
The devastating agroenvironmental trends in 
the Sahel were also weakening the social fabric. 
Entire families left the region to settle elsewhere, 
or husbands migrated to coastal countries to 
earn income, leaving their families behind during 
increasingly long periods. By 1980, for many 
farmers, the choice was simple: claim back their 
land from the encroaching desert or lay down their 
tools and leave. 
Planting Pits and Stone 
Bunds in Burkina Faso 
Around 1980, several farmers close to Ouahigouya, 
the capital of Yatenga Province, began experi-
menting with traditional planting pits. To reclaim 
severely degraded farmland that water could not 
penetrate, farmers would dig a grid of planting 
pits (also known as zaï) across the rock-hard plots. 
Their innovation was to increase the depth and 
diameter of the pits and then add organic matter, 
such as manure, to the bottom of the basins. 
Planting pits improve soil fertility and agricul-
tural production in several ways. They concentrate 
both nutrients and water precisely where they are 
needed. Farmers add manure to the pits, which also 
capture windblown soil, leaves, and litter. Termites 
are attracted to the organic matter, digging 
channels that enhance soil architecture as well as 
water infiltration and retention. By digesting the 
organic matter, the termites also make nutrients 
more easily available to the plant roots. The 
planting pits retain water for long periods of time, 
allowing crops to survive dry spells. And because 
farmers can dig the pits during the dry season, 
they do not have to wait until the rains come 
to prepare the land for planting. The technique 
allowed farmers to effectively raise their yields 
from virtually nothing to 300 to 400 kilograms per 
hectare in a year of low rainfall, and up to 1,500 
kilograms or more per hectare in a good year.2 
The use of new and improved planting pits 
spread rapidly, even though the government’s 
agricultural extension service had been crippled by 
economic reforms and refocused to the country’s 
cotton-growing regions. Several farmer-innovators 
were central to this process. In 1984, for example, 
a farmer named Yacouba Sawadogo began orga-
nizing semiannual market days to promote 
planting pits. At the market days, farmers brought 
a sample of the crop varieties they had cultivated 
in their zaï, deposited seeds with Yacouba, and 
then later selected the seeds they wanted to plant 
that season. Initially small, by 2000 Yacouba’s 
market days involved farmers from more than 100 
villages. In 1992, a farmer named Ousseni Zoromé 
began a “zaï school,” training local farmers on a 
gravelly site next to the road. When the crop grew, 
the effort attracted the attention of the minister of 
agriculture. By 2001, Zoromé’s network consisted 
of more than 20 schools and 1,000 members, 
with each group charged with rehabilitating its 
own piece of degraded land. Another farmer, Ali 
Ouedraogo, trained individual farmers in villages 
around Gourcy and visited regularly to work 
with them in their fields and exchange ideas. His 
students trained other farmers in improved zaï 
techniques and some of the students then experi-
mented with their own techniques. 
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Over time, and because of these knowledge 
exchanges, farmers improved and adapted the pits 
to their own needs. Some farmers used the pits 
to intensify cereal production, others to produce 
trees, and others to combine cereal and tree 
production. Farmers vary the number of pits per 
hectare and pit dimensions as well as the quantity 
of organic matter added to the planting pits. 
Another innovation based on a traditional 
farming practice was taking place in this region in 
the late-1970s and early-1980s. Farmers in Yatenga 
Province, with support from Oxfam, a nongovern-
mental organization, began building stone contour 
bunds to harvest rainwater. For optimum results, 
the lines of stone had to follow an imaginary line 
running along land of equal elevation. Around 
1980, the development of a simple tool for 
measuring water levels ensured correct alignment 
of the contours, something that farmers had been 
unable to do in the past. The level cost US$6 to 
make and could be mastered in a day or two by 
farmers with no reading or writing skills.3 
The new design allowed runoff to spread 
evenly through the field and trickle though the 
small holes in the stones, slowing runoff and 
causing water to infiltrate the soil. The practice 
improved the soil by trapping sediments and 
organic matter within the plots instead of allowing 
them to wash away with the rain. 
These techniques for rehabilitating farmland 
spread widely among farmers: the total area reha-
bilitated over the past three decades is estimated 
to be between 200,000 and 300,000 hectares. The 
additional food produced on this land helps feed 
about 500,000 people.4 A recent study shows that 
in villages where these soil and water-conservation 
techniques have long been present, 72 to 94 percent 
of the cultivated land has been rehabilitated with 
one or more conservation techniques.5
Increasing the Number of 
On-Farm Trees in Niger 
At about the same time, in neighboring Niger, 
farmers were also putting new twists on old tech-
niques. For centuries, farmers in Sahelian Niger 
had managed their woodlands to produce con-
tinuous harvests of trees. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
however, they faced significant tree losses from 
drought and human population pressures. In the 
early-1980s, they started experimenting with a 
process known as farmer-managed natural regen-
eration (FMNR)—a low-cost way of growing and 
reproducing trees and shrubs that provides useful 
food, fuel, or fodder. 
The original model for FMNR was developed 
by Tony Rinaudo of Serving in Mission, an inter-
national missionary organization. The model grew 
out of his observation that underneath farmers’ 
cleared fields lay extensive webs of living tree roots 
and stumps that were continually throwing up new 
shoots and stems. Here was an invaluable source 
of new tree stock—a virtual nursery. 
Rinaudo and local farmers developed an 
effective way of regenerating these trees. First, 
from among the mature root systems in the field, 
farmers would choose tree stumps based on the 
usefulness of the species. They would then select 
the tallest and straightest stems to protect on each 
stump and remove the rest. Thereafter, they would 
regularly prune the selected stems to promote 
their growth and the production of food, fuel, or 
fodder, while removing new, competing stems as 
needed. Periodically, they would harvest one of the 
original stems and choose a newly sprouting stem 
as a replacement. Farmers could then grow other 
crops between and around the trees. The tech-
niques were flexible, and farmers adapted them to 
their own situations and objectives. 
Rinaudo, knowing the value of trees to farmers, 
offered food to farmers during the droughts of 
1984 and 1985 in return for protecting on-farm 
natural regeneration. Many farmers immediately 
did so, but when food aid stopped, few continued 
to protect and manage their trees. Those who had 
cut their trees soon observed the benefits of FMNR, 
however, and the technique spread.
The trees generated a range of benefits. They 
reduced wind speed and evaporation. In the 1980s, 
crops had to be replanted three or four times as 
they were covered by windblown sand, but today 
farmers typically plant only once. The trees produce 
at least a six-month supply of fodder for livestock, 
and they provide firewood, fruit, and medicinal 
products that farm households can consume or sell. 
Moreover, certain tree species, such as the winter 
thorn acacia (Faidherbia albida), enhance fertility 
by adding nitrogen in the soil.
6 
Many villages now have 10 to 20 times more 
trees than 20 years ago.7 In the area where the 
Serving in Mission project took place, 88 percent 
of farmers practiced FMNR in their fields, adding 
an estimated 1.25 million trees each year.8 
Surprisingly, the highest tree densities were found 56  
in areas of high rural population density, where 
one might expect denuded landscapes. Moreover, 
many of the trees are young and, thus, still increas-
ing in density and cover. 
Boosting Crop Production 
and Improving Food 
Security 
Because these practices were driven primarily by 
farmer innovation over three decades, involved 
many dimensions of impact, and included 
numerous interventions by nongovernmental 
organizations and donors, assessing their impacts 
quantitatively is more difficult than would be the 
case for single, formal agricultural development 
projects or programs. Nonetheless, on-the-ground 
studies, supported by aerial photography and 
satellite imagery, attest to the magnitude of their 
success.  
Researchers examining the impacts of contour 
stone bunds and zaï have found increases in cereal 
yields, varying from 40 percent to more than 100 
percent.9 One study of 17 sites rehabilitated with 
stone bunds found that cereal yields averaged 
almost 800 kilograms per hectare—325 kilograms 
per hectare higher than the average yield on 
control plots.10 
Zaï alone usually have a greater impact on 
yields than stone bunds alone, but farmers reap 
the greatest returns from using both together. And 
farmers who also used at least five tons of manure 
per hectare achieved even higher yields, harvesting 
1,000 to 1,250 kilograms per hectare.11
Farmers in the Central Plateau of Burkina 
Faso have rehabilitated at least 200,000 hectares 
of land using these techniques. If cereal produc-
tion increased by an average of 400 kilograms per 
hectare—a conservative estimate—farmers have 
increased their annual harvest there by 80,000 
tons, or enough to feed about 500,000 people. 
With these increases, farm households that 
suffered from food deficits of six months or more 
during the early-1980s have been able to reduce 
their deficit periods from six months to two or 
three months, or to zero in some cases.  
Using satellite imagery, researchers at the 
United States Geological Survey have been able 
to identify where tree densities and tree cover in 
Niger have increased over time and where these 
changes are likely attributable to FMNR. Estimates 
from high-resolution images acquired during 2003 
to 2008 peg FMNR at nearly 5 million hectares.
Because of FMNR, farmers in Niger are 
producing an estimated additional 500,000 tons 
of cereals a year. This additional production 
covers the requirements of 2.5 million people 
out of a total population of about 15 million in 
2009. FMNR also has an indirect impact on food 
security through tree crop products, which farmers 
can harvest and sell in local markets. Moreover, 
despite a near-doubling of the population since 
1980, Niger has been able to maintain per capita 
production of millet and sorghum, which make up 
more than 90 percent of the typical villager’s diet. 
Per capita production remained at approximately 
285 kilograms between 1980 and 2006.12
A New Agricultural 
Landscape 
The land management techniques adopted by 
farmers in Burkina Faso and Niger have changed 
barren agricultural landscapes in those countries 
into complex agricultural systems with more 
vegetation and more varied vegetation. In the 
Central Plateau of Burkina Faso, rehabilitated 
plots have an average of 126 trees per hectare, 
compared with 103 trees per hectare on control 
plots. Moreover, the trees on rehabilitated land are 
larger and represent a wider range of species.13 The 
level of water in wells has improved significantly 
since land rehabilitation started, and farmers have 
created small vegetable gardens around several 
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wells, adding to their incomes and improving 
nutrition. Increased water recharge appears to 
result from increases in rehabilitated lands and not 
from increases in rainfall.
Although millet and sorghum remain the 
dominant crops in Burkina Faso, farmers are also 
increasingly growing cowpea and sesame. In some 
villages, they have begun reintroducing small plots 
of cotton on rehabilitated land. More on-farm trees 
and more livestock also add to diversity. With their 
increased supplies of fodder and crop residues, 
farmers can keep livestock closer to their fields, 
contributing to more intensive and profitable 
livestock production. In turn, livestock produce 
manure that can be used to improve soil fertility. 
Twenty years ago, most manure was used as a 
source of domestic energy, but now it is largely 
returned to the fields. In many places, a market 
has sprung up for manure, as well as for transport-
ing manure by donkey cart. 
These developments have also brought 
changes in how rural people earn their livelihoods. 
After the harvest, men once commonly migrated to 
urban areas for employment, but some indicators 
suggest that this pattern is changing as more men 
remain in the villages where they can now earn 
sufficient incomes from agriculture.
In recent years, the changed landscape has 
also been critical to managing crises. Between 
October 2005 and June 2006, when much of Niger 
was facing a food crisis caused by drought com-
pounded by other factors, including the export of 
cereals to the urban markets of northern Nigeria, 
villages that had protected and managed natural 
regeneration were much less affected by the food 
shortages than villages that had not.
Sahelian women may have gained the most 
from the land rehabilitation techniques. The 
innovations have greatly improved the supply of 
fuelwood over the past 20 to 30 years, allowing 
women to reallocate the time once spent on 
collecting fuelwood to other activities, including 
producing and preparing food and caring for 
children. Women in the Zinder Region who own 
baobab trees also earned substantial annual 
income (up to $210) from the sale of tree leaves 
used to make sauce for the daily porridge.14 
Farmers report that women involved in FMNR 
have a stronger economic position and better 
capacity to feed their families a nutritious,  
diverse diet. 
Lessons for Policy and 
Practice 
These stories are among the first examples of the 
success of poor farmers in enhancing food security 
while adapting to climate change. Therefore, they 
carry important lessons about effective partner-
ships for agricultural development. 
First, innovation by local people (“barefoot 
science”) is as important as cutting-edge research.  
The most successful innovations are often simple, 
low-cost improvements on practices that are 
already locally available and known to farmers. 
Second, a single technique or practice alone 
is generally not enough to achieve meaningful 
environmental and economic impacts but can act 
as a trigger for other innovations. Where farmers 
undertook multiple innovations simultaneously, 
they accomplished more rapid environmental 
improvements because soil, water, and vegetative 
regeneration proved to be mutually reinforcing. 
Third, a single menu of technical options can 
be adopted on a large scale, but to achieve this, 
the menu must be flexible, adaptable, and testable 
by farmers under their own social, economic, 
and environmental conditions. Farmers can then 
choose the practices that best meet their needs. 
Fourth, in resource conservation, individual 
farmers adopting innovations on single fields or 
farms can achieve impacts, but when communities 
work together collectively, they will produce more 
sustainable benefits. 
Fifth, farmers are more likely to adopt 
resource conservation innovations if at least one 
innovation or component provides significant 
benefits in the first or second year. 
Finally, spreading technical innovations 
requires coordinated, flexible configurations of 
actors. In Burkina Faso and Niger, the wide-
spread dissemination of innovations resulted 
from long-term collaboration between individual 
farmers, farmer groups, local and international 
nongovernmental organizations, bilateral and mul-
tilateral donors, and national governments. In the 
Sahel, the projects that became successes tended 
to start fairly small in scale and to closely involve 
local farmers in designing technical solutions. 
Charismatic leaders, both local and from outside 
the community, stimulated change through their 
own choices and actions and provided personal 
role models for others. In a number of the stories 58  
recounted, leaders were willing to take socially 
risky actions that diverged from customary 
behavior. These types of strong local leaders will 
need to play a large role in tackling tough conser-
vation problems.
Conclusion
In 1980, no one would have predicted the extent 
of re-greening in the Sahel today. Farmers in 
Burkina Faso and Niger have found low-cost ways 
of intensifying agriculture that allow production 
to grow along with population. Studies of these 
projects refute the popular perception that because 
dryland environments are difficult and market 
infrastructure is often lacking, investing in them 
does not pay. Moreover, the longevity of these 
innovations—two to three decades—attests to their 
social and political sustainability. 
These techniques alone will not solve all 
problems. Some of the techniques require a great 
deal of labor, and in the case of stone bunds, 
funding from outside the community is often 
required to purchase the necessary quantity of 
stones and cover the high costs of transporting 
them. They are most effective under specific envi-
ronmental conditions. Zaï, for example, function 
best in areas with rainfall between 300 and 800 
millimeters.15 Yet these innovations are important 
tools to help crop production in the Sahel address 
the needs of a burgeoning population. And the 
process by which these innovations emerged—
through experimentation, exploration, and 
exchanges by and among farmers themselves—is 
possibly the most vital lesson learned from the 
Sahel.16  n 
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T
he United States, Canada, the former 
Soviet Union, and many other countries 
have learned valuable lessons about the 
dire consequences of overexploiting land 
for intensive crop production. The emergence of 
dust bowls in the United States in the 1930s and 
in the Kazakhstan plains of the Soviet Union in 
the 1960s illustrated how unsustainable farming 
practices can cause long-lasting ecological and 
agricultural damages and losses. 
Argentina faced similar risks as it began to 
intensify the cultivation of soybean in the 1970s 
in the Pampas region, an expansive area of fertile 
land stretching from the Andes Mountains in the 
east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, an area 
more commonly associated with cattle ranching 
and the gauchos, Argentina’s cowboys. 
While soybean is a commercially lucrative 
crop, its cultivation negatively impacts soil fertility, 
particularly when farmed intensively following the 
cultivation of other crops such as wheat and maize. 
However, what could have been a disaster instead 
became an unmitigated success. The widespread 
adoption of zero-tillage cultivation practices, 
improved soybean varieties, and other technologies 
together enhanced yields, boosted production, and 
conserved soil fertility. Today, Argentina is a global 
leader in soybean production and exports, providing 
the international market with supplies of both food 
and feed that have helped keep global prices low. 
The Essentials of Zero Tillage
Although soybean was introduced in Argentina in 
the early decades of the 20th century, commercial 
cultivation began in earnest in the 1950s. Protein-
rich soybean is commonly used in livestock feed, 
and as global demand for livestock products—
both dairy and meat—increased as incomes 
grew during the latter half of the 20th century in 
many countries, some Argentine farmers saw the 
financial benefits of shifting to soybean cultiva-
tion. The land area under soybean production in 
Argentina expanded rapidly during the 1970s, con-
tributing significantly to an increase in Argentina’s 
agricultural output.
But while this new crop meant higher 
economic benefits—derived from new demand and 
the possibility of growing two crops, soybean and 
wheat, instead of one—it required a much tighter 
and more careful management schedule resulting 
from, among other factors, increased climatic 
risks, higher demands for weed-control strategies, 
the need for more efficient use of machinery, and 
the need for greater technical assistance.1 The fact 
that soybean was a new, relatively unknown crop, 
plus the greater complexity of the cropping system, 
required expert knowledge on how to bring all the 
pieces together in an effective way. Access to new 
and reliable information became a key issue for the 
success of soybean cultivation in Argentina.
Moreover, this new crop had a considerable 
impact on the land. On many farms where soybean 
cultivation followed wheat or maize farming, the 
conventional practice was to burn the remains 
of the crop cultivated in the period preceding 
soybean to minimize the time that the land was 
left uncultivated, thus extending the period 
available to till, seed, and grow the soybean. 
Innovating in  
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But this practice created problems such as soil 
erosion, water runoff, and loss of organic matter. 
The practice was so environmentally damaging 
that it actually started to undermine productivity, 
even in the best-endowed areas. By the early-
1990s, soil degradation was estimated to have 
reached levels as high as 47 percent in the Arrecifes 
River basin and 60 percent in the farmland of the 
Carcaraña River basin, two of the most important 
areas in Argentina’s Pampas region.2 
As a result of these problems, both scientists 
and farmers were interested in exploring cultiva-
tion practices that were less aggressive with regard 
to the preparation of the soil, less conducive to soil 
erosion, and less detrimental to productivity. Their 
exploration was accompanied by debates about 
appropriate technologies, farm shows to demon-
strate alternative cultivation practices, and foreign 
study tours to learn about practices in other 
countries. It was in this context that the develop-
ment of zero-tillage cultivation practices began in 
Argentina.
Zero tillage (also called no-tillage farming) 
is a resource-conserving cultivation practice that 
depletes organic matter from the soil at a lower 
rate than conventional tilling and improves the 
soil’s capacity to retain moisture. Under zero-
tillage cultivation, crops are planted in untilled 
soil by making a narrow hole or trench of suf-
ficient width and depth to cover seeds and apply 
fertilizer. The opening is typically prepared by a 
tractor-drawn driller, although in some countries 
such as India, draught animals are used instead of 
a tractor (see Chapter 9). The soil remains covered 
by plants from previous crops, and herbicides are 
used to break these plants down and return their 
nutrients to the soil. The seeds that emerge from 
the undisturbed soil draw on the nutrients from 
these plant residues for their growth.
The method was first popularized in the 1950s 
and 1960s in industrialized countries with the 
introduction of commercial herbicides. Farmers 
in the United States began experimenting with 
zero tillage in the 1970s, and scientists at the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, the University 
of Illinois, and the University of Kentucky con-
tributed greatly to the technology’s further 
development. By the end of the decade, the 
pipeline of zero-tillage technology—cultivation 
techniques, drillers, herbicides, and so on—was 
substantial, with promising applications not 
only in the United States, but also in Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Germany, among other 
countries. In Latin America, zero tillage was intro-
duced by the Instituto de Pesquisas Agropecuarias 
Meridional (IPEAME) in Londrina, in the state of 
Paraná, Brazil, in cooperation with the German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ).3 
Zero tillage (and reduced tillage, which 





























preparation) has several advantages. It can 
improve water retention, reduce soil erosion, lower 
the chances of drought-related crop failures, and 
lessen the need for labor that would be otherwise 
required for soil preparation and weeding. These 
advantages together help reduce or even neutral-
ize decades-long erosion processes, improve soil 
fertility, maintain or increase crop yields, and 
lower production costs. 
The Emergence of Zero 
Tillage in Argentina
The successful introduction of zero-tillage 
cultivation practices in Argentina—not only for 
soybean, but also for wheat, maize, sunflower, and 
sorghum, although on a much smaller scale—is a 
unique story in many ways. Zero-tillage cultivation 
was advanced by the emergence of a farmer-
driven network that brought together researchers, 
extension agents, private input suppliers, 
agricultural machinery producers, and others to 
adapt zero-tillage techniques and equipment to the 
needs of farmers in the Argentine Pampas.4
The story begins as early as 1968, when the 
National Institute of Agricultural Technology 
(INTA), Argentina’s largest agricultural research 
institution, started to notice the soil erosion 
problems that affected crop yields and output. 
This issue led to the establishment of a soil con-
servation program at INTA (later known as INTA’s 
Conservationist Agriculture Project), which played 
a significant role in developing both scientific 
capacity to address soil-fertility issues, and spe-
cialized machinery needed to practice zero-tillage 
cultivation. 
But INTA was not the only one to notice 
the effects of inadequate soil-management 
practices. In fact, zero tillage was being explored 
by a number of individuals representing various 
interests—farmers, technical-assistance providers, 
agricultural-input companies, and researchers—
as early as 1975. Through informal exchanges of 
information and experience, the idea that zero-
tillage cultivation could be adapted to the needs of 
Argentine farmers gained substantial footing. 
In working together to identify problems, try 
alternatives, and share information, these informal 
exchanges between and among private and public 
actors laid the groundwork for a formal network 
that spearheaded the widespread promotion and 
use of zero-tillage cultivation practices. A shared 
perception of the nature of the problem and a con-
vergence of interests among these various actors 
was the initial glue that led to the creation of the 
Argentine Association of No-Till Farmers, known 
by its Spanish acronym, AAPRESID.
AAPRESID was formed in 1989 as a nongov-
ernmental organization composed of farmers with 
an interest in conservation. Its main goal was to 
bring together researchers, extension agents, and 
private input-supply companies to get zero tillage 
off the ground, but it also acted as a lobbying 
group to help its members acquire necessary farm 
equipment, and to secure loans and tax exemp-
tions for farmers adopting zero-tillage practices on 
their farms. 
AAPRESID’s 20 or so founding members 
were mainly medium-and small-scale farmers 
and technical-assistance providers, all of whom 
were already involved in the movement to promote 
zero-tillage agriculture in Argentina. AAPRESID 
grew rapidly in tandem with the speedy increase 
in the adoption of zero-tillage farming throughout 
the country. Soon, the majority of key players in 
the agribusiness sector became members, and by 
1996, AAPRESID was firmly established as the 
main force driving the development and expansion 
of zero-tillage cultivation.
Accelerating the Cultivation 
of Soybean 
Three events contributed to a boost in zero-
tillage cultivation of soybean and other crops 
in Argentina in the 1990s. First, new soybean 
varieties were introduced in 1996 that were geneti-
cally modified to be resistant to the herbicide 
glyphosate (sold commercially in many countries 
under the brand name of Roundup Ready®). 
Glyphosate, commonly used as a weed killer, 
is particularly useful in zero-tillage cultivation 
because it breaks down plant residues and returns 
their nutrients to the soil. Using glyophsate in 
combination with the herbicide-tolerant soybean 
meant that farmers could apply the chemical, 
break down plant residue and weeds, and plant 
soybean quickly. This technique was aided by the 
use of drillers that seeded rather than plowed the 
soil in a way that encourages erosion.
Second, there was a significant decline in the 
global price of glyphosate during roughly the same 
time. The herbicide’s price began falling when its 
patent, held by Monsanto, a U.S.-based crop science 62	 	
and agricultural inputs company, expired. The 
patent expiration allowed for new competition and 
lower prices in the local market for the herbicide. 
Third, there was a change in Argentina’s 
economic policy regime with respect to agriculture. 
The government eliminated agricultural export 
taxes and reduced import duties on inputs and 
capital goods during the early-1990s. This change, 
together with the deregulation of a number of key 
markets for both agricultural goods and services, 
created favorable conditions that eventually led to 
the increase of both grain and oilseed production, 
the latter of which includes soybean. 
As a result of these convergent events, overall 
grain and oilseed production in Argentina grew 
from 26 million tons in 1988–89 to more than  
67 million tons in 2000–01. Cultivation of grain 
and oilseed crops using zero tillage expanded from 
about 300,000 hectares of land in 1990–91 to 
more than 22 million hectares in 2007–08  
(see Figure 8.1). 
As of 2007, Argentina’s soybean production 
accounted for more than 20 percent of global 
production, up from less than 5 percent as late as 
1982. Argentina is now the third-largest exporter 




There is much global debate about the use of 
chemical herbicides and genetically modified, 
herbicide-tolerant soybean in Argentina. These two 
inputs are central to making zero-tillage cultivation 
possible, and studies show that their environmen-
tal impacts are, at worst, no more significant than 
alternative inputs, and at best, when combined with 
zero-tillage practices, beneficial for soil fertility.5 
There is also some debate in Argentina over 
the influence of zero-tillage soybean cultivation on 
farming systems beyond the Pampas. Additional 
research is needed to better understand the 
potential impacts of a shift in farming systems—
from mostly extensive livestock production to 
relatively intensive agricultural production—in the 
more marginal areas outside the Pampean region.  
Irrespective of these issues, more than 22 
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million hectares of land were brought under zero-
tillage cultivation in Argentina between 1991 and 
2008, with valuable benefits for soil fertility, farmer 
incomes, export earnings, and global stocks of both 
food and feed. The use of zero tillage, along with 
the introduction of herbicide-resistant soybean 
varieties and other factors, improved soil fertility 
by reversing decades of erosion and the long-term 
threat of unsustainable land exploitation. 
In economic terms, about 8.3 percent of the 
total value of production of soybean and maize 
in Argentina—around US$12 billion—could be 
attributed to zero tillage, complementary tech-
nological innovations, and economic factors 
described earlier. For farmers alone, the cumula-
tive savings associated with the use of zero tillage 
since 1991 comes to about $4.7 billion. Moreover, 
the industry that emerged from the introduc-
tion of zero tillage—farm equipment production, 
extension services, input supplies, farming, and 
other related activities—is estimated to have 
generated some 200,000 new jobs in Argentina’s 
agricultural sector between 1993 and 1999.6 
Lessons Learned
The success of zero tillage in Argentina can 
be attributed to a combination of appropriate 
research and technology and the will to make it 
work. Beyond the quantitative impacts that have 
benefited Argentine farmers and global consumers, 
the social and economic processes that brought 
about the boom in zero tillage are themselves a 
success story.
Argentina’s switch from conventional planting 
to zero-till cultivation demonstrates that change 
is often more than the introduction and adoption 
of a new technology. Rather, change can involve 
the entire reorganization of the agricultural sector. 
The diffusion of zero-tillage cultivation practices 
in Argentina has had long-lasting effects on the 
ways in which key economic players—farmers, 
businesses, and government—interact to improve 
agricultural production. It has had a durable 
impact on the structure and composition of 
Argentina’s agricultural sector. And it has had a 
long-term impact on the soil—on the sustainability 
of intensive agriculture—in the country.
In particular, this story 
is anchored by a partner-
ship among very diverse 
stakeholders—farmers, 
scientists, extension agents, 
input suppliers, and farm-
equipment producers—who 
identified a problem and, 
in the process of sharing 
information and developing 
solutions, coalesced around 
an innovative network that 
allowed for the tremen-
dous growth in zero-tillage 
cultivation. 
And with the rise of 
Argentina as a major soybean 
exporter, this combination 
of technologies, practices, 
and ideas has provided the 
country with valuable export 
earnings while also supplying 
the international market with 
a food and feed crop that has 
contributed to keeping global 
food prices low.  n
Source:  FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2009. FAOSTAT 
statistical database. Rome.
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NOTES
The world’s savannahs have long been written off as wastelands due to their highly weathered, acidic, nutrient-
poor soils that inhibit agricultural production. The Cerrado region of Brazil—an area covering approximately 
204 million hectares of land (or 24 percent of Brazil’s entire land area) and representing 15 percent of world’s 
savannah area—was one such region, until the 1970s.a  
From a scientific perspective, the Cerrado region’s potential was unleashed when scientists at the Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) formulated a mixture of phosphorus, lime, and other inputs that 
could dramatically improve soil fertility and thus the agricultural potential of the region. But removing this 
technical impediment is only part of the story. Complementary investments by the Government of Brazil and 
hard work by farmers who took a chance by investing their livelihoods in the Cerrado also played key roles in the 
region’s development. For example, a critical contribution came from Embrapa’s investments in the development 
of crop varieties and cultivation practices that were appropriate to the savannah’s climate and soil and, therefore, 
encouraged the expansion of agricultural production in the region. Similarly valuable contributions came from 
direct government support in the form of road and irrigation development in the region, and indirect support in the 
form of low-interest loans to purchase fertilizers and machinery and to access veterinary services. 
By the late-1970s, large-scale farming and cattle ranching began to expand dramatically in the Cerrado. 
Today, with an estimated 40 to 50 percent of the Cerrado under productive use,  the region accounts for 59 
percent of Brazil’s coffee production, 55 percent of its beef,  54 percent of its soybean, 28 percent of its maize, 
and 18 percent of its rice.b By bringing the Cerrado into production, Brazil has been transformed into a global 
powerhouse for food and agriculture, and has been able to contribute to keeping both domestic and global food 
and feed prices relatively low. 
Importantly, the development of the Brazilian Cerrado offers valuable insights for other developing countries 
aiming to increase food and agricultural production as a means of reducing food insecurity, increasing incomes, 
and improving livelihoods—particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the largest concentrations of savannah areas 
still exist.
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Cultivating the Cerrado in Brazil	 65
T
he Indo-Gangetic Plains—named for 
the Indus and Ganges Rivers—is the 
breadbasket of the Indian subcontinent. 
This large swath of land, running from 
Pakistan across northern India and southern 
Nepal and into Bangladesh, is South Asia’s center 
of wheat and rice production. Since the mid-1990s, 
hundreds of thousands of farmers, nudged by 
stagnating crop yields, have adopted a new way of 
farming known as zero tillage. 
Zero tillage (see Chapter 8) is a cultivation 
practice that not only helps preserve soil fertility 
and conserves scarce water, but also boosts yields 
and increases farmers’ profits by reducing their 
production costs. Instead of plowing their fields 
and then planting seeds, farmers who use zero 
tillage deposit seeds into holes drilled into the 
unplowed fields. An estimated 620,000 wheat 
farmers in northern India have adopted various 
forms of zero tillage on an estimated 1.76 million 
hectares of land under rice and wheat cultivation, 
with average income gains amounting to US$180–
340 per household per year.
“Drilling” for Crops
The Green Revolution (see Chapter 3) transformed 
the Indo-Gangetic Plains. The technological 
package of improved wheat and rice seed, 
chemical fertilizer, and irrigation, accompanied 
by supportive policies, led to rapid productivity 
growth and the advent of rice–wheat systems. In 
rice–wheat systems, farmers cultivate two crops 
a year. During the cool, dry winter they grow 
wheat—the traditional mainstay of food security 
in the northwest Indo-Gangetic Plains—and 
during the warm monsoon season, they switch 
to growing rice. This pattern of cultivation now 
covers an estimated 14 million hectares of land in 
the region.1 
Since the 1990s, however, productivity growth 
in rice–wheat systems has stagnated for both 
crops.2 The main culprits appear to be land deg-
radation—or, the decline in soil quality associated 
with inappropriate soil and water management—
and the tendency for farmers to plant wheat too 
late to achieve the highest possible yields. By 
the time farmers have finished harvesting their 
rice, they are often hard-pressed to prepare their 
fields and plant wheat in a timely fashion. Rising 
productivity in rice and wheat has long been the 
linchpin of food security and rural economic 
growth in the region, so the slowdown in produc-
tivity growth generated serious concern. 
A promising option to help address this 
problem has arisen in the form of zero-tillage 
cultivation. What if farmers do not have to plow 
their fields before planting wheat? Eliminating this 
step not only saves precious time, but also avoids 
disturbing the soil in ways that contribute to soil 
degradation and the growth of weeds. By sowing 
seeds in unplowed fields in small slots or trenches 
that are carved out by tractor-drawn seed drills, 
farmers can also avoid drying out the soil and, 
thus, can use water more sparingly. 
The success of zero-tillage cultivation in 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and the United States 
provided the initial impetus for zero tillage in the 
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Indo-Gangetic Plains. But the zero-tillage practices 
used on large mechanized farms in the aforemen-
tioned countries did not immediately translate 
into viable practices for small-scale, resource-poor 
farmers in South Asia. 
At first, the specialized agricultural machinery 
required to plant seeds in a zero-tillage system 
was not available in the region. In the mid-1980s, 
though, the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) introduced a 
prototype drill in Pakistan. Using this prototype, 
scientists from Pakistan’s National Agricultural 
Research Centre developed zero-tillage methods 
suitable for local conditions. In India, CIMMYT 
introduced a prototype in 1989, and, in 1991, the 
first prototype of an Indian zero-tillage seed drill 
was developed at the G. B. Pant University of 
Agriculture and Technology in Pantnagar. 
The goal, however, was to develop a model 
that local manufacturers could produce and sell at 
an affordable price. Working with CIMMYT and 
the Rice-Wheat Consortium for the Indo-Gangetic 
Plains (a consortium of national and interna-
tional agricultural research institutions and other 
partners), both countries undertook programs to 
further develop and commercialize zero-tillage 
drills. Private sector companies improved and 
adapted the prototype drills, based on feedback 
from farmers. Most farmers using zero-tillage 
technology in the region now rely on locally manu-
factured zero-till seed drills, drawn by tractors, 
with 6 to 11 tines that sow wheat directly into 
unplowed fields with a single pass of the tractor.
India in particular was highly successful at 
developing local manufacturing capacity to adapt 
and produce zero-tillage drills at a competi-
tive cost. In 2003, the average price of a zero-till 
drill was $325 in India, compared with $559 in 
Pakistan.3 Close links between scientists and 
farmers in India also helped. Private manufactur-
ers placed machines in villages, where farmers 
could try them out, allowing for rapid feedback 
and the refinement of implements. State and local 
government officials helped disseminate the new 
technology and even subsidized the equipment 
to lower its cost to farmers. The Rice-Wheat 
Consortium helped build the public–private part-
nership, nurtured it through its formative stages, 
and facilitated technology transfers from interna-









Falling Costs, Rising 
Incomes
The spread of zero-tillage technology began in the 
late-1990s and accelerated in the early-2000s, 
particularly in the northwest Indo-Gangetic Plains 
of India, where zero- or reduced-tillage wheat 
accounts for between one-fifth and one-fourth 
of the wheat area.4 Surveys of farm households 
from 2003–04 found that 34.5 percent of sampled 
farmers in India’s Haryana and 19 percent in 
Pakistan’s Punjab used zero tillage (although many 
of them did not use zero tillage on their entire 
wheat crop).5 The spread of zero tillage has been 
slower in Pakistan than in India, hampered by, 
among other things, bureaucratic struggles within 
the national system about whether or not zero 
tillage was viable as well as a smaller presence of 
the Rice-Wheat Consortium. In the Indo-Gangetic 
Plains of India, about 620,000 farmers use zero- 
and reduced-tillage wheat, which is now estimated 
to cover 1.76 million hectares of land. Studies show 
that the payoffs to the investments in the research 
and development of zero- and reduced-tillage 
techniques by the Rice-Wheat Consortium of the 
Indo-Gangetic Plains and CIMMYT were substan-
tial, aided by accelerating farmers’ adoption of 
these practices by at least five years.6
In India, a review of zero-tillage wheat studies 
showed that adopting farmers could increase their 
incomes by about $97 per hectare of land, for two 
reasons—zero tillage raised their wheat yields and 
reduced their production costs.7 Adopter farm 
households could increase their annual overall 
incomes by $180 to $340. Large-scale farm 
surveys confirmed both a significant yield effect 
and cost-saving effect in Haryana (see Figure 9.1). 
But similar farm surveys in Punjab in Pakistan 
found zero tillage to be primarily a cost-saving 
technology for wheat cultivation, with no signifi-
cant yield effect. 
The biggest contributor to farmers’ increased 
income is the cost-saving effect. Using zero tillage, 
farmers spend much less time and fuel using 
tractors to prepare the land and plant wheat. The 
tractor-drawn zero-tillage drills allow farmers to 
make just one pass through their fields rather than 
the eight passes typically needed during traditional 
cultivation. As a result, farmers achieve an imme-
diate—and recurrent—cost savings amounting to 
Source: Erenstein, O. 2009. Adoption and impact of conservation agriculture–based, resource-conserving technologies in South Asia. 
In Proceedings 4th World Congress on Conservation Agriculture, February 4–7, 2009, New Delhi, India. New Delhi: World Congress on 
Conservation Agriculture.
Figure 9.1—Financial advantage of zero tillage over conventional tillage for 
wheat, 2003–04 



























about 15 to 16 percent of their operational costs, or 
about $52 per hectare of land in India.8
In addition, zero tillage has been shown to 
increase wheat yields in India by 5 to 7 percent, 
further boosting farmers’ returns.9 The rise in 
yields is closely associated with the timelier 
planting of wheat. If farmers cannot manage to 
plant wheat before mid-November, heat stress at 
the end of the wheat season can reduce their yields 
by 1 to 1.5 percent a day.10 By allowing farmers to 
plant wheat more quickly after the rice harvest, 
zero tillage can reduce these yield losses.
Zero tillage has reportedly increased families’ 
food consumption in some areas, probably through 
higher disposable income. And the adoption of 
zero-tillage cultivation has helped households free 
up time and money for various other productive, 
social, and leisure endeavors as well. 
Doing More to Reach  
the Poor
Zero tillage has so far primarily benefited farmers 
in the northwest Indo-Gangetic Plains of India, 
who typically operate more intensive and produc-
tive rice–wheat systems, have greater institutional 
support, and suffer from less poverty than do 
farmers in the eastern Indo-Gangetic Plains. The 
eastern plains, an area with 500 million people, 
are characterized by smallholders (70 to 90 
percent of farm households farm fewer than 2 
hectares of land) and widespread poverty (more 
than two-thirds survive on less than $2 per day).11 
Yet zero tillage has the potential to generate even 
greater yield gains and cost savings in these areas, 
where agriculture is less intensive. 
Another issue is whether zero-tillage cul-
tivation practices are displacing agricultural 
laborers. With the Green Revolution–induced 
intensification of agricultural production in the 
Indo-Gangetic Plains, farm labor opportunities 
have been an important source of income for 
landless and migrant workers. Yet given that wheat 
cultivation in the Indo-Gangetic Plains is already 
highly mechanized with the use of tractors, diesel 
pumps, and other equipment, this risk appears 
small—at least with respect to wheat cultivation. 
But if farmers adopt zero tillage for rice cultiva-
tion, laborers could indeed lose their earnings 
from the labor-intensive process of transplanting 
rice seedlings into wet fields. It is thus important 
to carefully examine the implications of dissemi-
nating this technology more widely. 
A Step toward Agricultural 
Sustainability 
Zero-tillage cultivation is having positive envi-
ronmental impacts in the Indo-Gangetic Plains. 
It saves fossil fuel, reduces greenhouse gas 
emissions, and cuts water use. Research has 
shown that farmers can save 36 liters of diesel 
fuel per hectare of land, an 80 percent savings 
over conventional wheat tillage.12 More research is 
needed to quantify the full range of environmental 
impacts.
Still, zero tillage should be used as a stepping 
stone to a broader agricultural concept known as 
conservation agriculture, which involves minimal 
disturbance of the soil, retention of residue mulch 
on the soil surface, and a rational use of crop 
rotations—an approach increasingly recognized as 
essential for sustainable agriculture. Zero tillage 
currently foregoes many of the benefits associ-
ated with conservation agriculture because it is 
applied to only one of the two cropping seasons, 
without adequate residue management or crop 
rotation. Reducing the tillage of rice still presents 
a challenge, particularly in terms of water and 
weed management and available rice varieties. 
Researchers in the Indo-Gangetic Plains are 
working to address these challenges and develop 
viable “double no-till” rice–wheat systems in 
which zero-tillage practices are applied to both rice 
and wheat cultivation.
Lessons Learned
Despite the wealth of information on zero tillage in 
the Indo-Gangetic Plains, much still remains to be 
learned about the spread of the technology and its 
impacts. Nonetheless, several key lessons from the 
success of zero tillage present themselves.
Create a technology attractive to 
private users and producers
The key to successfully introducing a new technol-
ogy is a financially attractive intervention. In many 
cases, interventions that are attractive from an 
environmental or social point of view do not get off 
the ground because of a lack of interest by com-
mercially minded actors—farmers who produce 
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for the market or equipment distributors who sell 
to farmers. Zero tillage proved attractive from a 
private viewpoint—for both technology suppliers 
and technology users—in the Indo-Gangetic Plains. 
It is important to show that the technology 
delivers on its promises in the farmers’ villages and 
fields. Research and development should actively 
involve farmers through, for instance, participa-
tory projects, farmer-to-farmer exchanges, and 
traveling seminars. Moving agricultural experts 
away from the yield paradigm can be a challenge. 
Producing the same with less can be an attractive 
proposition to farmers because it enhances their 
bottom line, but it implies a shift in mindset that 
has traditionally focused on producing more per 
unit of area.
Another critical aspect is to link farmers with 
knowledgeable and accessible technology suppliers, 
including local manufacturers who can make 
equipment that will do the job well at a competi-
tive price and adapt and repair it as needed. The 
successful business model that emerged for zero-
tillage drills also benefited from the fact that the 
zero-tillage drills are applicable across the Indo-
Gangetic Plains—a large area with many farmers. 
Pay attention to context
Context was imperative in the success of zero 
tillage in India. The slowdown in productivity 
growth in rice–wheat systems and concerns about 
production costs and sustainability opened the 
door to resource-conserving technologies like 
zero tillage. Concerned by stagnating productiv-
ity, many farmers became interested in prospects 
for improving their bottom line. The increas-
ing problem of herbicide tolerance of the weed 
Phalaris minor in the Indian state of Haryana 
also helped break through farmers’ reluctance to 
even try zero-tillage technology. Researchers were 
interested and excited by the prospects of enabling 
change in farmers’ fields. Policymakers were inter-
ested in technological solutions to enhance the 
sustainability of South Asia’s breadbasket while 
avoiding more demanding institutional changes. 
Use institutions and people to 
promote the technology
The Rice-Wheat Consortium played a pivotal and 
innovative role as facilitator, information provider, 
technology clearinghouse, and capacity builder. By 
providing resources to help get the technology out 
into farmers’ fields and manufacturers’ workshops, 
and by offering a forum in which interested parties 
could interact, the consortium played a critical role 
in spreading zero-tillage technology in the Indo-
Gangetic Plains. Key champions in the agricultural 
research and development system also picked up 
the technology and promoted it despite initial 
resistance. 
Conclusion
Hundreds of thousands of farm households in the 
Indo-Gangetic Plains have increased their farm 
income by adopting zero-tillage cultivation, while 
also generating significant benefits for the envi-
ronment—reductions in water and fuel use and 
improvements in soil conservation. Concerted 
efforts by an array of stakeholders that spanned 
public and private sectors, national and inter-
national research systems, and included several 
persevering champions provided the institutional 
support for this technological opportunity to 
materialize. The success of zero-tillage wheat so 
far could serve as a stepping stone to conserva-
tion agriculture and equitable rural development. 
And by raising farmers’ incomes and preserving 
the natural resource base on which agriculture 
depends, zero tillage is laying the groundwork 
for improved food security in South Asia’s Indo-
Gangetic Plains in the years to come.  n
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A
s  a result of extreme population pressures 
  on declining arable land, Bangladesh  
    has historically struggled with food  
      security. Exacerbating the situation 
are unpredictable monsoon seasons, flooding, and 
drought that can cause severe crop damage and 
yield losses. Despite these endemic challenges, 
Bangladesh has more than doubled the production 
of cereal grains since it became an independent 
nation in 1971.
This surge in productivity can be largely attrib-
uted to the proliferation of relatively simple and 
affordable shallow tubewells along with the devel-
opment of high-yielding, dry season rice, known 
locally as boro rice. In fact, boro rice production 
has increased from 10 percent of the country’s rice 
total rice production in 1966–67, when the Green 
Revolution was initiated, to 61 percent in 2008. 
The additional rice cultivated with the improved 
boro rice variety now feeds nearly 22 million 
people annually.
In addition to improving food security, boro 
rice has helped stabilize prices of staple food and 
has been the major factor behind the country’s 
recent downward trend in inflation, as well as in the 
reduction of poverty by almost 1 percent per year.1 
Shift in Government Policy 
Provides the Catalyst  
for Growth
Modern, small-scale irrigation technologies—
devices such as deep tubewells, shallow tubewells, 
hand tubewells, and low-lift pumps—have played 
an important role in Bangladesh’s agricultural 
sector since the early-1960s. Their use began in 
1962–63 with the supply of low-lift pumps for 
lifting water from surface sources to adjoining 
fields. The low-lift pumps spread quickly in the 
depressed basins of the northeastern and central 
regions where surface water was easily available in 
the dry season. By the mid-1970s, nearly 35,000 
shallow tubewells were fielded, irrigating nearly 
0.57 million hectares of land. By 1982–83, deep 
tubewells and shallow tubewells together were 
irrigating 0.61 million hectares of land, 40 percent 
of the country’s total irrigated area.2
However, high import duties meant that 
low-cost pumps and other irrigation equipment 
from Japan were largely inaccessible for most 
small-scale farmers. Instead, these farmers 
were forced to rely on a handful of state-owned 
companies that controlled the procurement, 
installation, and distribution and management of 
irrigation equipment, as well as the distribution 
of fertilizer and seeds. In spite of substantial 
government subsidies on equipment and inputs, 
farmers’ total dependence on the government 
effectively suppressed production capacity as the 
government struggled to keep up with demand 
and to efficiently manage the distribution of 
equipment. 
Despite the conventional wisdom of the time 
warning against privatization, it was clear that 
Bangladesh’s policy of direct involvement in the 
input market was inefficient and unsustainable. 
Pumping up Production
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Recognizing this reality, in 1979 the government 
initiated a policy to liberalize modern agricultural 
inputs, allowing for privatization in the import and 
marketing of irrigation equipment and chemical 
fertilizers. The policy reform was completed in 
1988–89 with the removal of a ban on the import 
of small engines, the elimination of import duties, 
and the withdrawal of restrictions on importing a 
variety of standard farm equipment. By early 1989, 
the cost of installing a shallow tubewell to irrigate 4 
to 5 hectares of land had fallen to about 60 percent 
of its subsidized price before privatization.3
This policy shift improved farmers’ access to 
minor irrigation equipment and opened the door 
to the rapid expansion of groundwater irrigation. 
With the reduction in prices, medium- and small-
scale farmers could afford the investment, which 
they financed mostly with their own savings. The 
total area of land irrigated increased from 2.06 
million hectares in 1988 to 3.56 million hectares 
in 2001 and 5.05 million hectares in 2008, or an 
average rate of increase of 150,000 hectares per 
year. Most of the increase can be attributed to 
groundwater exploitation through tubewells, with 
shallow tubewells accounting for 85 percent of the 
total increase. Today nearly 70 percent of farm 
households in Bangladesh use shallow tubewells 
for irrigation—equivalent to two-thirds of the 
country’s total irrigated area, or some 3.2 million 
hectares of land.4 
Boro Rice Leads the Way  
to Improved Yields and 
Food Security 
About a decade before market liberalization, sci-
entists were working to improve traditional boro 
rice yields. This led to the development of modern 
varieties of dry-season irrigated boro rice, which 
now are the highest yielding among Bangladesh’s 
three seasonal rice varieties. However, without 
an irrigation system, boro can only be grown in 
extreme low-lying lands in depressed basins that, 
given Bangladesh’s agroecological conditions, 
severely limited its production potential. Further, 
in order to thrive, boro rice is relatively dependent 
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on fertilizer, the supply of which was limited under 
a government-managed distribution system. Boro 
rice production increased dramatically once these 
two limitations were vanquished, mostly because 
privatization led to the spread of minor irrigation 
equipment and restrictions on fertilizer supply 
loosened.
With the expansion of shallow tubewells and 
other irrigation systems, boro rice cultivation has 
gradually spread from the very low-lying lands 
to higher elevations, replacing the traditional 
rice varieties known as aus (which is drought-
tolerant but low-yielding) and deep-water aman 
(a long-duration crop but susceptible to damage 
by flooding). During 1989–2008, the area of land 
planted with aus and aman rice declined by  
1.7 million and 0.5 million hectares, respectively, 
as it was replaced with boro rice. In fact, though 
the total acreage of land under rice cultivation 
did not change, production has increased from 
23 million tons in 1989–90 to 43 million tons in 
2007–08, due to the rapid expansion of boro rice 
cultivation. Modern variety boro rice is cultivated 
on nearly all irrigated land in the dry season, and 
it has accounted for almost the entire increase 
in Bangladesh’s rice production since 1988 (see 
Figure 10.1). 
The increase in rice production after the policy 
change that eased access to agricultural inputs is 
estimated at 5.9 million tons per year. The changes 
that came with the government’s liberalization of 
markets also created 238,000 new full-time jobs.
Increased Production, 
Decreased Prices
Though boro rice is relatively intensive in terms of 
the amounts of water, fertilizer, and other inputs 
needed for cultivation, its high yields mean that 
the costs, when measured against the amount of 
rice produced, are still lower compared with other 
varieties. For example, the cost of production per 
ton of output for boro was 22 percent lower than 
aus in 1988 and 17 percent lower in 2007. Reduced 
production costs for farmers have helped keep 
rice prices within affordable limits of low-income 
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, monthly statistical bulletins and statistical yearbooks, various years.
Figure 10.1—Contribution of boro rice to growth in rice production, 1950-2002








































rice consumers. The price of rice declined by 0.42 
taka per kilogram (kg) (US$6.14 per ton) per year 
during 1976–88 and a further 0.55 taka per kg 
($8.04 per ton) per year from 1988 to 2007 (see 
Figure 10.2). The cheaper price of rice that followed 
increased production has been particularly benefi-
cial for low-income urban consumers and the rural 
landless, who spend on average nearly 50 percent 
of their budget on food (compared with 30 percent 
for all consumers). In tandem with this outcome, 
the incidence of poverty declined by 1 percent per 
year during the 1980s and 1990s. The progress was 
more rapid at 2 percent per year during 2000–05.5
Emergence of a Water 
Market Benefits Small 
Farmers 
Privatization has led to an increase in the share 
of farms owning shallow tubewells from just 4.6 
percent in 1988 to 22 percent in 2007, and the cost 
of the tubewells has declined from $670 to $220 
during the past two decades. However, ownership 
is skewed toward larger landholders, with 2007 
data showing shallow tubewells in the hands of 
almost 90 percent of farmers operating farms of 
more than 2 hectares of land, compared to only 6 
percent of farmers operating up to 0.4 hectares. 
The latter group constitutes 52 percent of farm 
households in Bangladesh.
But while most marginal farmers do not own 
shallow tubewells, they have universal access to 
irrigation through a water market that emerged 
with the proliferation of the shallow tubewells. 
Due to the fragmented and scattered nature of 
landholdings in Bangladesh, land parcels near a 
tubewell are usually owned by a number of farmers 
in addition to the tubewell owner. Consequently, 
the tubewell owner can sell water to operators of 
adjoining plots to optimize use of the well. This 
has given rise to active local markets for water 
transactions, pushed down the costs of water 
use, provided tubewell owners and users with an 
incentive to use water wisely and economically, 
and contributed to widespread adoption of modern 
rice varieties in the dry season. 
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Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, monthly statistical bulletins and statistical yearbooks, various years.
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Environmental Impact 
The expansion of boro rice cultivation has raised 
some environmental concerns. One is the prospec-
tive decline in soil fertility due to growing more 
than one crop on the same piece of land, a practice 
that has increased with the availability of irrigation 
and the shorter time to maturity of modern rice 
varieties.  However, such double cropping of rice is 
widely prevalent in medium and high lands only. 
Also, it is not yet clear whether double cropping 
and the concomitant yield increases do indeed 
threaten soil fertility. 
Another concern is that boro rice is pushing 
out major noncereal crops such as pulses and 
oilseeds, important sources of protein and micro-
nutrients for the poor (see Chapter 15). The area 
of land on which pulses and oilseeds are cultivated 
indeed has declined over time, though it is unclear 
whether this is entirely because of the expansion of 
boro rice cultivation. 
A third point pertains to the heavy use of pes-
ticides with boro rice, which is having an adverse 
impact on the quality of surface water and the fish 
habitat. The incidence of pesticide use is very high 
with boro rice compared with other rice varieties. 
In 2008, more than 80 percent of farmers used 
pesticides in the cultivation of modern boro rice 
compared with only 9 percent for wheat and about 
16 percent for other traditional rice varieties.
Finally, the overexploitation of groundwater 
resources may be damaging the country’s drinking 
water. Cultivating rice during the dry season is 
requiring a heavy use of groundwater through 
shallow tubewells. The National Commission on 
Agriculture noted that the potential recharge of 
the aquifer that could be extracted by shallow 
tubewells had almost been exploited by 1996. Since 
then, the use of shallow tubewells has expanded, 
which suggests that the groundwater resources 
have already been overexploited. To address this 
problem, other options could be considered, such 
as harvesting rainwater and a synchronized use 
of surface water and groundwater for further 
expansion of boro cultivation in Bangladesh.
Another concern related to the country’s 
drinking water is arsenic contamination, which 
has been shown to be a serious problem in 
Bangladesh.6 However, its link with the exploita-
tion of groundwater for boro cultivation has yet to 
be firmly established.  
Lessons Learned: The Right 
Equipment and the Right 
Policies Plant the Seeds for 
Improved Food Security
In the 1960s when the long-term irrigation policy 
and water-resource development plans were for-
mulated, policymakers and civil society generally 
agreed that private investment-based minor irriga-
tion was inappropriate for Bangladesh because 
they feared that small farmers and share tenants 
would be marginalized by such a system. When the 
privatization of the input market began to take hold 
in Bangladesh in the early-1980s, this sentiment 
remained largely unchanged, with concerns that 
privatization would create inequity in access to 
irrigation water and promote further inequality in 
the distribution of agricultural income.7
Yet the experience shows a different outcome. 
The relaxation on import duties on minor irrigation 
equipment and the encouragement of private trade 
in the input market did not stand in the way of 
progress. Farmers’ increased access to small-scale 
irrigation equipment such as shallow tubewells has 
allowed for high-yielding boro rice in Bangladesh 
to be cultivated on low-lying lands as well as on 
medium-low and medium-high elevations.
With the Bangladesh government’s decision to 
deregulate input markets, particularly for minor 
irrigation equipment, the area of land under boro 
rice cultivation expanded tremendously. The gross 
effect of market liberalization for minor irriga-
tion equipment is an additional 5.9 million metric 
tons of rice production per year, enough to feed an 
additional 22 million people.  nNOTES
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n the second half of the 20th century, a 
race was underway in China between a 
blistering rate of population growth and 
vigorous efforts to feed an expanding 
populace by increasing rice production. Efforts in 
the 1960s to boost rice production gained ground 
with the introduction of semidwarf rice varieties 
that increased yields from 2 to 3.5 tons per hectare 
by 1975. These gains were respectable, but not 
sufficient. So Chinese scientists started developing 
even higher-yielding rice.
In 1976, Chinese scientists had made a crucial 
breakthrough, successfully commercializing what 
is known as three line hybrid rice, raising yields to 
more than 5 tons per hectare by 1983. As the tech-
nology advanced, nationwide rice yields averaged 
more than 6 tons per hectare by 1995. And by 
2004, yields of super hybrid rice cultivated in 
selected regions had achieved yields of more than 
10 tons per hectare.1
By pushing rice yields steadily and dramati-
cally upward, the development of hybrid rice has 
allowed China to feed an additional 60 million 
people a year while reducing the land allocated to 
rice production by 14 percent since 1978.  Hybrid 
rice now accounts for 63 percent of all land under 
rice cultivation in China, helping to make it the 
world’s largest rice-consuming country that also is 
self-sufficient in rice production.2
Breakthroughs in Rice 
Breeding
Historically, food security has been one of China’s 
greatest challenges. Since 1950, China’s arable 
land has been halved from 0.18 to 0.10 hectare 
per person, while its population has more than 
doubled from about 560 million to 1.3 billion.3 
Rice imports could not meet China’s burgeoning 
demand—only a small share of global rice produc-
tion reaches world trading systems. Agricultural 
production has thus become one of China’s top 
priorities.
China began its effort to develop hybrid rice in 
1964 (see box next page). In hybrids, the offspring 
plants of two genetically distinct parents offer 
higher yields or other positive traits superior to 
those of their parent plants (see Chapter 4). But 
scientists faced special challenges in developing 
hybrid rice because rice, unlike maize, is a self-
pollinating crop, with small florets that contain 
both male and female organs. To overcome this 
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difficulty, China’s rice breeders developed a system 
that combined three lines, or types, of rice rather 
than just two. First, a male sterile plant (called 
the A line) is bred, or crossed, with a genetically 
identical plant that is not sterile (called the 
maintainer line, or B line). The resulting plant 
is another male sterile plant that can then be 
crossbred with a genetically distinct plant (called 
the restorer line, or R line). The offspring is then a 
plant with fertile hybrid seeds. 
Scientists spent years searching for and 
developing A, B, and R lines that could produce 
rice plants with strong hybrid vigor. China’s 
Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry 
of Agriculture put their weight behind this effort, 
naming the three-line hybrid rice technology 
one of 22 key research projects in 1971. From 
1972 to 1975, scientists tested thousands of 
hybrids, comparing them with yields from other 
rice varieties commonly cultivated by farmers. 
The hybrids beat the yield results of these other 
varieties by 20 to 30 percent, signaling that 
hybrids had the potential to generate a significant 
jump in the country’s rice yields.4 
Still, the early hybrids faced a number of 
challenges: they were all based on a narrow 
genetic base, they were susceptible to disease, 
they produced only one late crop a year, and they 
produced relatively few grains when cultivated 
for seed production. As a consequence, farmer 
adoption of hybrids stagnated. It was not until the 
late-1970s and early-1980s that scientists intro-
duced more A lines to diversify the genetic base of 
hybrid rice and develop hybrids with different crop 
maturity dates and lower vulnerability to diseases 
and pests. By planting hybrids that were best suited 
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by adopting appropriate cultivation practices, 
Chinese farmers were rapidly able to reap the yield 
benefits of this new development in rice.
Hybrid rice cultivation also received a boost 
from concurrent policy reforms that occurred in 
China during the 1980s—primarily the transition 
from the collective production system before 1979 
to the household responsibility system after 1981 
(see Chapter 19), and the liberalization of the rice 
retail market in 1993. These policy shifts gave rice 
farmers more freedom to decide what types of rice 
to cultivate and encouraged hybrid rice breeders 
to develop hybrids designed to meet consumer 
preferences rather than strictly meeting produc-
tion quotas.
Ramping Up Seed 
Production
Still, producing enough good-quality, affordable 
seed to meet the farmers’ growing demand for 
hybrid rice remained a challenge. Without suf-
ficient quantities of seed for farmers, the gains 
generated through years of research would be 
lost. Scientists devoted themselves to studying 
genetics, environmental conditions, and water 
and fertilizer management in hybrid seed produc-
tion, and by 1975, they had developed a systematic 
package of techniques for producing hybrid rice 
seed. An army of about 30,000 people from rice-
growing provinces, including farmers, researchers 
and technicians, converged on Hainan Island in 
1975 to produce hybrid seeds. They succeeded 
in producing enough seeds to provide the raw 
material needed to launch large-scale commercial 
seed production in 1976, which was followed by 
large-scale hybrid rice cultivation in both southern 
and northern rice-growing regions (Figure 11.1).
Source: China National Hybrid Rice Research and Development Center (CNHRRDC). Hunan, China: CNHRRDC.
Figure 11.1—Average yields for hybrid rice seed production in China 
















































This seed production effort had not only 
helped to ensure that plenty of high-quality seeds 
would be available for commercial hybrid rice 
production, but it also lowered costs for seed busi-
nesses and farmers, promoting the fast and steady 
expansion of hybrid rice production throughout 
China. Many large hybrid rice seed businesses 
emerged in the late-1970s with the encouragement 
and support of the state. 
Pushing the Yield 
Boundaries 
In the early-1970s a Chinese scientist discovered 
a male sterile rice plant whose sterility could be 
controlled by length of daylight or temperature. 
In 1987, scientists proposed a way of using this 
material (called environment-conditioned genic 
male sterility, or EGMS) to develop hybrids using 
just two lines. By controlling the male sterility or 
fertility on the same plant under different environ-
mental conditions, scientists could eliminate a step 
in the hybrid development process. Besides simpli-
fying the process of developing a hybrid, the new 
two-line system was more effective in terms of both 
seed production and commercial rice production. 
In trials in southern China between 1998 and 2003, 
a number of two-line hybrids showed remarkable 
yield increases over the three-line hybrids.5 Dozens 
of two-line hybrids were released into commer-
cial production, and by 2008, two-line hybrids 
occupied 3.3 million hectares of land under rice 
cultivation, about 11 percent of total rice acreage 
and 22 percent of total hybrid rice acreage.6
But China has worked to push the yield bound-
aries still further. Encouraged by efforts in Japan 
and at the International Rice Research Institute to 
develop super-high-yielding rice, China proposed 
a super hybrid rice program in 1996. The program 
set ambitious yield targets: it aimed to achieve 10.5 
tons per hectare between 1996 and 2000 (Phase I), 
12 tons per hectare between 2001 and 2005 (Phase 
II), and 13.5 tons per hectare between 2006 and 
2015 (Phase III). Indeed, the program achieved its 
phase-one target in 2000 and its phase-two target 
in 2004. By 2006, the Ministry of Agriculture had 
certified 34 rice hybrids as “super rice.”7 Chinese 
rice breeders are now working on phase three. 
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More Food, Jobs, and Land
Hybrid rice technology has been essential to 
China’s self-sufficiency in rice production. China’s 
total rice production increased from 136.7 million 
tons in 1978 to 197 million tons in 2008—a 44.1 
percent jump—as the hybrid rice program raised 
the national average yield from 3.4 tons per 
hectare to 6.7 tons per hectare (a 67.5 percent 
increase in yield) (Figure 11.2). This growth in pro-
duction has allowed China to feed an additional 60 
million people per year. The concurrent reforms 
in China’s land tenure system also played an 
important role in promoting hybrid rice cultivation 
and improving production incentives for farmers. 
The fact that hybrid rice’s yield advantage has 
enabled China to cultivate it using less land is also 
clearly important. China reduced its total rice-
growing acreage from about 34.4 million hectares 
in 1978 to 29.4 million hectares in 2008, a 14.5 
percent decrease. Farmers could thus diversify into 
production of other crops, including high-value 
crops such as fruits and vegetables, on land not 
used for rice farming.8 China’s commercialized 
rice hybrids also have adapted better than con-
ventional inbred rice to a whole range of climatic 
and geographic conditions, including high-stress 
environments. Their vigorous root system, strong 
stem, thick leaves, and high photosynthesis effi-
ciency give them a significant yield advantage in 
rice-growing regions where environmental stresses 
are more acute.  
Hybrid rice technology has had an impact on 
China’s labor market as well. Hybrid rice research, 
extension, seed production, and allied industries 
employ tens of thousands of people, while the 
hybrid rice cultivation itself has helped to release 
rural labor into other off-farm areas of employ-
ment, such as rural industries.
Keys to Success
One of the most important elements in the suc-
cessful development and dissemination of hybrid 
rice was the full support and commitment of the 
Chinese government. From the research programs 
of the mid-1960s to today, the government has 
provided generous funding, conducive policies, and 
information campaigns that promoted the research, 
development, and deployment of hybrid rice. 
Coordination and collaboration were also 
critical for developing the new rice technologies. 
Commercializing both the three-line and two-line 
hybrid rice varieties took years of cooperative 
research by hundreds of rice scientists from 
research institutes and universities. A sophis-
ticated three-tier seed system and four-level 
research extension network also were key con-
tributors to the success. The three-tier seed system 
included provincial seed companies to purify 
parental lines, prefectural seed companies to 
multiply A lines, and county-level seed companies 
to produce hybrid seeds. This system ensured 
a high quantity and quality of the hybrid rice 
seed for commercial production. The four-level 
extension network consisted of county, commune, 
brigade, and production teams to evaluate, select, 
and promote hybrid rice and appropriate cultiva-
tion practices.  
Finally, hybrid rice would not have been 
successful in China without the emergence of a 
hybrid rice seed industry. Cultivation of hybrid 
rice increased from 140,000 hectares in 1976 to 
18.6 million hectares in 2008, with a commen-
surate increase in demand for hybrid seed.9 With 
a combination of policy support and financial 
subsidies from the state in the initial phases, the 
seed industry has gone from a small venture in 
seed production to a vibrant business sector that 
now manages large and competitive production 
and distribution systems.
Lessons from China’s 
Experiences
China’s experiences offer a number of lessons. 
From an institutional and policy standpoint, 
full government support and commitment were 























made hybrid rice attractive, profitable, and 
sustainable, and government support was impor-
tant—especially in the early stages—for research; 
seed production; and farmers’ purchases of hybrid 
seed, pesticides, and fertilizers. 
Furthermore, a national, high-ranking 
scientist coordinated and oversaw the progress 
of technology development. Adequate human 
resources—from full-time researchers all the way 
to extension workers devoted to publicizing the 
technology—ensured helpful participation from 
multiple disciplines related to the technology.
In addition, an effective seed production 
infrastructure was essential, along with minimum 
seed quality standards and long-term mainte-
nance of genetic purity of parental lines and hybrid 
seeds. Given that different ecological rice-growing 
regions or markets need unique hybrids, it was 
critical that research and extension infrastructures 
were regional.
Lastly, comprehensive training programs, 
which included plot demonstrations, technology 
workshops, technical briefings, frontline demon-
strations, field tours, and mass media campaigns, 
helped popularize the remarkable yield improve-
ment of hybrid rice.  
Conclusion
Even in the wake of the successes of the past 
several decades, hybrid rice in China faces a 
number of challenges. Rice farming, which con-
tributes to soil erosion and salinization, has caused 
considerable environmental stresses. Existing 
hybrid rice varieties have gradually lost resistance 
to disease and insects. To maintain and increase 
yields, Chinese hybrid rice breeders must continu-
ally develop new hybrids with multiple resistances 
to diseases and insects. Yet with a majority of 
educated young and middle-aged workers moving 
to metropolitan areas, producing and promoting 
hybrid rice will become more difficult. Continued 
investment in agricultural research and continu-
ous innovation in developing, promoting, and 
sharing new technologies are essential in sustain-
ing the gains achieved by hybrid rice technologies 
developed in China.  n 
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illions of small-scale farmers in India 
live in harsh environments where 
rainfall is limited and irrigation and 
fertilizer are unavailable. India’s arid 
and semiarid lands constitute more than 50 percent 
of the country’s geographic area and are home to 
60 percent of the rural population. Farmers in 
states such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, 
and Rajasthan have long grown sorghum and pearl 
millet—hardy crops that can thrive in almost any 
soil and survive under relatively tough conditions. 
Production from these crops was low, however, and 
so were returns to farmers, until improved, higher-
producing varieties were developed and distributed 
starting in the 1970s. Since then, a succession of 
more productive and disease-resistant varieties has 
raised farmers’ yields and improved the livelihoods 
of about 6 million millet-growing households and 3 
million sorghum-growing households.
The success and sustainability of these 
improved varieties resulted from three inter-
ventions by the Indian government and the 
international community: increased investments in 
crop improvements during the 1970s, the devel-
opment of efficient seed systems with a gradual 
inclusion of the private sector in the 1980s, and 
the liberalization of the Indian seed industry in 
the late-1990s. Thanks to these interventions, 
improved varieties have delivered benefits to some 
of the poorest people and areas in India.
An evolving partnership between public 
research and private industry has played a central 
role in getting these improved varieties out to 
millions of poor and small-scale farmers in India’s 
arid and semiarid lands. By allowing farmers to 
grow the same amount of millet or sorghum using 
half as much land, these improved varieties have 
made it possible for farmers to shift farmland to 
valuable cash crops—that is, crops they can sell in 
the market—and thereby raise their incomes. 
Dryland Farming in India
Millions of Indian farmers must eke out a living by 
cultivating crops in areas where rainfall is low and 
unreliable. Among the crops suited to these harsh 
conditions are millet and sorghum, which belong 
to a group of annual grasses that produce small 
grain seeds and are often cultivated as cereals. 
Millet comes in many varieties, including pearl 
millet, finger millet, little millet, and foxtail millet, 
but here “millet” refers to pearl millet only. Millet 
and sorghum are widely grown in Africa, Asia, and 
Russia and can be used as grain or forage. They 
are resistant to drought, grow quickly (the period 
from planting to harvest is typically three to four 
months), and can be cultivated in a wide range of 
soil types. 
In India, sorghum is predominantly grown in 
arid and semiarid regions, particularly in the states 
of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and 
Tamil Nadu. Farmers can grow it with as little as 
400–500 millimeters of rain a year. If rainfall is 
slightly higher—500–600 millimeters a year—
farmers tend to prefer pearl millet over sorghum 
and grow it extensively in the dry western and 
northern regions of the country, specifically in the 
states of Gujarat, Haryana, and Rajasthan. 
Improving Crops for 
Arid Lands
Pearl millet and sorghum in India
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Sorghum and millet are the principal sources 
of energy, protein, vitamins, and minerals for 
millions of the poorest people in harsh and unfa-
vorable agricultural environments. These crops 
currently constitute an estimated 11.4 percent of 
the global cereal area harvested and 4.1 percent of 
the total output of world cereals.1 
The Indian Government 
Invests in Millet and 
Sorghum Research
The first advances in millet and sorghum research 
in India resulted from the efforts of a range of 
government institutions. In the early 1960s, the 
Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), 
with assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation, 
initiated research on hybrid sorghum and pearl 
millet. Success came relatively quickly. The first 
sorghum hybrid (CSH-1), bred in India, was 
officially released for commercial cultivation in 
1964, followed by the first pearl millet hybrid (HB 1) 
in 1965. 
In 1967, to help organize and focus research 
on these two crops, ICAR initiated the All India 
Coordinated Millet Improvement Project, and two 
years later, the All India Coordinated Sorghum 
Improvement Project. These programs organized 
government research and in many locations 
tested for improved characteristics of hybrids and 
varieties—through state agricultural universi-
ties, research institutes, and experiment stations. 
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Plant	researchers	must	continually	issue	new	varieties	of	pearl	millet	to	stay	ahead	of	the	threat	of	downy	mildew.	
During	the	past	few	decades,	a	boom-and-bust	pattern	has	developed:	an	improved	variety	of	pearl	millet	is	
released to the public, generating hefty gains in productivity; a few years later, the variety becomes susceptible to 
downy	mildew,	yields	fall,	and	the	cycle	begins	again	(see	Figure	12.1).	
So far, the only solution appears to be constant research to improve pearl millet’s resistance to the disease. 
In	recent	years,	both	public	and	private	entities	have	released	pearl	millet	varieties	that	are	resistant	to	downy	
mildew and have achieved widespread adoption, but it may only be a matter of time before these varieties, like 
the ones released before them, become vulnerable to the fungus and must be replaced.
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Source: McGaw, E. M. 2001. Fine tuning the progeny: Making good things even better. Policy Brief. London: 
Department for International Development.
Figure 12.1—Pearl millet yields and downy mildew, 1949-50 to 2006–07    85
The creation of the International Crops Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in 
1972 further stimulated research on sorghum and 
pearl millet and contributed substantially to the 
research effort on these crops. 
Joint efforts by these institutions resulted 
in the release of a succession of pearl millet 
hybrids offering yield advantages. Since the mid-
1960s, average grain yields have nearly doubled, 
even though much of the production of millet 
has shifted to more marginal production envi-
ronments. Production of pearl millet in India 
currently stands at 9 million tons and hybrids 
cover more than half of the total national pearl 
millet area of 10 million hectares.2 Researchers 
face a constant challenge from downy mildew, 
however—a fungus that can cause crop losses of up 
to nearly 100 percent (see box previous page).3
Similarly, tremendous advances in sorghum 
improvement resulted from decades of a partner-
ship between ICRISAT and the Indian national 
agricultural research system. Although the first 
set of sorghum hybrids was released in the mid-
1960s, many other popular hybrids have followed, 
augmenting the spread of sorghum hybrids and 
pushing up productivity, especially for kharif 
sorghum, or rainy season sorghum. The hybrids 
reflect impressive advances in diversifying parental 
lines and incorporating resistance to major pests 
and diseases.
Cultivating a Seed Industry
At the beginning of the Green Revolution, it 
became clear to the Indian government and to key 
state governments that state extension services 
and emerging private seed companies could not 
distribute enough seed to allow for the large-
scale adoption of new varieties. The government 
decided to create state seed corporations, the first 
of which evolved out of the G. B. Pant University 
of Agriculture and Technology in Pantnagar. This 
corporation then became a model for the National 
Seed Corporation  and other state seed corpora-
tions. The Indian government, with the financial 
support of the World Bank and technical assis-
tance from the Rockefeller Foundation, financed 
the development of state seed corporations in most 
major Indian states in the 1960s. Gradually these 
state seed corporations replaced state departments 
of seed production and formed the nascent foun-
dations of a formal seed industry. 
Often, formal seed industries are taken for 
granted, especially in industrial countries, where 
agriculture is extremely productive. But in India, 
as in many other countries, seed industries are still 
emerging. The problem stems from the limited 
profitability of seeds. When farmers are able to 
plant and save seeds from one season to the next 
without losing much in terms of yield and output, 
there is little need for them to purchase new 
seeds—and little opportunity for seed producers to 
sell new seeds. 
It is only when commercial seeds offer clear 
advantages in terms of quality and performance 
that farmers become more willing to purchase 
them. When improvements are bred into a crop, 
for example, farmers must buy or otherwise gain 
access to the improved seed to realize the benefits 
of breeding. Farmers must also buy seeds for 
hybrids, the yields of which tend to drop when 
grain from harvests is saved and planted in the 
next season (see Chapter 4). 
But seed industries do not emerge simply by 
themselves. The right rules and regulations must 
be in place to encourage private investment in the 
industry and to limit the role of the public sector 
where it is a less-efficient purveyor of seed to 
farmers. In India, this institutional framework for 
the development of a seed industry emerged with 
the Indian Seed Act in 1966. The nascent Indian 
seed industry was heavily regulated under the act, 
however, with limited entry and formation of large 
firms—domestic or foreign. Private seed imports 
for both commercial and research purposes were 
restricted or banned, ostensibly to protect small-
holders from predatory corporate practices. 
A Private Seed Industry 
Emerges
Since the 1970s, the private sector has played 
an ever-increasing role in developing improved 
varieties of millet and sorghum and distributing 
them to farmers, through innovative partnerships 
with public-sector agencies. In 1971, India began 
deregulating the seed sector, relaxing restrictions 
on seed imports and private firms’ entry into the 
seed market. This change, combined with a new 
seed policy in 1988, spurred enormous growth in 
private-sector seed supplies in India. Currently, 
the Indian market for agricultural seed is one of 
the biggest in the world. 86  
Sorghum and pearl millet breeding by 
private companies began around 1970, when four 
companies had their own sorghum and pearl millet 
breeding programs. By 1985 this number had 
grown to 10 companies. In 1981, a private company 
developed and released the first hybrid pearl millet. 
One major reason for the spurt in private-
sector growth was the strong public-sector research 
on sorghum and millet. International agricultural 
research centers such as ICRISAT exchanged 
breeding material with public and private research 
institutions. National agricultural research centers 
such as ICAR and agricultural universities provided 
breeder seed not only to the national and state seed 
corporations, but also to private seed companies 
to be multiplied and distributed through their 
company outlets, farmer cooperatives, and private 
dealers. For private firms, public institutions like 
ICRISAT, ICAR, and state universities provided 
invaluable genetic materials free of charge.
Today, more than 60 private seed companies 
supply improved pearl millet to small-scale farmers 
and account for 82 percent of the total seed supply, 
while more than 40 companies supply improved 
sorghum, accounting for 75 percent of supply. 
Many of these companies benefit not only from 
the availability of public research on improved 
pearl millet and sorghum, but also from innovative 
partnerships that specifically aim to disseminate 
new materials to the private sector. The most 
recognized of these partnerships is ICRISAT’s 
hybrid consortia, developed in 2000–01. Private 
companies pay a membership fee to ICRISAT to 
receive nonexclusive access to hybrid parent lines 
that can then be used for the development and 
marketing of their own seed products. Although no 
single company has a monopoly over an individual 
line—all companies can use them for their own 
purposes as they choose—the market is currently 
large enough to allow all companies to compete for 
the smallholders’ business. 
The ultimate beneficiaries of this public–pri-
vate system are the millions of small-scale farmers 
who grow sorghum and millet. Public research 
agencies contribute genetic materials and scientific 
expertise to improve crop varieties when the incen-
tives for private-sector involvement are limited. 
Then, private companies take on the final develop-
ment of new varieties and seed distribution—tasks 
to which they are often better suited than are public 
agencies. In this way, the benefits of crop improve-
ments are delivered directly to farmers, who find 
them worthwhile enough to support financially.
Impacts of Improved Millet 
and Sorghum 
During the past four decades, farmers have 
benefited from rising millet and sorghum yields 
(see Figure 12.2). Although yields of pearl millet 
stagnated for a time, perhaps owing to frequent 
outbreaks of downy mildew, they rebounded again 
in the mid-1980s, when ICRISAT released varieties 
with greater resistance to the fungus. 
Farmers have readily adopted the improved 
varieties of sorghum and millet. By 1992–94, 
about 55 percent of the hectares of land under 
sorghum and pearl millet cultivation in India were 
planted with improved varieties, nearly doubling 
the productivity of both crops compared with the 
unimproved varieties. The area under cultivation 
with improved varieties continues to rise and so 
does productivity. In addition, as the number of 
varieties to choose from increases, farmers seek out 
more appropriate varieties for their growing condi-
tions and consequently tend to experience more 
stable yields. Six million hectares of land under 
pearl millet cultivation (more than 60 percent of 
the total pearl millet area) in India are now planted 
with more than 70 hybrids, of which at least 80 
percent are from the private sector, many based on 
genetic materials from ICRISAT.4
Because sorghum and millet are central to poor 
people’s diets in arid and semiarid regions of India, 
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when yields rise, the benefits to those people are 
direct and immediate. In rural areas of the state of 
Maharashtra, sorghum accounts for 48 percent of 
total per capita cereal consumption, and in rural 
Rajasthan and dry areas of Gujarat, pearl millet 
accounts for more than 50 percent of cereal con-
sumption, contributing to about 20–40 percent of 
people’s total energy and protein intake.5 
Besides providing more pearl millet and 
sorghum to consume, the improved varieties also 
offer significant economic returns to farmers. 
It has been conservatively estimated that the 
annual returns to India’s farmers from pearl millet 
varieties developed by ICRISAT total US$50 
million—more than 12 times the cost of its invest-
ment in pearl millet research.6 
Sustainability of the 
Interventions
Sorghum and pearl millet policies and the 
programs that support them appear to be sustain-
able for several reasons. Farmers’ demand for a 
range of millet crops and millet varieties in the arid 
and semiarid regions of India (including the states 
of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, and 
Gujarat) is unlikely to diminish in the near future 
because currently few substitute crops for these 
harsh growing environments exist. Moreover, new 
sources of demand are emerging for sorghum, such 
as for biofuels and animal and poultry feeds.
Moreover, the public and private seed industry 
continues to receive valuable genetic materials 
from the public-sector research system and thus 
finds the development of new pearl millet and 
sorghum products profitable. Although 80–90 
percent of the benefits from the adoption of 
sorghum and millet hybrids went to farmers, the 
spread of privately released hybrids shows that 
private firms are also benefiting enough to induce 
them to invest in the research and development of 
cultivars for small farmers in unirrigated regions.7 
It is noteworthy that the amount of land 
cultivated with sorghum and millet has steadily 
declined. Still, overall production of pearl millet 
is increasing, primarily because of higher yields. 
These higher and more stable yields for pearl 
millet have enabled farmers to plant millet on a 
smaller area of land and to use a larger area for 
other crops, particularly cash crops. Sorghum 
yields have risen more slowly than those for millet, 
and thus overall sorghum production has declined 
along with the area under 
cultivation. During the 
rainy season, the area 
of land under sorghum 
cultivation in particular 
has declined considerably, 
owing to competition 
from other high-value 
crops such as maize, 




farmers have access to 
irrigation and rising 
incomes are changing 
food-consumption 
patterns, the area sown to 
sorghum and other millet 
crops is gradually giving 
way to rice, wheat, maize, 
and other specialty crops. 
This trend is in part due 
to government pricing 
and promotion policies 
that favor wheat, rice, and 
Source: India, Ministry of Agriculture. Indiastat. www.indiastat.com. 
Note: For 2007–08, actual data, rather than three-year averages, were used to denote the  
current trend. 
Figure 12.2—Yields of pearl millet and sorghum,  
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maize. If at some point the government decides 
that it cannot afford to continue subsidizing wheat, 
rice, and maize production, demand for sorghum 
and pearl millet is likely to increase.
 
Learning from India’s 
Experience
All three elements of the Indian interventions to 
improve sorghum and pearl millet hybrids were 
important. First, the investments in public-sector 
plant-breeding and crop-management research 
were made by the national government, state 
governments, and international agricultural 
research centers. When hybrids of sorghum and 
millet were first being developed, all three of these 
groups contributed genetic material that benefited 
farmers directly and provided the basis for private 
researchers to develop new varieties. 
Second, the government invested in seed 
production in public and private institutions. The 
Indian government and state governments, with 
the help of donors, made major investments in 
government seed corporations that multiplied 
the seeds of not only wheat, rice, and maize, but 
also pearl millet and sorghum. Seed laws were 
written and enforced to allow small private-sector 
seed companies to enter into the seed business 
and make profits. The government also provided 
training for people involved in the seed industry in 
both public and private institutions. 
Third, India liberalized the seed sector starting 
in the mid-1980s. Instead of allowing state seed 
corporations to become regional monopolies, 
the government opened the doors to investment 
by large Indian firms and allowed foreign direct 
investment in the sector. This change, coupled 
with continuing investments in public plant 
breeding and public–private partnerships, has 
continued to provide private firms with a steady 
stream of genetic materials for developing propri-
etary hybrids. India also benefits from a seed law 
that allows companies to sell truthfully labeled 
seed without having to go through costly and 
time-consuming certification and registration 
processes for new hybrids and varieties. The result 
is a vibrant and sustainable supply of seed of new 
cultivars that are drought-tolerant and resistant to 
many pests and diseases. 
Conclusion
Since the mid-1960s, yields of pearl millet and 
sorghum in India have doubled. In contrast to 
the major Green Revolution crops, very few yield 
increases of millet and sorghum is attributable to 
irrigation, given that 90 percent or more of these 
crops is grown in unirrigated, rainfed conditions. 
This doubling of yields has allowed farmers to 
grow the same amount of food using half as much 
land, further allowing them in many cases to shift 
land to valuable cash crops and increase their 
incomes. In addition, millet and sorghum contrib-
uted to food security because they are considerably 
more resistant to drought, pests, and diseases than 
other major food grains. Furthermore, because the 
wealthy tend to eat rice and wheat, the benefits 
of these new technologies have gone primarily to 
poor Indian consumers.  n
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istorically, cotton has been a key cash 
crop in many West African countries. It 
is not typically viewed as a food security 
crop because cotton fiber (or lint), its 
primary commodity, is not consumable. But if 
cotton cultivation can contribute to increasing 
household incomes, and if such changes in 
incomes can translate into increases in the quality 
and quantity of food consumed in the household, 
then cotton is an important crop to many small 
farmers. This is the case in Burkina Faso, where 
cotton has played an important role in both the 
economy and culture for many generations.
Dating back to the French colonial rule 
and continuing through independence in 1960, 
Burkina Faso’s cotton expansion strategy has 
involved substantial government intervention, 
a feature also common in many countries in the 
region. This system revolved around “contract 
farming” arrangements by which a state-controlled 
cotton company provided inputs (such as research 
on cotton improvement, farmer education services, 
fertilizers, loans, and marketing services) in 
exchange for the farmers’ output through exclusive 
purchase rights. This arrangement, where the state 
protects farmers from free-market perils including 
large-scale market fluctuations and difficulties 
in accessing credit, seemingly would contribute 
to positive outcomes, such as the faster adoption 
of modern inputs, high repayment rates, and 
production growth. 
But despite growth in the cotton industry in 
the 1960s and 1970s, this state-led strategy had 
become widely criticized by the late-1980s. The 
state cotton company had exorbitant operating 
costs, which reduced farmers’ earnings, and was 
accused of corruption, while inefficiencies in the 
structure of farmers’ groups meant that farmer 
repayment rates to the state ran only at around 40 
percent. By the early-1990s, the entire Burkinabè 
cotton sector was in serious financial jeopardy.
Although these types of problems were evident 
in nearly all of Africa’s cotton-producing countries, 
governments across the continent responded quite 
differently and with mixed success: some govern-
ments, such as Mali’s, resisted reform and others, 
such as Benin’s, embraced wholesale liberalization. 
Being quite systematic in its approach, Burkina 
Faso pursued a third path, careful to introduce 
reforms gradually and to learn lessons from its 
neighbors.1 
This more nuanced reform approach has 
been the driving factor behind Burkina Faso’s 
threefold increase in cotton production since the 
early-1990s, which led the country to become 
Africa’s leading cotton producer in 2006 and its 
leading exporter in 2007. By comparison, produc-
tion stagnated in both Mali and Benin, where it 
had been much higher in the past. Since Burkina 
Faso’s reforms began, the number of households 
cultivating cotton has nearly doubled to more than 
175,000 from 1996 to 2006, and cotton-related 
work has generated an estimated 235,000 new 
jobs that have directly and indirectly benefited 
around 1.8 million people. Despite recent financial 
problems and falling cotton prices, the Burkinabè 
model represents a remarkable success.
Navigating Through 
Reforms
Cotton reforms in Burkina Faso
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Burkina Faso’s Cotton Story
Cotton has long been an integral part of the 
Burkinabè economy. After relatively slow growth 
under the French colonial administration in the 
1920s, cotton production expanded and continued 
to increase rapidly in 1960 after the transition from 
French rule. An important continuous presence 
throughout the West African cotton sector was 
the French Company for the Development of 
Textile Fibers (CFDT), which continued to provide 
new seed varieties, extension services, and other 
inputs and marketing services after independence 
and even after Burkina Faso established a state-
controlled cotton company, SOFITEX, in 1979. 
In partnership with CFDT, SOFITEX continued 
to operate the state-led system in which farmers, 
organized in cooperatives known as Village 
Groups, were provided with improved seeds, 
extension services, fertilizers, pesticides, and 
marketing services in exchange for the exclusive 
marketing of their cotton crops.
But while the state-led CFDT cooperation 
system introduced new production techniques and 
high-yielding crop varieties, which resulted in a 
twofold increase in crop yields during the 1980s, 
the state’s heavy hand led to some significant 
drawbacks. Poor financial management, cor-
ruption, and rampant overspending throughout 
the system, combined with falling cotton prices 
in international markets during the late-1980s, 
signaled that the system was not working well. 
Corruption also became widespread among Village 
Group leaders and SOFITEX officials, weakening 
the credibility of the state-led system. As a result 
of these shortcomings, the prices paid to farmers 
declined from 1988 to 1992, Village Groups accu-
mulated large debts, and production started to 
collapse in the early-1990s. At this stage, the need 
to reform the sector was urgent, and both donors 
and the Burkinabè government recognized that the 
cotton sector was too important to ignore.
Despite broad agreement that the sector was 
in trouble, the major players within it—including 
the World Bank and the French international aid 
agency, Agence Française de Développement—did 
not immediately agree on the best reform path. On 
one side, the World Bank emphasized the inef-
ficiency in the state’s management of the sector, 
leading to weak returns to farmers. On the other 
side, the Agence Française de Développement , the 
CFDT, and some officials in the Burkinabè govern-
ment believed that disorganized farmers would 
be at a disadvantage upon losing protection and 
support from the state in the face of full-scale liber-
alization. Hence, the reform path that emerged was 
both a political compromise and an effort toward 
maintaining the best elements of the state-led 
model while removing or minimizing the worst.
Cotton Sector Reforms
The first stage of Burkina Faso’s reform process 
focused on strengthening local institutions and 
building capacity in preparation for eventual 
market liberalization. One of the first priorities 
was to build and strengthen farmers’ organiza-
tions. This specific reform targeted one of the most 
immediate problems—the low repayment rates by 
farmers’ groups for state-provided credits—but it 
was also aimed at increasing farmers’ participa-
tion in the cotton sector. The problem with the 
existing Village Groups was that they required 
cotton farmers to be pooled together with other 
farmers. This meant that the other farmers got a 
free ride off the relatively profitable cotton sector, 
which discouraged cotton production and reduced 
repayment rates. So to improve cotton farmers’ 
social capital and production incentives, the 
government introduced legislation to allow cotton 
farmers to form and manage their own voluntary 
membership groups (Groupement de Producteurs 
de Coton, or Cotton Producer Groups) in 1996. As 
a result, group repayment rates increased from 
50 to 60 percent before the reforms to more than 
90 percent afterward.2 Moreover, thousands of 
farmers joined cotton groups, and the Cotton 
Producer Groups arguably facilitated the rapid 
expansion of cotton farming in the country. In this 
phase, local capacity was further strengthened 
with the formation of a cotton union in the late-
1990s; by 1999, the government had allocated 30 
percent of its SOFITEX shares to the union. 
Another reform looked to maintaining the 
benefits of contract farming—such as poten-
tially higher repayment rates and higher input 
use—while inducing greater efficiency through pri-
vate-sector participation. The government took a 
number of steps to begin the process of liberalizing 
cotton markets, starting with allowing the private 
sector to provide functions for which the state had 
no comparative advantage (for instance, in areas 
such as input provision, transport services, and 
cotton refinement, but not research and develop-
























Gathering harvested cotton92  
ment).3 Further liberalization in 2004 provided 
two private companies with exclusive purchase 
rights in “concession areas” of the country’s 
cotton-producing areas, along with a monopoly on 
contract farming arrangements with the Cotton 
Producer Groups.
By 2006, the government had significantly 
reduced its role in the cotton sector, having 
delegated most responsibilities to the new 
cotton union and the Cotton Producer Groups. 
In addition, it had established an interprofes-
sional association to promote cooperation among 
important stakeholders, including cotton farmers, 
bank representatives, government officials, 
research institutes, and other private stakeholders. 
This association became an important institution 
for resolving conflicts and promoting the develop-
ment of the sector, particularly at a time of decline 
in cotton prices since the early-2000s. 
Impacts on Production  
and Exports
In terms of production, the numbers reflect a 
dramatic increase after the reform. Cotton produc-
tion (both seed and lint) increased from 150,500 
tons in 1995 to 690,000 tons in 2007, which trans-
lated into an increase in US$165 million in cotton 
export earnings.4 Before the reforms, cotton pro-
duction accounted for just 3.3 percent of national 
agricultural production in terms of value; by 2006, 
it had reached more than 8 percent.5 Further, 
the number of cotton-producing households 
nearly doubled, from around 95,000 in 1996 to 
more than 175,000 in 2006.6 This growth pattern 
was largely driven by the intervention, since the 
reformulation of the farmers’ groups successfully 
improved incentives for cotton production and 
improved relationships between farmers’ groups 
and cotton firms.
The indirect contributions of cotton sector 
growth to GDP growth are also significant, espe-
cially in terms of foreign exchange earnings. 
Cotton exports before the reforms represented less 
than 30 percent of Burkina Faso’s annual export 
earnings, but reached as high as 70 percent during 
the reform period and are now regularly around 50 
percent of export earnings.
An indirect indicator of the success of the 
reforms is that Burkina Faso has overtaken Mali 
and Egypt to become the current African leader 
in cotton production as of 2006 and lint-cotton 
Chapter 13  Navigating Through Reforms
Note: Production figures are based on five-year averages.   
Source: FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2009. FAOSTAT statistical database. Rome.
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exports as of 2007, based on a threefold increase in 
production since the early-1990s. In 2007, Burkina 
Faso’s cotton production exceeded Mali’s by 66 
percent, which is especially noteworthy consider-
ing that Mali had significantly outpaced Burkina 
Faso on this front for the previous two decades 
(see Figure 13.1).
Contributions to 
Employment and Rural 
Welfare
Cotton sector reforms in Burkina Faso have 
resulted not only in extensive growth in production 
but also in a corresponding increase in employ-
ment opportunities and rural welfare, benefitting 
an estimated 1.8 million people. In terms of job 
creation, the share of cotton farmers has almost 
doubled between 1994 and 2003, reflecting an 
increase in agricultural employment from 11.3 
percent to 19.9 percent during this same period. 
This amounts to an estimated 235,000 new jobs 
for farmers in the sector, some of whom were land 
croppers or migrants returning to Burkina Faso 
from war-torn Côte d’Ivoire after 2001. The cotton 
reforms eased the absorption of this new labor 
force in allowing migrants to quickly access inputs 
and form their own farmers’ groups.7
But new employment opportunities were not 
the only impact of the reforms. Cotton produc-
tion affects food security through its impact on 
farm income, which households can spend on food 
purchases and on food production. Household 
incomes rose sharply among cotton farmers during 
1995 to 2003, with estimates varying from 19 
percent to 43 percent. Poverty rates among cotton 
farmers also fell sharply from 62 to 47 percent 
between 1994 and 2003, although it should be 
noted that poverty rates among the rest of the 
population also fell during this period.8 
In terms of food production, the relationship 
with cotton is complicated because while food 
crops can compete with cotton for land, cotton 
farmers also grow food as part of an intercropping 
strategy. So, somewhat counterintuitively, food 
production actually increased in cotton-producing 
areas during the reform period: as farmers grew 
more cotton, they also produced more food by 
intercropping.9 In 1996, around 40 to 45 percent of 
people involved in cotton cultivation reported that 
they were food secure; as of 2006, this figure had 
increased to 70 percent. 
However, there is no evidence that rates of 
malnutrition have declined for the broader popu-
lation, suggesting that the cotton success story 
has principally influenced food consumption 
only among cotton-producing households. This 
situation exists probably because, unlike food pro-
duction, cotton growth does not alleviate poverty 
by lowering the economywide price of food, which 
is one of the most direct determinants of poverty 
reduction. For this reason, expanded cotton 
production should not be viewed as the primary 
means of solving the country’s broader malnutri-
tion problems.
Are Burkina Faso’s 
Cotton-Sector Reforms 
Sustainable?
The success of Burkina Faso’s reform approach 
hinges, to a large extent, on government policies 
as well as on the ability of the Cotton Producer 
Groups and the cotton union to manage the 
responsibilities that the government transferred 
to them. Though difficult to predict because the 
reforms and their impacts are still ongoing, the 
constraints that the Cotton Producer Groups 
continue to face—particularly a lack of resources 
as well as hints of corruption in the cotton union—
suggest that further reforms will likely be needed 
to ensure a continuous and smooth transfer of 
power from the state. 
Perhaps most disconcerting is the recent 
financial difficulty that the sector has faced, which 
is largely linked to cotton pricing. Because inter-
national cotton prices are volatile, governments 
have long tried to smooth out part of the interna-
tional price volatility at the farm level to reduce 
farmers’ risk and income variation. However, the 
dangers are twofold: prices can be smoothed to the 
point where they are out of synch with real world 
price movements, and stabilization funds can be 
easily mismanaged and abused. Though Burkina 
Faso did try to move to a pricing formula that was 
more closely aligned with international prices, the 
formula was poorly implemented and the cotton 
stabilization fund was mismanaged. While in this 
sense the Burkinabè government’s cotton reforms 
were unsuccessful, government officials do at least 
appear to be addressing the problem by outsourc-
ing the management of the stabilization fund to 
the West African Development Bank. Meanwhile, 
the government intervened again to recapitalize 94  
cotton firms as a means of shoring up the sector 
before new private investors come on board. This 
effort shows that although decision-making under 
the new institutional structures in the sector has 
not been error-free, problems have been addressed 
relatively quickly and in an appropriately consul-
tative manner. Indeed, the closer collaboration 
among SOFITEX, the farmers’ union, and the 
private sector that has evolved may well be one of 
the most significant outcomes of the entire reform 
process. 
The environmental sustainability of cotton 
production is also critical, especially in a region 
known for degraded soils and thought to be highly 
vulnerable to climate change. One concern is 
that increased cotton production has gone hand 
in hand with a requisite increase in land use, 
including marginal lands that may have more 
fragile soils. For cotton production, it is critical 
to improve and maintain soil fertility by applying 
appropriate amounts of both chemical and organic 
fertilizers. Currently, however, there are concerns 
that farmers are not applying the recommended 
levels of either type of fertilizer. As such, some 
new initiatives have been established to improve 
soil management, including pilot organic farming 
projects and extension programs to help farmers 
obtain environmentally friendly inputs, such as 
organic fertilizer. 




technology that it was possible to develop varieties resistant to insects. The first generation of such varieties are 
known as Bt cotton and contain a gene introduced from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis	(Bt)	that	produces	
a toxin lethal to specific types of bollworms.
Bt	cotton	spread	rapidly	from	the	United	States	to	Australia,	Mexico,	Argentina,	China,	and	South	Africa	(all	of	
which	commercialized	Bt	cotton	in	the	mid-	to	late-1990s)	as	well	as	to	India,	Colombia,	Egypt,	Brazil,	and,	most	
recently, Burkina Faso.a Studies show that over the years Bt cotton has benefitted farmers overall, although there is 












has translated not only into lower costs of production, but also into fewer reported cases of insecticide poisoning.d 
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The Burkinabè Cotton 
Reforms: Keys to Success
Burkina Faso’s gradual approach to cotton-sector 
reforms differed from that of several other cotton-
producing African countries, some of which stuck 
to the troubled status quo while others embarked 
on overly hasty liberalization paths. The problem 
with the latter approach is that it introduces a real 
risk of market failures that could result in more 
harm than good. On the other hand, keeping the 
pre-reforms status quo was clearly untenable. 
Burkina Faso’s success is grounded in a 
number of factors. For both political reasons and 
a genuine desire to preserve the better elements 
of the state-led model, Burkina Faso adopted a 
cautious and pragmatic approach to reform. This 
approach has facilitated institution building—such 
as the farmers’ groups and the cotton union—and 
allowed policymakers to observe and improve 
upon the outcomes of the reforms. For example, 
while reforming farmers’ groups improved incen-
tives for farmers to work cooperatively and 
increase production, the success of this effort also 
provided a strong case for strengthening key insti-
tutions as part of the liberalization process. Also, 
creating the cotton farmers’ union served political 
ends and also helped farmers become greater 
participants in decision-making. In addition, 
the partial privatization of the cotton sector was 





performance of Bt cotton under different agroclimatic conditions and pest pressures; the differences in farmers 
practices and the lack of information in the hands of farmers; the cost of the technology; the challenges for small 
farmers who must navigate through markets in which large companies own the Bt traits and supply costly seeds; 
and the risk to develop resistance to the Bt toxin and overwhelm the gains afforded by the technology. But based on 
the evidence thus far, Bt cotton seems to be providing new opportunities for small farmers to increase cotton yields 
and output, with the potential to increase both incomes and food security.
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driven by pragmatism rather than ideology; some 
elements of state involvement had always worked 
well, so it made sense to preserve those elements 
while allowing the private sector to operate where 
it had a greater advantage. Moreover, the granting 
of private sector regional monopolies partly acted 
as an experiment through which policymakers 
could gauge the potential of this sector. 
The broader principles that underlie this 
success story then are those that relate to the 
process of reform rather than the specific details—
especially Burkina Faso’s pragmatic approach 
of introducing reforms gradually, sequencing 
and prioritizing them. Given the very similar 
institutional and agroecological conditions 
of neighboring cotton-producing countries, 
particularly Mali, it is possible that the more 
specific policy initiatives of the Burkinabè cotton 
reforms could potentially be applied to these 
countries as well.  n
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F
rom the early-1990s to 2007, maize 
farming and marketing in Kenya 
underwent a major transformation. The 
government reduced its role in markets 
for fertilizer and maize while also dedicating 
significant resources to constructing roads, building 
other types of rural infrastructure, developing 
improved maize varieties, and promoting improved 
agronomic practices. These moves, along with other 
favorable changes in the wider economy, set off a 
chain of positive events—major private investment 
in fertilizer and maize marketing, more fertilizer 
consumption, higher maize yields, and lower maize 
prices—that have improved the welfare of both 
maize farmers and maize consumers in Kenya.
Overall, the government’s reforms worked 
together to make it easier for farmers to get access 
to and afford fertilizer for their crops, and for 
some of these farmers to sell surplus maize above 
household requirements. Although government 
action catalyzed the changes, actions by farmers 
and private fertilizer importers and dealers went 
a long way to make this possible. Small farmers 
have increased their use of fertilizer per cultivated 
hectare of maize by 33 percent in the past 10 years, 
contributing to higher maize yields, increased farm 
incomes, and improved national food security.
Still, this success story is a fragile one. 
Widespread post-election violence in 2008, 
drought, unstable world markets in 2008 and 
2009, and policy changes have threatened the 
positive developments in Kenya’s maize and 
fertilizer sectors as well as the country’s overall 
agricultural outlook. Continued success will depend 
on the return to greater political stability, renewed 
clarity and transparency regarding the operations 
of the state in input markets, and sustained public 
investments in support of market development and 
the welfare of small farmers.
Facing the Food Price 
Dilemma
In the early-1990s in Kenya, policymakers were 
struggling with the problem posed by the classic 
food price dilemma: how can a country keep food 
prices at tolerable levels for consumers while at the 
same time giving farmers adequate incentives to 
feed the nation and raise farm incomes? For many 
years, the solution pursued by Kenyan policymak-
ers was to strike a balance between these two 
competing objectives by controlling the prices of 
maize and maize meal. The state-run National 
Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) generally 
bought maize from farmers at higher-than-market 
prices and sold maize to industrial maize millers at 
below-market prices. 
The government was also heavily involved 
in the fertilizer market. It assigned the Kenya 
Farmers Association the task of importing fertil-
izer, over half of which was financed by foreign 
aid donors by the late-1980s. It designated a 
state-run corporation, the Kenya National Trading 
Corporation, to distribute fertilizer donated by 
foreign governments. Import quotas kept fertilizer 
imports from rising too high. The Kenyan gov-
ernment also set the price of fertilizer to make it 
affordable for small-scale and poor farmers. 
Unlocking the Market
Fertilizer and maize in Kenya
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By the early-1990s, it was becoming clear that 
Kenya’s system of state-controlled maize and fertil-
izer markets was unsustainable. Because the NCPB 
had to cover the gap between the prices at which it 
bought and sold maize, it incurred massive deficits 
during the 1980s. At the same time, the state 
system of buying and selling maize was becoming 
increasingly inefficient and corrupt, driving sellers 
and buyers to illegal markets outside of the state’s 
control. Fertilizer dealers found it unprofitable to 
supply fertilizer to remote areas at the prices set 
by the government. Designed to improve farmers’ 
access to fertilizer, the controlled fertilizer pricing 
structure thus had the opposite effect in distant 
and hard-to-reach areas of Kenya. At the same 
time, a tide of worldwide support for market 
liberalization was rising, based on the belief that 
greater reliance on markets would encourage com-
petition and lower marketing costs to the benefit of 
both farmers and consumers. 
Reforming Markets for 
Fertilizer and Maize
In the early-1990s, the Kenyan government 
launched a series of reforms designed to spur 
agricultural productivity by encouraging private 
investment in fertilizer distribution.  It removed 
fertilizer import restrictions, allowed private actors 
to participate in importing, trading, and distrib-
uting fertilizer, eliminated controls on access to 
foreign exchange, and removed customs duties 
and taxes imposed on fertilizer imports. By 1996, 
donor-financed imports had dwindled to 5 percent 
of total consumption, and small-scale farmers 
relied exclusively on the private sector and coop-
eratives for fertilizer.
Reforms, however, went even further. In 
late 1993, under pressure from international 
lenders, the government eliminated controls on 
the movement and price of maize and eliminated 
subsidies on maize sold to registered millers. 
By 1995, private traders were officially allowed 
to transport maize across districts. Starting in 
1995/96, and under pressure from external 
donors, the government dramatically reduced 
NCPB’s operating budget. By the early-2000s, 
less than 4 percent of small farm households sold 
maize directly to the NCPB.1 
Currently, most of the maize purchased by 
the NCPB comes from large-scale farmers in the 
maize-surplus parts of the country. Although 
the NCPB’s purchases now account for less than 
one-third of the maize sold by all Kenyan farmers, 
its operations still significantly affect market 
prices. NCPB purchase and sale operations tend 
to raise market prices, particularly during good 
harvest years, and therefore protect against 
downward price risk. 
Although the liberalization process, especially 
in its early years, was marked by unpredictability, 
vacillation, and perceptions that state resources 
were being channeled to particular firms, it 
generated a dramatic response from the private 
sector and was largely satisfactory to small farmers. 
Easing the Way for  
Fertilizer Use
The reforms to maize and fertilizer markets, 
coupled with the freeing of the foreign exchange 
regime in 1992, created a new policy environ-
ment in Kenya. Private firms surged into fertilizer 
importing, wholesaling, distribution, and retailing. 
By 1996, Kenya had 12 major importers, 500 
wholesalers, and roughly 5,000 retailers distrib-
uting fertilizer in the country.2 The number of 
retailers was estimated to rise to between 7,000 
and 8,000 by 2000.3 Some of the largest importers 
were cooperatives and estate firms supplying their 
members, most of whom were small-scale farmers 
participating in contract-farming arrangements for 
tea, coffee, and sugarcane. 
Thanks to the increase in the number of fertil-
izer retailers, the average distance small farmers 
had to travel to get to the nearest fertilizer retailer 
fell from 8.1 to 3.4 kilometers between 1997 and 
2007. Over the same period, the average distance 
they had to travel to get to the nearest hybrid 
maize seed stockist declined from 5.6 to 3.4 kilo-
meters. The rise in the number of rural fertilizer 
and hybrid seed retailers, as well as accelerated 
public investment in road infrastructure since 
2003, expanded small farmers’ access to fertilizer, 
reduced their transaction costs, and helped raise 
the demand for modern inputs and the productiv-
ity of smallholder maize production. 
A key factor in increasing fertilizer use has 
been cost and price. The cost added on to the 
price of fertilizer between offloading at Mombasa 
port and delivery to the farm has decreased 
substantially since the liberalization of fertilizer 
marketing, with much of the cost savings passed 
on to the farmer through lower retail prices. 100  
Another important factor in keeping fertilizer 
prices low is increased competition among local 
importers and wholesalers. Competition has led 
importers and wholesalers to exploit cheaper 
ways of transporting fertilizer and use cheaper 
international sources of credit while also pursuing 
more efficient business practices by merging local 
firms with more established international fertilizer 
firms. If inflation is taken into account, fertilizer 
prices in Kenya are currently about equal to what 
they were in the mid-1990s even though world 
fertilizer prices are substantially higher than they 
were in the mid-1990s. 
With increased availability and competitive 
prices, many more farmers are using fertilizer. 
The proportion of small-scale farmers using 
fertilizer on maize during the main growing 
season rose from 56 percent in 1996 to 70 percent 
in 2007, although these rates vary considerably 
throughout the country. The highest proportion 
of smallholders using fertilizer occurs in the 
highlands of central and western Kenya, where 
more than 80 percent of all maize-growing 
smallholders apply fertilizer on maize. Fertilizer 
application rates rose from 84 kilograms per 
hectare of land in 1997 to 111 kilograms per 
hectare in 2007, a 34 percent increase. Overall, 
total national fertilizer use doubled between the 
mid-1990s and late-2000s (see Figure 14.1).
Maize Yields Rise and  
Prices Fall
Between 1997 and 2007, maize yields increased 
by roughly 18 percent. This yield improvement is 
not reflected in official government maize pro-
duction statistics, which do not take into account 
the increasingly large number of farmers who are 
growing maize on the same fields as other crops, or 
the shift over time in the proportion of maize area 
grown in relatively semi-arid regions. This shift 
was facilitated by the release of improved maize 
Chapter 14  Unlocking the Market
Source:  Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture for data on fertilizer consumption and donor-financed imports; author interviews with fertilizer 
importers for fertilizer import data. 
Figure 14.1—Trends in fertilizer consumption, commercial imports, and donor-
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cultivars well suited to mid- and low-altitude areas 
of the country.
Maize farmers have also found it easier to 
sell their increased production of maize. More 
private maize assemblers—that is, traders who buy 
directly from farmers and assemble maize for bulk 
distribution—are now spread across rural areas 
where maize surpluses are expected. More than 
90 percent of Kenya’s maize sales are now made 
to private traders, who are more accessible than 
they were in the past. In the lowlands of Eastern 
Province, for example, the average distance 
between farm and private buyer declined from 6.55 
to 1.62 kilometers between 1997 and 2007, and 
in the high-potential areas of western Kenya this 
distance declined from 1.80 to 0.40 kilometers. 
This improved penetration of maize assemblers in 
rural areas has likely reduced farmers’ costs and 
resulted in tangible benefits. 
Since the mid-1990s, maize meal, a staple 
in Kenyan diets, has become more affordable. 
The average daily wage for an urban Kenyan 
consumer employed in the formal sector bought 
three times more staple foods in 2006/07 than 
it did in 1995/96. Although the recent food price 
crisis partially reversed this trend, the quantities 
of staple foods affordable per daily wage in urban 
Kenya during the 2008/09 marketing season were 
still roughly double their levels of the mid-1990s. 
And in rural Kenya, because of the removal of 
bans on the movement of maize between districts, 
grain is now easier and cheaper to purchase in 
drier lowlands and marginal zones where food 
deficits are more common. Many farmers in these 
marginal areas are net consumers, who must buy 
food because they do not produce enough for their 
own subsistence.
More Improvements  
Are Possible
The case of fertilizer and maize markets in Kenya 
shows how public policy changes and investments 
can be a catalyst for greatly expanded private 
markets for agricultural inputs like fertilizer and 
outputs like maize. Nonetheless, Kenya could 
improve the well-being of small farmers and 
consumers even more by pursuing a number of 
other reforms, which can serve as useful lessons 
for other countries as well. 
First, well-managed and efficient transport 
and storage arrangements can further reduce the 
cost of distributing grain and fertilizers. At Kenya’s 
port of Mombasa, the offloading of commodities 
from ships is frequently delayed, and the regional 
railway system is deteriorating. The limited 
transport capacity requires fertilizer importers to 
rent storage facilities near the port, thereby raising 
costs. Improving Kenya’s railway system, in par-
ticular, could greatly reduce the cost of fertilizer to 
farmers in the upland production region.
Second, the government should reduce the cost 
and complexity of port operations. In Kenya, port 
fees, levies, and other charges should be rational-
ized and aggregated. In addition, documentation 
procedures need to be reduced, and some services 
should be provided electronically. 
Third, fertilizer packages should be tailored 
to local demand from small farmers, who require 
and are able to purchase only small packets. In 
addition, fertilizer quality control needs to be more 
actively enforced.
Fourth, fertilizer use could be made more 
profitable for farmers if it were combined with 
training on cultivation practices, soil fertility, 
water management, and efficient use of fertilizer 
and improved seed technologies that are respon-
sive to fertilizers.
Fifth, by offering farmers credit, inputs, and 
know-how, farmer organizations can provide an 
important resource to help small farmers make use 
of higher levels of inputs like fertilizer and achieve 
better production and marketing practices. 




























When Kenya liberalized markets for fertil-
izer and maize and invested in various types of 
public goods to support small-scale agriculture, 
thousands of private actors plunged into these 
markets, encouraging both an impressive rise in 
fertilizer use and significantly increased maize 
yields on the plots of small farmers. A recent 
nationwide survey revealed farmers’ satisfaction 
with the reformed maize markets: more than 65 
percent of farmers reported that they prefer the 
current liberalized maize marketing system over 
the previous state-controlled system.4 
In 2008, however, the positive developments 
in Kenya’s maize and fertilizer markets were 
threatened by civil disruption, drought, and the 
unprecedented surge in world fertilizer prices. 
Early-2008 witnessed the destruction of physical 
infrastructure in western Kenya (such as grain 
storage facilities) and the closing of many fertilizer 
supply stores. Moreover, the incentives to use fer-
tilizer in Kenya have been adversely affected both 
by drought and by world events, as the price of fer-
tilizer in relation to that of maize in Kenya reached 
its highest level in at least 18 years. Sustaining 
the success of the past two decades will require 
a return to political stability, a commitment to a 
clearly defined and relatively limited state role in 
fertilizer markets, and continued public invest-
ments in market development and the welfare of 
small farmers.  n
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B
eginning in the 1960s, agricultural 
scientists, policymakers, and farmers 
undertook a huge effort to increase the 
production of staple grains, especially 
in Asia, in what was described as the Green 
Revolution (see Chapter 3). This heavy focus 
on cereal production boosted food production 
and incomes for millions of rural people—but 
it also pushed a number of other crops to the 
sidelines. For example, legumes—including 
soybean, chickpea, and mungbean—had long been 
important in Asian diets, but in the 1960s yields of 
these crops were either stagnant or declining. 
In the early-1970s, scientists at AVRDC – The 
World Vegetable Center decided that the potential 
benefits of mungbean were too important to 
ignore. They recognized mungbean’s potential to 
supply nutrients and protein to Asia’s hungry, offer 
farmers a new income-generating opportunity, 
improve soil fertility, and diversify crop rotation 
practices—if only mungbean could be fit into the 
cropping practices of Asian farmers. 
In response to this challenge, AVRDC 
launched a research program aimed at increasing 
both the yields and output of the crop by breeding 
improved varieties. By working with national 
research partners in 27 Asian countries to adapt 
these varieties to local conditions, the program has 
succeeded in releasing 112 improved mungbean 
varieties to an estimated 1.5 million farmers. 
Farmer adoption rates have been substantial, 
and the release and dissemination of improved 
varieties have contributed to a 35 percent increase 
in mungbean production in Asia with consequent 
benefits to farmers’ well-being.1
Mungbean: Part of a 
Balanced Diet
Mungbean, along with chickpea and pigeon pea, 
is a major legume crop that supplements the 
largely cereal-based diets of the poor in Asia. 
When consumed together, cereals and legumes 
(also known as pulses) contribute significantly to a 
healthy and balanced diet. Cereals are deficient in 
the amino acid lysine, which legumes can provide; 
legumes are low in sulfur-rich amino acids, which 
cereals can provide. High in protein and easy to 
digest, mungbean consumed in combination with 
cereals can thus significantly increase the quality 
of protein in a meal.
Mungbean is also valuable because, like 
other legumes, it converts nitrogen from the air 
into helpful compounds that contribute to plant 
growth and soil fertility. This process, known 
as nitrogen fixation, is mediated by naturally 
occurring bacteria that live on small nodules 
on the mungbean’s roots. The bacteria produce 
nitrogen compounds that help the plant to grow 
and, when the plant dies and decomposes, increase 
the fertility of surrounding soil.
The importance of legumes was emphasized 
by AVRDC when it was established in Taiwan in 
1971. The Center’s aim was to enhance the diets, 
cropping systems, and incomes of poor farmers 
in Asia through the production and consump-
Counting on Beans
Mungbean improvement in Asia
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tion of vegetables. To do so, the Center selected 
two legumes for crop improvement—soybean and 
mungbean.
When AVRDC began its research on 
mungbean, Asian farmers were growing traditional 
varieties that posed several vexing problems. 
They took a long time to harvest—90 to 110 days 
to reach maturity—and thus could not be easily 
rotated in-between cereal crops.2 They also tended 
not to mature in the field all at once, meaning that 
farmers had to spend long hours harvesting the 
crop multiple times, while their pods (the casings 
in which the beans grow) tended to shatter easily, 
resulting in significant crop losses. In addition, 
mungbean crops were susceptible to insects and 
diseases, especially the mungbean yellow mosaic 
virus. And though these varieties required a great 
deal of labor, they produced only about 400 
kilograms of small seeds per hectare of land. 
After some discussion, plant scientists agreed 
on the goals of their mungbean improvement 
program. The ideal mungbean, they decided, 
would, among other things: 
•  carry all of its pods on the top of the plant for 
easy harvesting; 
•  have a stable potential yield of more than 2 
tons per hectare;
•  mature quickly, in about 60 to 75 days;
•  mature at a uniform rate so that farmers 
could complete the harvest in one go;
•  have larger seeds than traditional varieties; 
and
•  be resistant to pests and diseases like 
Cercospora leaf spot, powdery mildew, 
mungbean yellow mosaic virus, bean fly, pod 
borer, and bruchid weevil.3
Having agreed on a blueprint, AVRDC 
recognized that the development of this ideal 
mungbean required a strong relationship with 
national agricultural research organizations 
in countries where improved mungbean could 
be cultivated. To this end, AVRDC established 
the South Asia Vegetable Research Network 
(SAVERNET) in partnership with its key 
collaborators—scientists at national agricultural 
research organizations in Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Thailand.
Under SAVERNET, AVRDC scientists and 
scientists in participating countries screened and 
exchanged germplasm (that is, genetic materials) 
to identify desirable traits with which to develop 
improved mungbean lines. Working closely 
with farmers, they evaluated the performance of 
promising varieties under different agroecological 
conditions in different countries and during 
different seasons. Results were consolidated 
and shared among the network members. Over 
time and with technical support from AVRDC, 
the national partners in each country gradually 
assumed greater responsibility over their national 
mungbean improvement programs.
Research breakthroughs, however, were not 
immediate in all countries. Although mungbean 
research showed spectacular success in Southeast 
Asia and China, the main region in need of 
improved varieties was South Asia, where the 
mungbean yellow mosaic virus severely con-
strained the crop’s production. In 1992, AVRDC 
established an informal network with scientists 
in Pakistan to collaborate on finding a solution. 
Shuttle breeding—that is, growing two crops a year 
by sending germplasm back and forth between 
AVRDC in Taiwan and the Nuclear Institute for 
Agriculture and Biology in Pakistan—enabled 
scientists to develop improved mungbean yellow 
mosaic virus–resistant varieties for South Asia. 
In 1997, the South Asian members of SAVERNET 
organized a mungbean subnetwork to disseminate 
these virus-resistant varieties. Within four years 
and with crucial support from the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development 
(DFID), scientists managed to release these 
improved, virus-resistant varieties, which yield 
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at least 2 tons per hectare and mature in 55 to 
65 days, throughout the region—in Bhutan, 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
Farmers did not immediately take to the 
improved mungbean varieties in all countries; they 
had to be convinced. AVRDC’s national partners 
in different countries demonstrated the value of 
improved mungbean by conducting demonstra-
tions in farmers’ fields, organizing field days 
(events for sharing agricultural information), 
promoting adoption through model farmers, 
and encouraging both public and private seed 
companies to multiply and distribute improved 
mungbean seed so that farmers could replicate 
these demonstrations. 
Ultimately, these efforts succeeded. Between 
1997 and 2002, mungbean cultivation in South 
Asia took off, and by 2005, improved mungbean 
was being cultivated on 1.5 million hectares of 
land.
Beyond AVRDC and its partners, much of the 
credit for this success goes to the farmers who 
were active in the research and development of 
improved mungbean. They were instrumental not 
only in evaluating the improved varieties under 
farm conditions, but also in producing seed that 
could be shared with other farmers. For example, 
under a Seed Village Program launched in India’s 
Punjab state in 2003, a total of 270 farmers, each 
planting mungbean on just 0.4 hectares of land, 
succeeded in producing about 2,700 tons of high-
quality seed that was distributed to other farmers 
in the next season. 
Impacts of the Mungbean 
Transformation
Mungbean has been transformed from a marginal 
to a relatively important crop and, in the process, 
has contributed to improving rural household 
income, expanding employment opportunities, 
diversifying diets, increasing nutritional security, 
and enhancing soil fertility in Asia.
Since the 1980s, improved mungbean has 
led farmers to plant the crop on more and more 
land (Figure 15.1). Today, improved mungbean 
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Figure 15.1—Estimated area under mungbean before and after the interventionvarieties occupy almost 90 percent of the area 
under mungbean cultivation in Pakistan and 
Thailand, 85 percent in China, and around 50 
percent in Bangladesh and Myanmar, accounting 
for almost 3 million hectares of land.4 Overall in 
Asia, production of mungbean varieties increased 
from 2.3 million tons in 1985 to 3.1 million tons in 
2000.5 Globally, improved mungbean constitutes 
more than 25 percent of worldwide mungbean 
production.6
Moreover, mungbean production is raising 
the yields of farmers’ other crops by improving the 
productivity of the soil. Including mungbean in 
the rice–wheat crop rotation system enriches the 
soil and breaks soil fatigue caused by cereal–cereal 
rotations. Farmers in Punjab who grow mungbean 
as well as paddy rice have found their paddy rice 
yields, and their incomes, rising. 
Mungbean also promises health benefits for 
consumers, especially poor women and children, 
who are most vulnerable to the effects of poor 
nutrition and a lack of micronutrients in their 
diets. Mungbean is rich in protein and iron, and 
improved mungbean varieties contain 6 milli-
grams of iron per 100 grams of raw seed, whereas 
traditional mungbean varieties contain only 3.0 to 
3.5 milligrams.7
Lessons from the Mungbean 
Experience
The experiences of the many partners involved 
in developing and disseminating improved 
mungbean in Asia point to a number of lessons:
Commitment—For the intervention to succeed, 
it needed a strong commitment from all par-
ties—international research institutes, national 
partners, donors, nongovernmental organizations, 
and individual farmers. 
Plan with a purpose—Realistic goals and 
specific plans based on available resources helped 
the intervention move forward. Deadlines were 
set for achieving goals. Progress was monitored 
semiannually and annually, which allowed project 
participants to make midcourse adjustments as 
needed.
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Focus on farmers—Crop-management practices 
varied in each country and season. National 
agricultural research systems developed farmer-
friendly technologies to address the farmers’ 
specific constraints in their countries. 
Share across boundaries—Progress and 
success varied between countries and between 
provinces or states within countries. For instance, 
Punjab in India was able to make rapid progress in 
seed production and distribution; Bangladesh was 
able to adopt and follow the example of Punjab. 
Within India, Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Jharkhand, and Rajasthan made good progress 
with assistance from Punjab. Success in one area 
can serve as a catalyst for success in neighbor-
ing states and countries. And sharing resources 
between countries and between states within a 
country is the best way to rapidly spread technol-
ogy and improve productivity, nutrition, and food 
security.
Welcome all contributions, large and 
small—China and India are big countries with 
sufficient resources to maintain large germplasm 
collections and conduct meaningful research. But 
smaller countries also made significant contri-
butions: the Philippines developed high-yield, 
early-maturing, bold-seeded varieties; Pakistan 
developed lines with a high level of resistance 
to the mungbean yellow mosaic virus. Even at 
the community level, the Seed Village Program 
and other seed exchanges helped rapidly expand 
mungbean production.
Adapt as needed—Evaluating improved technol-
ogy, regardless of its source, and determining if 
it was suitable for local situations returned large 
dividends in Myanmar, with a small investment. 
Train professionals and consumers—
Training was essential for researchers, extension 
staff, farmers, and economists to systematically 
organize, plan, and implement activities and 
collect data. In addition, to enhance nutritional 
security, women received training in mungbean 
preparation to ensure that valuable nutrients 
would not be lost during cooking.
Provide visible proof—Demonstration trials, 
farmers’ field trials, and field days proved that 
“seeing is believing,” enabling farmers to see for 
themselves the performance of the improved 
varieties compared with local varieties. When 
farmers actively participated in research and 
development efforts, they felt they had ownership 
in the output. 
Promote the benefits—The return on invest-
ment to the farmer is extremely important for the 
success of any new crop variety. Farmers need 
to understand why maintaining pure seed of the 
improved variety is worthwhile. 
It is also important for international agri-
cultural centers to be sensitive to the needs and 
achievements of the national partners. National 
agricultural research systems should be properly 
credited for their efforts, and international agri-
cultural centers should work behind the scenes, 
providing technology and other support that are 
unavailable to the national systems. Each country 
has its own rules and regulations for releasing new 
varieties, and international scientists should follow 
them carefully to avoid delays or work closely with 
national scientists to encourage minor modifica-
tions that can speed release.  
Conclusion
Only ongoing involvement from all partners will 
ensure that the mungbean transformation will 
continue to respond to current and evolving condi-
tions. For instance, for the improved varieties to 
perform to their full potential, researchers need 
to refine seasonal and location-specific growing 




































tists will have to develop improved varieties to 
withstand continuously evolving diseases, insects, 
and climate conditions. Studies should take 
the broadest possible view of the intervention’s 
impacts to explain its value to policymakers and 
donors. 
The world population is expected to reach  
8 billion within the next 10 years, and more than 
half of that population will be in Asia. Despite 
rising incomes in China and India, food and 
nutrition security continue to be a concern across 
the continent. Protein, calorie, and micronutri-
ent deficiencies affect almost 2 billion people in 
the region.8 In 2000, vegetable sources provided 
49.8 grams of protein per capita per day in 
Asia, compared with 21.2 grams from animal 
sources.9  Mungbean—a nitrogen-fixing, protein- 
and iron-rich legume—will undoubtedly play an 
ever-growing role in Asian diets as governments 
seek to enhance food security and sustain their 
agricultural base. Through continuing research 
cooperation among local, national, and interna-
tional partners to improve and share mungbean 
germplasm and technical expertise, small-scale 
farmers can increase yields, diversify crop 
rotations, and increase their incomes by growing 
this nutritious legume for their families and com-
munities.  n
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F
armers have confronted the scourge of 
rinderpest, or cattle plague, ever since 
cattle were domesticated some 10,000 
years ago. For centuries, humankind 
has depended on livestock for draft power, milk, 
meat, skins, and manure. Rinderpest—which in 
its severest form can kill 95 percent or more of the 
animals it infects—has had devastating effects, 
blighting the lives of farmers throughout Africa, 
Asia, and Europe. It has been described as “the 
most dreaded bovine plague known, belonging to 
a select group of notorious infectious diseases that 
have changed the course of history.”1
Rinderpest was detected and confirmed for the 
last time in 2001 in Kenya. Few veterinarians and 
even farmers alive today have seen the disease, and 
its existence is fading from memory. The eradica-
tion of rinderpest can be viewed as an achievement 
on par with the eradication of smallpox from the 
human population, the only other time an infec-
tious disease has been eradicated. This remarkable 
feat was accomplished thanks to the efforts of 
scientists around the world to develop and perfect 
vaccines and—just as important—to international 
collaboration and coordination aimed at moni-
toring the disease and eliminating it wherever it 
lingered.  Rinderpest eradication was the outcome 
neither of a single project nor the efforts of a 
single agency; rather, it was the result of a series of 
periodic, internationally coordinated efforts built 
on the ongoing national programs of many affected 
countries during the course of many decades. 
History of the Disease
Rinderpest is thought to have had its origins as 
far back as the domestication of cattle in Asia, 
possibly in the region of the Indus River in 
modern-day Pakistan. It has had a severe impact 
not only on domesticated ruminants and swine, 
but also on many wild animals such as African 
buffaloes, giraffes, and warthogs. Related to the 
human measles virus, rinderpest is a contagious 
disease characterized by necrosis (cell death) and 
erosions throughout the digestive tract. Affected 
animals develop fever, discharges from the eyes 
and nose, erosions of the mucosa or soft lining 
in the mouth, diarrhea, dysentery, and death. 
Animals that recover are debilitated and suffer a 
long convalescence—although they are thereafter 
immune to the virus. When the virus is intro-
duced to a formerly unaffected area, it results in 
high mortality, but in areas where rinderpest is 
endemic, the morbidity and mortality rates can be 
low because many animals that survive an earlier 
exposure (and perhaps received vaccination) are 
protected. 
Warfare was a potent vehicle for spreading 
rinderpest throughout Europe, Asia, and the 
Middle East, because of the large cattle herds 
traveling with marauding armies. The Huns and 
Mongol invaders brought the disease from Asia 
into Europe, where it was spread by the movement 
of livestock meant to feed the populations of 
the burgeoning cities. For many centuries, no 
European countries were consistently free from 
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rinderpest. World War II led to a major resurgence 
of the disease throughout East and Southeast 
Asia. As late as the early-1990s, the civil distur-
bance caused by the Gulf War resulted in a major 
upsurge of infection in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.
The looting and social disruption of warfare 
was not alone in spreading rinderpest. Organized 
trade in cattle, largely from Russia, repeatedly 
introduced rinderpest into recipient countries in 
Europe and elsewhere in the 17th, 18th, and 19th 
centuries. As a result, from 1857 to 1866, Europe 
was stripped of cattle. 
Introduced into eastern Africa in the late 
19th century, rinderpest set off what came to be 
known as the Great African Pandemic. It spread 
from the Indian to the Atlantic Ocean and moved 
rapidly down the eastern seaboard of Africa in 
grazing animals both domestic and wild, reaching 
Southern Africa in 1896. When the first major 
African pandemic died down, it left behind pockets 
of infection from which arose periodic epidemics 
and pandemics. 
An array of sanitary measures—such as the 
culling of infected animals combined with gov-
ernment compensation for farmers, the safe 
disposal of carcasses, sanitary cordons around 
infected farms, and strong legal enforcement—was 
gradually adopted across Europe in the 18th and 
19th centuries, setting the stage for the control 
and eventual eradication of rinderpest there in 
1908. But in much of Africa and Asia, rinderpest 
remained a persistent scourge throughout the 20th 
century.2
Developing a Vaccine
The eradication of rinderpest in the developing 
world during the 20th century depended on two 
factors: first, the discovery of an effective vaccine 
that worked well in tropical countries, and second, 
the adoption of a system of mass vaccinations 
followed by surveillance, and focused vaccinations 
in case of outbreaks. 
In the late-1890s, South African scientists 
showed that immune serum (serum taken from a 
recovered animal) and virulent blood (blood taken 
from an infected animal), when given simultane-
ously, produced long-term immunity to rinderpest, 
despite the risk of disease inherent in its use. 
By 1928, this “serum-simultaneous” method 
developed independently had eliminated rinder-
pest from European Russia.
Throughout the 20th century, the effort to 
develop a more effective vaccine continued, with 
important breakthroughs along the way. Scientists 
across the globe developed and improved upon 
attenuated vaccines—that is, vaccines using live 
but less virulent viruses—in the mid-20th century. 
Yet the search continued for a vaccine that would 
provide long-term protection to all types of cattle, 
would not require the accompaniment of an 
immune serum, and would not sicken the animals 
being immunized. 
In the late-1950s, Walter Plowright, working at 
the East African Veterinary Research Organization 
in Kenya, achieved a breakthrough using tissue 
culture—in other words, he grew a virus in cells in 
a lab instead of in animal hosts. His tissue-culture 
rinderpest vaccine produced neither lesions nor 
fever and was safe and effective for cattle of all 
breeds and ages and both sexes. Its only drawback 
was that it had to be kept at a low temperature—
a distinct disadvantage in African climates. 
However, in the late-1980s, scientists developed 
a variant of tissue-culture rinderpest vaccine, 
called Thermovax, that could be kept at ambient 
temperatures in the tropics for up to four weeks. 
This vaccine was widely used to great effect in 
community-based vaccination programs in Africa, 
particularly in remote areas of Sudan, Somalia, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda, as well as 
in Afghanistan.
Eliminating Rinderpest
With rinderpest vaccines becoming available, 
countries and regions began adopting major 
campaigns aimed at eliminating the disease. In 
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1948 in western China, for example, rinderpest 
was killing millions of cattle, buffaloes, and yaks. 
Recognizing that feeding its millions of citizens 
required eliminating the disease, the new govern-
ment made eradicating rinderpest a high priority. 
The Chinese also undertook heroic measures 
in this battle. For example, to combat pockets 
of infection in the Himalayas at a time when 
there was little or no motorized transport and no 
refrigeration, the vaccine virus was transported 
in live, infected sheep on the backs of yaks and 
horses to sites where the vaccine was produced for 
immediate use. Success in China came rapidly. No 
outbreak has occurred there since 1955 and the 
vaccination process ceased in 1956.
Success in India was slower. In 1954, India 
initiated its National Rinderpest Eradication 
Programme. The program aimed to systematically 
vaccinate 80 percent of cattle and buffaloes in five 
years, to be succeeded by a follow-up period during 
which the remaining 20 percent plus the annual 
calf crop would be vaccinated.3 Overall, mass 
vaccinations succeeded in eliminating endemic 
rinderpest in some states but did not prevent it 
from being reintroduced. By the mid-1980s, it was 
clear that the program was failing, and the country 
shifted course. In the endemic states, mass vacci-
nations were re-launched with the goal of covering 
90 percent of the cattle population within three 
years. In non-endemic areas, authorities adminis-
tered focused vaccinations only in the event of an 
outbreak. Strict controls on the movement of cattle 
helped reduce the transmission of the disease 
within India, and rinderpest was eliminated from 
the country in 1995.
Although China and India managed to 
eradicate rinderpest within their borders through 
their own national programs, it took global coor-
dination to wipe out the disease in other parts of 
the developing world. In the 1960s and 1970s, a 
number of African countries, coordinated by the 
Organization of African Unity, joined forces in an 
effort called Joint Project 15. This project aimed 
to eliminate rinderpest using intensive, inter-
nationally coordinated vaccination campaigns. 
Although Joint Project 15 was highly successful 
at first, it failed to eliminate three or four persis-
tent reservoirs of rinderpest, and new pandemics 
eventually emerged. By the early-1980s, rinder-
pest pandemics in East and West Africa were 
converging in Nigeria, in what became known 
as the second Great African Pandemic. National 
emergency control programs, many mounted 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), brought the resurgence 
under control by 1986. Though devastating, these 
events did have the beneficial effect of stimulating 
a continentwide Pan-African Rinderpest Campaign 
(PARC)—and ultimately the Global Rinderpest 
Eradication Programme (GREP).
Conceived in 1992 and launched in 1993, 
GREP operated under the auspices of the FAO, 
which provided coordination assistance and 
offered technical guidance. When GREP began, 
authorities had no clear picture of where rinder-
pest was occurring or how the virus survived and 
spread. Once scientists established the geographic 
extent of rinderpest infection and recognized that 
hidden reservoirs of infection were giving rise to 
visible epidemics in normally unaffected popula-
tions, it became possible to develop a strategy for 
its progressive elimination.
GREP set a deadline of 2010 for global freedom 
from rinderpest, based on internationally coordi-
nated rinderpest-control activities on three fronts: 
Africa, West Asia, and South Asia. The international 



























































community would fund these campaigns—often 
with nominal national contributions—and the 
regional organizations would implement them. 
After successfully carrying out rinderpest-control 
activities, individual countries would undergo 
an accreditation process to be declared free from 
rinderpest. The World Organization for Animal 
Health defined a pathway to accreditation that 
incorporated a series of verifiable epidemiological 
objectives, including a requirement that countries 
cease all vaccinations. Completion of all steps on 
the pathway to eradication was expected to be far 
less costly than continuing with endless rounds of 
mass vaccinations. 
As GREP helped spread information on the 
prevalence and risk of rinderpest, the focus of 
rinderpest control thus shifted from vaccina-
tion to surveillance—but this shift did not always 
occur quickly or easily. A number of countries 
in Africa and Asia sought security by continuing 
to implement annual vaccination campaigns for 
many years after rinderpest had been eradicated 
from their territory and the risk of reinvasion had 
become minimal. 
Nonetheless, the shift away from mass vacci-
nations to surveillance and accreditation did occur 
over time. The Pan-African Rinderpest Campaign, 
which was implemented in 20 countries in West 
Africa and 7 countries in East Africa, combined 
emergency action to control existing outbreaks 
with efforts to strengthen veterinary services, for 
example. It also included a phased vaccination 
and surveillance program aimed at eradicating 
remaining pockets of the disease. As noted previ-
ously, the last known case of the disease worldwide 
occurred in Kenya in 2001. 
Impact of Rinderpest 
Eradication 
By preventing the illness and death of millions of 
livestock, rinderpest eradication has generated 
enormous benefits for people’s livelihoods and 
food security. Eradication has prevented the 
devastating effects of rinderpest on poor rural 
households with limited assets or few alternatives 
to livestock production. Given the many links in 
the livestock marketing chain, the cessation of 
rinderpest means increased economic activity 
among traders, slaughterhouses, brokers, retailers, 
and other stakeholders. In Pakistan, for instance, 
rinderpest impeded international trade with the 
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Gulf countries, which sought to keep the disease 
away from their borders. Cattle exports from 
Pakistan to the Middle East increased dramatically 
after those states lifted a ban, imposed because of 
rinderpest, when Pakistan declared provisional 
freedom from the disease in 2003 (see Figure 16.1).
Lessons from the Rinderpest 
Eradication Experience
Obviously, the biology of different diseases and 
hosts must inform the methods to control and 
eradicate diseases, but the experiences with rinder-
pest offer some lessons. The rinderpest-eradication 
strategy evolved from annual, institutionalized 
vaccination campaigns to a process of seeking 
active infection, containing and eliminating it 
based on a sound understanding of the disease, 
and then confirming the absence of the rinderpest 
virus. These lessons learned could act as a model 
for other endeavors in animal disease control. 
A campaign of global eradication requires an 
international coordinating body. For rinderpest, 
the FAO was mandated by the ministers of agri-
culture of its member countries to assume this 
role in 1993, and it provided the basic funding for 
the GREP. FAO proposed and guided the strategy, 
monitored progress, and hosted an international 
forum for exchanging technical information. 
At the same time, however, global campaigns 
are too large to be operated by a central unit 
only. Regional organizations committed to 
working closely with the global coordinating body 
are needed to coordinate regionalized control 
campaigns and to certify disease freedom. Regional 
ownership of the accreditation process can help put 
pressure on intractable countries to undergo the 
process. Although a number of regional programs 
were envisioned, in reality only the African regions 
assumed responsibility for rinderpest eradication 
through PARC. To safeguard the program, the 
GREP secretariat ended up promoting rinderpest 
eradication in parts of the world not covered by 
regional campaigns.
A global disease eradication program needs 
a clear and realistic aim supported by a timetable 
and a step-by-step approach. Before the program 
starts, planners need to consider such issues as 
Source: FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2009. FAOSTAT statistical database. Rome. 
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vaccine delivery systems, the capacity of targeted 
countries’ veterinary services, legal provisions, and 
policy issues such as cost recovery. 
It is also important to take into account the 
attitudes of livestock owners by consulting with 
them beforehand. In Ethiopia, for example, the 
central planning of vaccination campaigns failed 
to place vaccination teams at sites amenable to 
pastoralists and antagonized them by insisting on 
vaccinating all ages of cattle, which the pastoralists 
knew to be unnecessary. Rinderpest was quickly 
eliminated once the program began basing its vac-
cinations on the preferences of livestock owners, 
and combining this effort with community-based 
animal health worker programs in remote areas 
and the use of a thermostable vaccine. 
A disease-eradication campaign also needs 
appropriate technical tools, such as a clear and 
evolving understanding of the epidemiology of the 
targeted disease and safe, effective, affordable, and 
quality-assured vaccines. The setting of quality-
assurance procedures for rinderpest vaccines and 
the establishment of a facility in Africa where 
vaccine assessment and certification could be 
performed made an invaluable contribution, not 
only to PARC, but also to GREP outside Africa, by 
offering services to campaigns in other countries. 
Furthermore, for vaccines that are to be used in 
developing countries, it is important that they retain 
their potency in the warm temperatures of the trop-
ics—in other words, they should be thermostable. 
Vaccines that might be fit for use in temperate or 
developed-country environments are not necessar-
ily useful in tropical or developing environments 
and remote locations. The seminal research that 
led to the provision of a thermostable rinderpest 
vaccine made a significant contribution to eradicat-
ing rinderpest from remote areas in Africa and Asia. 
A set of diagnostic tools for detecting the 
disease is also needed to support rapid diagnosis 
and surveillance. In the case of rinderpest, one 
issue that has caused serious problems in monitor-
ing and accreditation is the inability to discriminate 
between antibodies induced by vaccination and 
wild virus infection. A test to distinguish between 
infected and vaccinated animals would have sped 
up the accreditation process. Instead, scientists had 
to wait until a sufficient number of animals had 
been born after the vaccinations ceased before they 
could test a suitable cohort to see if the rinderpest 
virus was still circulating.
Finally, a clearly defined accreditation 
process for disease freedom is needed. From the 
start of GREP, it was envisaged that the World 
Organization for Animal Health would assume 
responsibility for operating the rinderpest freedom 
accreditation process. Stringent conditions 
for accreditation were set, and slow but steady 
progress was made in accrediting countries as free 
from the rinderpest disease or infection. Setting 
a deadline of 2010 for global rinderpest eradica-
tion was helpful in guiding countries along the 
pathway to accreditation. In fact, it is likely that 
rinderpest stopped circulating in both domesti-
cated and wild animals in 2001—nine years before 
the deadline—yet no declaration of global freedom 
has been made because the remaining unaccred-
ited countries are increasingly reluctant to devote 
any resources to the accreditation process—even 
though they have eradicated rinderpest. As a 
result, although no known cases of rinderpest have 
emerged since 2001, accreditation of all countries 
individually may not be possible by 2010 (see 
Figure 16.2). How this will be resolved is unclear. 
It may be that not every single country needs to 
be formally accredited as free from rinderpest and 
intransigent countries do not need to be coerced 
into undertaking the accreditation process. In any 
future eradication program, the final accreditation 
process, and the manner in which an announce-
ment of global eradication is to be made, needs to 
be clearly defined in advance.
Conclusion
After plaguing farmers in Africa, Asia, and 
Europe for thousands of years, rinderpest has 
finally been eliminated. Although global accredi-
tation of freedom from rinderpest has not yet 
been completed, some 127 countries around the 
world have been declared free of the disease, 
and another 11 are in the accreditation pipeline. 
Besides increasing confidence in food production 
through cattle and buffaloes, growing confidence 
in rinderpest freedom is leading to an increase in 
trade in livestock and their products from previ-
ously infected countries, with enormous benefits 
for producers and consumers. By saving millions 
of livestock and contributing to the increasing pro-
duction of animal products, rinderpest eradication 
has improved food security and the livelihoods of 
millions of people worldwide.
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Global eradication of an infectious disease has 
occurred only twice, with smallpox and rinderpest. 
The experience of rinderpest eradication shows 
how much a careful combination of scientific 
expertise and close international cooperation can 
accomplish.  n 
Source: World Organization for Animal Health. 2009. www.oie.int/eng/status/Rinderpest/en_RP_free.htm.Reaching livestock keepers with veterinary services is a perennial challenge, especially where farmers and 
pastoralists live in remote areas beyond the reach of government service delivery systems. As late as the 1990s, 
this challenge was seriously hindering efforts to eradicate rinderpest. Outbreaks were still to be found in parts 
of South Sudan, East Africa, and the Horn of Africa, areas where armed conflict or the remoteness of pastoral 
communities were hampering eradication efforts.
Two breakthroughs helped wipe out these last pockets of rinderpest. First was the development in the late-
1980s of Thermovax, a heat-stable formulation for the rinderpest vaccine that was far less dependent on cold-
chain facilities. Second was the realization by international agencies, national governments, and nongovernmental 
organizations that community-based animal health workers (CAHWs) could be effective in vaccinating cattle in 
far-flung pastoralist communities.
While the development of the improved vaccine is well documented, less recognized is the role that CAHWs 
played in combating rinderpest. This novel approach was developed by nongovernmental organizations working 
with livestock keepers in East Africa and India during the 1980s. It uses community participation to select people 
from within a rural community to be trained as animal health workers, identify livestock diseases and report 
outbreaks, and develop locally-acceptable incentives to keep these services running.a
Community-based animal health workers were specifically used to combat rinderpest in South Sudan, 
the Afar region of Ethiopia, Karamoja in Uganda, and Turkana in Kenya, as part of the Pan African Rinderpest 
Campaign. The effort, directed by the Organization of African Unity/Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources and 
implemented in partnership with various nongovernmental organizations working on the ground, quickly achieved 
dramatic results. 
In South Sudan, where armed conflict had disrupted cold chains and brought vaccination efforts to a 
standstill by 1992, a community animal health worker program using the new vaccine succeeded in vaccinating 
over 4.3 million cattle between 1993 and 1995; as a result confirmed outbreaks of rinderpest decreased from 11 
in 1993 to only one in 1998.b In Ethiopia’s Afar region, where government teams had been unable to contain the 
disease through a 15-year campaign dating back to the late-1970s, community animal health workers succeeded 
in vaccinating 73,000 cattle in just one season in 1994. Because of this success there were no further cases of 
rinderpest after 1995; the reservoir of infection had been effectively removed.
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ilk has historically been an important 
source of protein for Indians, especial-
ly for the country’s many vegetarians. 
But India has not always been able to 
produce enough milk to satisfy consumer demand. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, India faced severe milk 
shortages and relied heavily on milk imports. Mil-
lions of Indian farmers, most with just a few cows, 
produced milk, but they had no way of delivering 
their highly perishable products to the fast-growing 
cities where demand for milk was high and rising.
Impressed by the success of a dairy coopera-
tive union in Gujarat, the Government of India 
established the National Dairy Development Board 
(NDDB) and mandated it to expand the pattern 
of dairy cooperatives established in the Anand 
District of Gujarat throughout India. The NDDB 
conceived and developed the Operation Flood 
program, which organized dairy farmers into 
cooperatives, introduced technological advances 
to help them produce more milk, and transformed 
the policy environment in support of smallholder 
dairy. It helped create a national “milk grid,” 
linking India’s dairy cooperatives with major 
cities in a chain of milk production, procurement, 
processing, and marketing. The beneficiaries have 
included small-scale dairy farmers, urban and rural 
consumers, and even landless milk producers. This 
intervention had a large impact on the evolution 
of the dairy industry in India and successfully 
contributed to improving nutrition and reducing 
poverty. 
Today, in the wake of Operation Flood and 
other development programs targeting the dairy 
industry, milk production has nearly tripled. India 
has become the world’s largest producer of buffalo 
and goat milk and the sixth-largest producer 
of cow milk. Operation Flood contributed to a 
“white revolution” in India, similar to the Green 
Revolution in crop production (see Chapter 3).
Flooding India with Milk
India’s dairy industry is largely traditional, local, 
and informal. Milk production is dominated by 
smallholder farmers, including landless agricul-
tural workers, who rely primarily on family labor 
to collect and deliver milk to consumers and 
markets. Eighty percent of milk comes from farms 
of only two to five cows.1 These many small farms 
traditionally lacked access to markets. No system 
existed for procuring milk produced in rural areas, 
and the perishable nature of milk made it difficult 
and expensive to transport. 
In response to the limitations of this system, 
milk producers of the Anand district in the state 
of Gujarat organized themselves into a private 
cooperative called Kaira District Cooperative Milk 
Producers’ Union Ltd. in 1946. After a visit to the 
cooperative, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri 
decided that this model should be replicated 
throughout India. His dream came to fruition in a 
bold initiative to “flood India with milk” through a 
sophisticated procurement system using rural pro-
duction to satisfy urban demand. Operation Flood, 
a national-scale, federally sponsored intervention, 
began in 1970 and lasted until 1996.
Operation Flood was designed to increase milk 
production, ensure that a stable supply reached 
rural and urban consumers, and raise the incomes 
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of dairy farmers. It replaced the ad hoc production, 
marketing, and selling of milk with an organized, 
continuous dairy-supply chain from production to 
consumption. The intervention was organized in 
three tiers. At the base, farmer-controlled, village-
level cooperatives were responsible for supplying 
milk to the production and marketing chain, 
making local dairy sales, and testing samples of 
dairy products. The middle tier was made up of 
district-level cooperative unions, which owned and 
operated processing plants, transported equipment 
for collecting and processing milk, and managed 
cattle feed plants. They also provided animal 
healthcare through livestock centers. At the apex 
were state federations, which conducted marketing 
and coordinated interstate sales. This network of 
village dairy cooperatives, district and regional 
cooperative unions, and state marketing federa-
tions became known as the national milk grid. 
The various elements of the dairy indus-
try—production, procurement, processing, and 
marketing—were, however, carefully scaled up in 
three phases. Phase one, carried out from 1970 to 
1980, targeted just four major urban markets—
Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi, and Chennai (known 
as Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madras, respec-
tively, at the time of Operation Flood)—for milk 
marketing and incorporated 1 million rural milk 
producers with 1.8 million milk-producing animals. 
The second phase, from 1981 to 1985, expanded the 
program to 10 million rural producers with several 
million head of improved high-quality, crossbred 
dairy cows. During this phase, the number of milk 
sheds rose from 18 to 27, and marketing expanded 
to cover all 147 major Indian cities. The third 
phase, lasting through the mid-1990s, focused on 
consolidating and filling remaining gaps in the 
grid. It targeted nearly 7 million farm families and 
170 milk sheds, and improved veterinary health-
care (see Figure 17.1).
The government of India created the National 
Dairy Development Board in 1965 and made 
it responsible for appraising, promoting, and 
supporting dairy cooperatives. The NDDB was 
established to direct India’s dairy development, by 
planning and providing farmer extension services, 
and improving dairy technologies, veterinary 
services, and nutrition. The founding chair of the 
NDDB, Dr. Verghese Kurien, the AMUL general 
manager, transformed cooperatives from an idea 
into a reality and conceived the overall design for 
Operation Flood. The Indian Dairy Corporation, 
established to manage the financial aspects of the 
intervention, later merged into the NDDB, which 
continues to oversee dairy development programs 
throughout India today after the completion of the 
Operation Flood program. 
Financing for Operation Flood came from an 
innovative source. When the European Economic 
Community (EEC) donated surplus dairy com-
modities—skimmed milk powder and butter oil—to 
India, the architects of Operation Flood incorpo-
rated these EEC donations with milk produced 
by Indian cooperatives and sold the combined 
products to help pay for development of the dairy 
industry. In this way, food aid was monetized to 
support local production. The intervention also 
drew on loans from the World Bank.
How Operation Flood 
Reshaped the Dairy 
Industry
Operation Flood linked rural dairy producers to 
urban consumers through dairy cooperatives, 
trucking networks, chilling plants, refrigerated 
vans, railway wagons, and processing plants. By 
linking production to consumption, the program 
created the incentives needed to encourage dairy 
producers and others involved in the supply chain 
to invest in order to increase their earnings from 
dairying. Gradually their confidence in dairying as 
a stable source of employment and income rose.
Operation Flood aided this process by intro-
ducing numerous technological and infrastructural 
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advances in dairying. On the production side, 
advances included crossing exotic breeds of cows 
with indigenous breeds to improve production. 
Estimates show that whereas one indigenous 
cow provided about 1.5 kilograms of milk a day, a 
crossbred cow could provide 4 kilograms a day.2 
On the processing side, advances included the 
introduction of silos, pasteurizers, storage tanks, 
and refrigerators that conformed to international 
standards, increasing the nation’s capacity to 
convert milk, a highly perishable commodity, into a 
commodity that could be stored and traded nation-
wide. And on the marketing side, new technologies 
were developed to improve the weighing and testing 
of milk and to improve the capacity to sell it in bulk. 
Some critics argued that crossbreeding favored 
larger farmers, eliminated indigenous Indian 
animals, and increased reliance on higher-quality 
feed. In fact, crossbreeding was part of the Indian 
government’s strategy for improving productivity 
in India without wiping out well-known breeds of 
Indian cattle. Only a small percentage of Operation 
Source: National Dairy Development Board. 2009. Personal Communication.








































Operation Flood I 
Operation Flood II 
Operation Flood III 
Opera￿on Flood Milksheds Districts 
Covered
I (July 70-Mar 81) 39 39
II (Apr 81-Mar 85) 97 161
III (Apr 85-Mar 96) 34 162
Total 170 362120	 	
Flood’s strategy focused on crossbred animals; and 
even landless milk producers sometimes acquired 
these animals. 
Between the periods of 1988–89 and 1995–96, 
milk production increased from 42 million liters 
a day to 67 million liters a day, milk procurement 
increased from 28 million liters a day to 35 million 
liters a day.3
A study of three districts—Bikaner in 
Rajasthan, Periyar in Tamil Nadu, and 
Sabarkantha in Gujarat—illustrates the benefits of 
Operation Flood at a community level.4 The study 
showed that households in villages with coopera-
tives had higher average incomes from all income 
sources, higher average incomes from milk, and 
higher average levels of employment. The creation 
of a national milk grid and the establishment of 
village cooperatives and district unions through-
out India generated many jobs; as of the early 21st 
century, 11 million households were employed 
by dairy cooperatives.5 The households benefited 
from cooperatives they owned, as well as from 
cooperatives that sold them feed, provided veteri-
nary care, and purchased their milk. 
 Although India’s dairy sector may have grown 
regardless of Operation Flood and cooperatives 
set up under Operation Flood accounted for only a 
small share of the total milk procured and marketed 
in India, these cooperatives were responsible for a 
major share of the formal, organized dairy sector. 
With the help of some other development factors, 
Operation Flood successfully created an enabling 
environment for dairy-sector development in India.
A Lasting Impact
More than a decade after the conclusion of 
Operation Flood, the dairy cooperative network 
continues to grow (Figure 17.2), and production 
and marketing continue to increase. The number 
of individual cooperative participants remains 
high (at 13 million in 2008, including 3.7 million 
women), and cooperatives still produce high 
volumes of milk. And although these numbers 
represent only a small proportion of India’s dairy 
market from any angle, they still convey the scale 
of Operation Flood’s success in revolutionizing the 
dairy industry in India.
Consumers now have increased access to more 
and better-quality milk products. Since the 1970s 
total output of milk and milk products has con-
tinuously risen faster than crop production. Dairy 
production rose an average of about 4.5 percent 
a year between 1970 and 2001. Official govern-
ment statistics for 2007–08 show that India is 
producing more than 100 million tons of dairy a 
year and that per capita availability of milk is near 
250 grams a day, up from 128 grams a day in 1980 
and 113 grams a day in 1968, before Operation 
Flood began (Figure 17.3).4  Among dairy farmers, 
overall per capita consumption of milk increased 
from 290 to 339 grams per day between 1988-89 
and 1995-96.
Operation Flood also had a favorable impact 
on income distribution in India. Although it was 
not a primary aim of the program to improve 
income distribution in India, by reaching out 
to small, marginal farmers and landless milk 
producers, it stands to reason that by promoting 
access for all to a strong milk market, balanced 
cattle feed, animal healthcare, and artificial 
insemination services the intervention would have 
a positive impact on income distribution between 
the rich and the poor. Studies of Operation Flood 
showed that the program effectively engaged the 
rural poor: in 1984, 72 percent of cooperative 
members were small and marginal farmers (or 
those who operated fewer than 5 hectares of land) 
and the majority of these were also from minority 
castes and tribes.5 Landless farmers’ incomes 
doubled after the organization of milk collection 
through cooperatives.6 Later studies showed that 
among landless households, milk production made 
a considerable contribution to income generation 
and confirmed the potential for poor households to 
increase their income through milk production.7 
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Sources: Gupta, P. R. 1997. Operation Flood: The third phase. In Dairy India 1997, ed. P. R. Gupta. New Delhi: P. R. Gupta; NDDB 
(National Dairy Development Board). 2006. Annual report, 2005–2006. Anand, India; Aneja, R. P. 1994. Dairying in India: A success 
story. APAARI Publication 1994(4). Bangkok, Thailand: Asia-Pacific Association of Agricultural Research Institutions.
Figure 17.2—Cooperative growth during and after Operation Flood, 1970–2006






























Farmer members (le￿-hand axis) Village milk coopera•ves (right-hand axis)
Sources: Gupta, P. R. 1997. Operation Flood: The third phase. In Dairy India 1997, ed. P. R. Gupta. 
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Figure 17.3—Production and per capita availability of milk in India, 1950–2008
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Operation Flood also benefited women. 
Employment rates, including those of female 
workers, were higher among Operation Flood ben-
eficiaries than among nonbeneficiaries.8 Extension 
activities, such as education on cattle breeding, 
meetings for knowledge sharing, and tours of dairy 
plants—all essential components of the coopera-
tive development process—have worked to engage 
women directly, with visible impact on women’s 
knowledge, confidence, and societal status. Not 
only are women increasingly depositing milk in 
cooperatives, but they are enjoying the benefits of 
higher prices, better information, and improved 
access to healthcare for their livestock. Women 
now make up more than 25 percent of coopera-
tive members, and more than 2,700 all-women 
cooperatives are functioning. Women continue to 
play a small role in running the dairy cooperative 
societies; however, less than 3 percent of board 
members are women.9
Drawing Lessons from the 
Operation Flood Model
Imitations of Operation Flood have already begun 
to emerge. In India alone, the Operation Flood 
model is being replicated for other products, 
including vegetable oils, fruits, and vegetables. 
Other Asian countries, such as China, the 
Philippines, and Sri Lanka, are also following 
this model. It is thus worth examining Operation 
Flood to learn from its design and implementation, 
as well as the myriad ways in which it generated 
impact on rural welfare.
Use food aid for development
Food aid has traditionally been used mainly for 
humanitarian purposes. Operation Flood marked 
the first time that food aid was leveraged as a 
resource for investment in development. Operation 
Flood used dairy products supplied as food aid by 
the European Economic Community as raw inputs 
to stimulate the growth of the dairy supply chain 
and used the proceeds from those commodities 
to help finance dairy development. This strategy 
helped scale up the industry, thus creating the 
capacity to absorb increasing production from 
India’s own dairy production. 
A related and more subtle message concerns 
the importance of a longer-term perspective. 
Several leaders had the foresight to see what 
could happen if new avenues for dairy develop-
ment were not pursued: mass quantities of cheap 
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Kenya is the “milkshed” of Africa, with more than 6 million dairy cattle producing roughly 4 billion liters of milk 
per year, and higher milk consumption (145 liters per person per year) than any other African country. Most dairy 
cattle are owned by small-scale farmers, and an estimated 86 percent of their milk is supplied in an unprocessed 
form to consumers through a supply chain dominated by small-scale traders, transporters, and sellers.a
Until recently, public policies and business interests controlled the country’s dairy supply chain to such an 
extent that small-scale milk vending of lower-priced raw milk in urban areas was essentially criminalized in the 
name of food safety and quality. With the support of the Kenya Dairy Board, the government’s regulatory agency 
that oversees the dairy industry, these policies and interests created a market based on unfair competition. The 
negative repercussions affected both small-scale milk vendors, many of whom are women, and consumers, many 
of whom prefer to purchase milk from outside the formal industry because of lower prices and preferred taste.b
The conflict between the few large businesses on the one hand and the poor, haphazardly organized, and 
voiceless small-scale milk traders on the other became more apparent in the mid-1990s following the collapse of 
the dairy market monopoly—the Kenya Cooperative Creameries, a parastatal company—due to poor management, 
corruption, and weak competitiveness.c With the monopoly’s collapse, the door was opened for other private-sector 
dairy processors to enter the market, bringing about a newly vibrant industry for smallholders. 
But it quickly became apparent that these new processors were unable to fill the gap left by the monopoly, 
while the status quo that criminalized raw milk sales in urban areas continued. To address this policy challenge, 
key stakeholders in the dairy sector redirected the efforts of the collaborative Smallholder Dairy Project, which 
ran from 1997 to 2005 and brought together the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute and the International 
Livestock Research Institute with the Ministry of Livestock and various civil society organizations.d The project 
helped set in motion a policy-change process at multiple levels with diverse decisionmakers in both government 
and industry. The project also developed a pragmatic model for training, supporting, and certifying small-scale 
traders as a means of assuring milk quality, strengthening their business capabilities, and expanding the market. 
In 2004, the project contributed to the introduction and enforcement of new regulations that streamlined 
license application processes in the dairy trade. This allowed small-scale milk producers, traders, tea shop 
retailers, and transporters to legally engage in dairy activities and take part in the newly instituted milk quality 
assurance scheme.
Today, there is evidence that this new legislation, combined with continued growth in Kenya’s dairy 
market and the reorganization of industry players such as the Kenya Dairy Board, has contributed to welfare 
improvements. Smallholders are able to sell more milk to consumers at a lower cost, consumers are enjoying safe, 
lower-priced milk, and new jobs are being created throughout the dairy-supply chain. One study suggests that 
large economic benefits are attributable to the policy change.e These benefits have also stimulated wider interest 
among policymakers in other countries in the East African region, with some already embarking on implementing 
similar schemes.
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dairy imports could have poured into India and 
destroyed local markets. 
Invest in local markets
Operation Flood focused not only on boosting 
milk production, but also on developing a strong 
marketing system for milk. The architects of 
Operation Flood continuously analyzed the rising 
demand for livestock products and designed an 
integrated and comprehensive program to meet 
this demand, complete with supply-chain manage-
ment systems and centralized quality control.
Support collective action 
Operation Flood demonstrated how collective 
action can be an effective tool in promoting com-
mercialization among farmers. By bringing dairy 
producers together in cooperatives, the program 
provided markets with quantities of milk that would 
have been too costly to assemble from producers on 
an individual basis. The cooperatives also played a 
role in strengthening social cohesion, overcoming 
rural caste and class hierarchies, and fostering a 
sense of ownership in the development process. 
Envision creative structures 
Operation Flood revolutionized how dairy was 
conceived and organized. Concentrating on a single 
primary product, it created a vertically integrated 
value chain encompassing every aspect from 
primary producer to final consumer. Horizontal 
integration—bringing inputs, extension, and 
services all within the same program—also helped 
ensure that the benefits of economies of scale were 
available to each producer. The cooperative infra-
structure made it easy for producers to use new 
products and processes. 
Conclusion
Operation Flood was a key element in the transfor-
mation of India into a self-sufficient milk producer, 
and even into a milk exporter. By pointing the 
way to the use of production-enhancing tech-
nologies, establishing more effective and efficient 
supply chains, and orienting producers toward 
markets, Operation Flood helped promote a more 
productive Indian dairy industry. Milk is now 
big business in India. As of 2007 India was the 
largest milk producer in the world, and milk was a 
bigger contributor to the country’s gross domestic 
product than rice. At least 20 percent of India’s 
agricultural economy is composed of dairying, 
and about 70 percent of the rural population is 
somehow involved in milk production. The growth 
in production has made milk increasingly available 
to consumers, providing an important source of 
nutrition for millions of people.  n 
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n 2006, there were nearly 9 million farmers 
in the world who never once tilled soil.1 
They did not tend to livestock or harvest a 
single plant, yet they are part of one of the 
world’s fastest-growing food-producing sectors: 
aquaculture. Mainly taking the form of fish 
farming, aquaculture has skyrocketed in the past 
three decades. It is growing at 9 percent annually 
and is projected to contribute 41 percent of world 
fish production by 2020.2
Aquaculture’s global popularity has been 
advanced by a series of innovations in how fish 
are farmed. One such advance emerged from the 
Genetic Improvement of Farmed Tilapia (GIFT) 
project, which began in the Philippines in 1988 
and served as a launching point for tropical finfish 
genetic improvement around the world.
Relying on a coalition of national and inter-
national research institutions, governments, 
donors, and small private actors, the GIFT project 
produced an affordable and resilient fish that now 
meets the needs of millions of poor consumers not 
only in the Philippines, but throughout much of 
Asia. The project’s achievements have generated a 
lively exchange of ideas, research methodologies, 
and genetic materials across borders, highlighting 
the potential of aquaculture to help achieve future 
food security. If just 5 percent of the area deemed 
suitable for aquaculture in Africa were put to use, 
enough extra fish could be produced to feed the 
growing population on the continent until 2020.3
The Long Road to Success 
Historically, the world has obtained fish by har-
vesting them in their natural environments. 
Capture fisheries comfortably filled this role until 
the 1970s, when the combination of overuse and 
a booming global population began to quickly 
diminish the availability of marine fish. Fifty-two 
percent of global marine fish stocks are now fully 
exploited.4 As a result, aquaculture, or fish culture, 
has become more attractive. Today, low-income 
food-deficit countries, mostly in Asia, account 
for nearly 85 percent of the world’s aquaculture 
production.5 
Fish are an important part of life in the 
Philippines. The country’s fisheries sector employs 
12 percent of the total rural labor force, and the 
average Filipino consumes 28 kilograms of fish 
every year, compared with a world average of 16 
kilograms.6 In the face of dwindling fishery stocks, 
the country has long embraced aquaculture, and 
the demand for a reliable source of fish drives the 
development of new aquaculture technologies for 
raising fish yields in the Philippines.
Ironically, the success of tilapia breeding in 
the Philippines began with failure. In 1949 the 
country introduced a batch of Mozambique tilapia 
from Thailand, publicizing them as “wonder fish” 
that would ease food-security concerns in the 
region. Over the next decade, however, farmers 
encountered major problems related to inbreeding 
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    125and poor integration with local fish. Additionally, 
the strain was dark in color and small in size, two 
traits that consumers largely rejected. Large-scale 
tilapia culture declined and was not revived until 
decades later.
In 1974, the Government of the Philippines tried 
again, this time with a research program on tilapia 
at the Freshwater Aquaculture Center of the Central 
Luzon State University. With the discovery that male 
tilapia grow faster than females, the research focused 
on ways to produce all-male tilapia cultures. At the 
same time, a series of commercial technologies were 
developed, including floating net enclosures for 
breeding tilapia and floating cages for feeding them. 
The government transferred these finished products to 
rural farmers, enticing them with field demonstrations, 
provincewide workshops, bank credit, and opportuni-
ties for collaboration with researchers. The government 
also encouraged private companies, nongovernmental 
organizations, and cooperatives to test and adopt many 
of these new technologies. The Philippines emerged 
as one of the largest tilapia-producing countries in the 
world in the 1970s.
Meanwhile, a whole different species of fish 
was receiving attention in the Philippines. Native 
to Africa, Nile tilapia was originally introduced 
to Asia in the 1970s for the purpose of expanding 
small-scale aquaculture. Even though it showed 
promise, it soon ran into problems related to the 
insufficient supply of fish seed (fertilized fish eggs) 
and poor fish growth. It was not until the late-
1980s that this species of fish would change the 
face of Philippine aquaculture. 
The Emergence of an 
Aquaculture Superpower 
In 1988 the International Center for Living 
Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM), now 
known as the WorldFish Center, and its partners 
established the Genetic Improvement of Farmed 
Tilapia (GIFT) project. GIFT scientists were inter-
ested in finding the perfect strain of tilapia, but 
they also knew that the food security of millions 
of people hinged not just on tilapia, but on fish in 
general. Thus, the overall aim of the project was to 
build worldwide capacity to genetically improve all 
tropical finfish. 
Scientists began their research by focusing 
on Nile tilapia because of its ability to breed and 
produce new generations rapidly, its tolerance for 
shallow and turbid waters, its high level of disease 
resistance, and its flexibility for culture under 
many different farming systems. Tilapia in general 
is so versatile and resilient that it has been dubbed 
the “aquatic chicken.” Scientists brought together 
existing strains of Nile tilapia already being used 
by Filipino farmers with wild Nile tilapia strains 
collected from Africa. They conducted a series of 
experiments in which they bred many different 
combinations of strains together to create a 
new strain that could perform extremely well in 
different environments. 
A hybrid between a strain from Egypt and 
a strain from Kenya outperformed the rest, but 
the technicalities associated with crossbreed-
ing these two strains were challenging. Thus, 
ICLARM scientists used selective breeding—the 
process of choosing and breeding “parents” with 
favorable traits in order to pass these traits on to 
the next generation—with the expectation that 
this approach would improve tilapia performance 
more than a crossbreeding program within a few 
generations. So that there would be enough genetic 
variability, scientists created a synthetic base pop-
ulation using the 25 best-performing fish groups 
of the 64 tested. This population served as the 
parents for subsequent generations of GIFT fish.
By 1993, scientists had produced three 
generations of offspring, which were growing 
much faster and exhibiting higher survival rates 
than local tilapia strains. Eventually the GIFT fish 
showed genetic improvements of 7 percent over 
nine generations of fish, or a 64-percent cumulative 
increase in tilapia growth over the original base 
population—an impressive feat by any standard.
7 
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Scaling Up
Once the GIFT project had completed its breeding 
work, it turned to the tasks of distributing 
the improved fish, building breeding capacity 
in neighboring countries, and evaluating the 
positive and negative impacts of its product on 
the ground. In the project’s host country of the 
Philippines, GIFT fish were initially disseminated 
to farmers through government agencies. The 
Freshwater Aquaculture Center of Central Luzon 
State University and the Bureau of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources took the lead in creating a wide, 
national distribution network for GIFT and other 
improved tilapia strains. Using outreach stations 
and hatcheries, they disseminated more than half 
a million GIFT seed by the end of 1997, as well as 
more than 10 million fingerlings (young fish) of 
improved tilapia by 2003.8
To help improve tilapia outside of the 
Philippines, ICLARM established the International 
Network on Genetics in Aquaculture (INGA) in 
1993 as a forum for exchanging ideas, research 
methodologies, and genetic materials. Based in 
Malaysia, INGA brought together developing-
country members across Asia and Africa, including 
scientific institutes, regional and international 
organizations, and one private-sector institution. 
ICLARM and INGA started by disseminat-
ing improved tilapia strains through trials in 
five member countries: Bangladesh, China, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Results were 
even better than in the original research in the 
Philippines: in Bangladesh, for example, GIFT 
strains showed a 78-percent increase in weight 
compared with non-GIFT fish.9 Confident in the 
performance of the strain, ICLARM and INGA 
scientists transferred tilapia germplasm, or 
genetic material, to national agricultural research 
centers so that the centers could use it in research, 
breeding, and dissemination to farmers. 
To date, 11 countries have received GIFT 
strains, using them to develop national breeding 
and dissemination programs. Vietnam, for 
example, has produced and disseminated nearly 
2 million improved tilapia seed. Hatcheries in 
Thailand produce and circulate 200 million GIFT 
fry (young fish) annually.10 
In 1997, the GIFT project had bred nine 
generations of fish when donor support ended. 
The project provided genetic material for this 
ninth generation to all of its institutional partners, 
mostly for noncommercial use. To continue 
breeding and outreach efforts, the Philippines 
established a nonprofit private foundation called 
GIFT Foundation International (GFII), which 
signed formal licensing agreements with private-
sector hatcheries throughout the country that 
would allow them to produce GIFT and GIFT-
derived strains of tilapia. In 1999, seeking to 
expand its market and increase its earnings, 
GFII entered into an agreement with GenoMar, a 
private Norwegian biotechnology firm. GFII trans-
ferred dissemination rights to GenoMar, which in 
turn rebranded the strain as GenoMar Supreme 
Tilapia (GSTTM). GSTTM is currently disseminated 
through GenoMar’s private hatcheries in China 
and the Philippines. According to the company, 
GSTTM has an average genetic gain of 20 percent 
with every generation, among other enhance-
ments. These results, however, require verification. 
Rich Food for Poor People
The impact of GIFT and GIFT-derived tilapia in 
the Philippines has been enormous. Tilapia pro-
duction has soared during the past three decades, 
from 18,540 tons in 1980 to 279,000 tons in 
2007 (see Figure 18.1). In 2003, GIFT strain and 
the GIFT-derived strain GET EXCEL together 
accounted for 68 percent of total tilapia seed 
produced in the country, amounting to 624 million 
fry and fingerlings.11
An estimated 280,000 people in the 
Philippines benefit directly or indirectly from 
employment in the tilapia industry, with two-
thirds of the nation’s hatcheries dedicated to 
producing GIFT and GIFT-derived seed.12 The net 
returns to farming improved tilapia are particu-
larly high, primarily because the improvements 
significantly reduce farmers’ production costs. 
Depending on the production environment, 
improved strains are 32 to 35 percent cheaper to 
produce than non-improved strains.13
Improved tilapia also serves as a cheap source 
of highly nutritious food for consumers. Fish 
contain a substantial amount of protein, as well 
as a variety of essential minerals, vitamins, and 
amino acids. In Asia, fish provide an average of 
31 percent of the total supply of animal protein. 
Moreover, as a source of protein in the Philippines, 
tilapia is generally more affordable than pork, 
beef, chicken, and even other freshwater fish. 
From 1990 to 2007, average tilapia prices rose 111 128  
percent whereas beef prices jumped 148 percent 
and pork prices 157 percent (see Figure 18.2). 
This combination of high nutritional value and 
high production is good news for food security. 
From 1997 to 2001, national consumption of fish 
and fishery products in the Philippines increased 
2.2 percent annually.14 Since 1990, Filipinos have 
increased their total consumption of tilapia by 
more than 360 percent.15 A large percentage of 
this population consists of poor consumers who 
buy cheaper fish and rely on fish as their primary 
source of animal protein. 
Murky Issues
GIFT fish will face some obstacles in the future. 
Although Asia currently caters to a booming global 
demand for tilapia, the Philippines is still working 
to strengthen its export competitiveness and 
performance. The government is currently taking 
steps to improve the country’s export standing 
by focusing resources on increasing production 
and building up the country’s capacity to package 
and market tilapia as fillets in response to global 
market preferences.
Environmentally, the precautions taken by 
the WorldFish Center and INGA on the respon-
sible movement of fish germplasm across and 
within borders will need to be sustained. The finite 
availability of fresh water will require future inno-
vations in fish culture. Tilapia will increasingly 
need to be produced in systems that improve the 
circulation of air, filtration and feeding techniques, 
waste removal, and recycling of water.
As aquaculture booms during the next few 
decades, sorting out the issue of who exactly owns 
fish genetic resources will also be important. 
GenoMar holds exclusive commercial rights to all 
subsequent products created from GIFT. Thus, 
while the WorldFish Center continues to keep 
the historical 9th generation GIFT fish within 
the public domain for research and development 
activities, GenoMar is already working with the 
14th generation of GSTTM exclusively for commer-
cial purposes and without special consideration 
for small-scale farmers who were the focus of the 
original GIFT program. This and other factors 
have resulted in weak dissemination of GIFT fish 
to small producers. 
Lessons Learned from a 
Groundbreaking Project
The GIFT project has shown that fish is a viable 
crop for the developing world. Before the initiative, 
the Philippines had no systematic way of banking 
or preserving farmed-fish genetic resources. In 
fact, fish gene banks are rare, especially in tropical 
developing countries. GIFT introduced technology 
and training for gene banking and now maintains 
an internationally important tilapia gene bank. 
Tilapia seed producers currently have wider access 
to high-quality tilapia broodstock. 
GIFT also represented the first systematic 
collection and transfer of Nile tilapia germplasm 
from Africa to Southeast Asia. Although African 
fish farmers have yet to benefit from these achieve-
ments, introducing GIFT to Africa could improve 
growth of the current fish stock there by an 
estimated 64 percent.16 
The GIFT story also highlights the impor-
tance of coordination among key players. A 
strong commitment on the part of the govern-
ment and international research institutes to 
create a favorable policy environment, set up 
infrastructure, and lead the way in research 
and development despite past setbacks was 
key. Regional networks coordinated technology 
transfers to other countries and initiated projects 
to monitor and evaluate the development and 
dissemination of improved tilapia. Public–private 
partnerships in the dissemination phase influ-
enced the public’s access to improved strains. 
Being able to create win–win partnerships in the 
future, especially between the public and private 
sectors, will require paying close attention to 
such issues as legal protections and ownership of 
genetic resources.
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Source: FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2009. FAOSTAT statistical database. Rome.
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Perhaps the key lesson of GIFT is the impor-
tance of a strong initial mandate to apply the 
lessons learned in tilapia to the larger aquacul-
ture picture. The program has proved that much 
can be gained from applying genetics to aqua-
culture—especially through selective breeding, a 
particularly cost-effective way of achieving genetic 
improvement. This technology can now be applied 
to the genetic improvement of other species, like 
the world’s most popular farmed fish, carp. 
During the past two decades, genetically 
improved tilapia has positioned itself as a low-cost, 
high-yielding, profitable fish. The industry has 
offered direct, measurable benefits by way of 
nutrition, employment, and income genera-
tion. Aquaculture, one of the most viable ways 
of increasing fish and food production in the 
next century, stands to gain from further work 
on genetic improvement. Although the improve-
ments achieved through genetic selection may 
seem limited in a small population of fish, the 
cumulative gains that occur when hatcheries 
and farms—and, therefore, millions of fish—are 
involved can be a powerful tool in the sector.17 If 
other developing countries can scale up this kind 
of success, as a number of Asian countries have 
done, they can significantly improve the food 
security of future generations.  n
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I
n 1977, China’s Anhui Province was facing 
food shortages and flooding that brought 
the province to the verge of famine. 
Agricultural productivity was languishing 
under large-scale, collectivized agriculture, in 
which farming was managed by communes 
made up of thousands of people rather than by 
individual households. In desperation, some 
communes in the province began secretly allowing 
farmers to manage their own plots. This small 
group of farmers achieved stunning improvements 
in food production, greatly exceeding the 
productivity of the communes.
The success of these farmers marked the 
beginning of a massive shift in Chinese agricul-
ture. In 1978, facing up to the weak performance 
of collective agriculture in many areas of the 
country, the Chinese Communist Party reluc-
tantly embraced these experiments, giving rise 
to the Household Responsibility System in which 
parcels of collective land were allocated to farm 
households. Once permitted, the system spread 
throughout China like wildfire. Four years later, 
more than 90 percent of the country’s farmland 
had been parceled out to more than 160 million 
farm households.1 
The shift to household farming, along with 
other factors (such as reforms in the state’s 
procurement system for agricultural goods, 
better seeds for rice farmers, and investments in 
irrigation) led to dramatic increases in food pro-
duction and reductions in poverty. The per capita 
incomes of rural people doubled in just five years.2 
Widespread hunger was averted, and hunger and 
malnutrition fell dramatically. Although reforms 
spread across China rapidly, they were generally 
advanced through careful experimentation—
“crossing the river while feeling the rocks,” 
according to Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount 
leader from 1978 to 1992.3 
Reform Begins: Desperation 
and Experimentation 
By the late 1970s, China had had more than two 
decades of experience with collectivized agricul-
ture. When the Chinese Communist Party came 
to power in 1949, it had launched a brief “land-
to-the-tiller” program, but it soon switched to a 
system of collective agriculture, creating produc-
tion cooperatives in 1952 and then scaling them up 
to communes in 1959 (see box next page). 
The collectivization of agriculture was 
expected to benefit from economies of scale and 
to provide a base for the development of rural 
industries, but the results were disappointing. 
Grain production rose by 13 percent during the 
land-to-the-tiller period (1949-52) and continued 
to increase less strongly during the agricultural 
cooperatives period (1952–58). With full col-
lectivization in the Great Leap Forward in 1958, 
grain production declined and the country suffered 
serious famine during 1960–63. And during the 20 
years that followed (1957–78), the amount of com-
mercial grain contributed by each rural resident 
fell from 85 to 63 kilograms. Food shortages were 
rife throughout the country, and food rationing 
was introduced in urban areas. During the 1970s, 
Crossing the River 
While Feeling the Rocks
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an estimated one-third of the rural population 
lacked a stable food supply.4 
In 1978, driven by famine and the collapse of 
confidence in collective agriculture, a few pro-
duction brigades in Fengyang County in Anhui 
Province—a poor region plagued by flood and 
famine—secretly distributed land to their member 
households to farm. These farmers relied on their 
memories of household farming and their ongoing 
experience with small household food plots, which 
many farmers managed even under collectivized 
agriculture. These small plots—usually smaller 
than 0.02 hectares—were several times more pro-
ductive than their collectives’ land.5 
That first year’s productivity increases in 
Anhui were impressive. Some brigades that had 
returned to household farming had production 
increases of two to five times those in unconverted 
brigades.6 Local officials embraced the reform, 
which was then carried out under the protection of 
Wan Li, the provincial governor of Anhui.  
The time was right for the Communist Party 
to consider a change. In 1976, Chairman Mao 
died and the Cultural Revolution came to an end. 
China’s agricultural sector was in turmoil, with 
grain failures and famine occurring in parts of 
the country. Although the Communist Party had 
expressly forbidden a return to household farming 
as late as 1977, the following year it stated that 
the breakup of communal lands into household 
holdings was an option.
The return to household farming required 
party leaders to skillfully manipulate ideo-
logical themes in the service of pragmatism. Du 
Runsheng, director of rural policy of the Chinese 
Communist Party, described three key points in 
the reformers’ strategy for winning acceptance of 
the reform within the Party: (1) build the system 
initially within the communes rather than abolish-
ing them outright, (2) allow the populace to choose 
from among a number of forms of organization, 
and (3) allow the reform to spread gradually.7  
Local communes adopted the new system 
wholeheartedly. In January 1980, only 1 percent 
of all production teams in China had converted to 
household farming, but by December of that year 
the figure was 14 percent. It reached 28 percent 
by July 1981, and 45 percent by October 1981. 
By the time the government recognized that the 
Household Responsibility System was broadly 
applicable, 45 percent of the production teams in 
China had already been dismantled.8 By the end 
of 1983, about 98 percent of production teams 
and 94 percent of farm households in China were 
farming under the new system.9
Chapter 19  Crossing the River While Feeling the Rocks
In	the	1950s,	the	Chinese	government	adopted	a	collective	system	of	agriculture	in	which	land	was	held	by	the	
state,	and	peasant	households	were	reorganized	into	communes.	Each	commune	was	composed	of	an	average	







be given to the household or shared between the household and the production team. The third phase—the 
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A Parallel Reform:  
The State Procurement 
System 
Around the same time that the Household 
Responsibility System was getting underway on 
a grassroots level, the Chinese government was 
formulating another response to the country’s food 
crisis: major changes to the system of state pro-
curement of agricultural products. 
In 1977, the government was the only legal 
purchaser of many key commodities, including 
rice, wheat, maize, oilseeds, and cotton. Production 
brigades within communes were assigned quotas, 
and this quota production had to be sold to the 
state at prices set by the state. When communes 
were divided into household farms, meeting these 
quotas became the responsibility of households. 
This procurement system gave the government a 
powerful tool for influencing farmers’ production.
After 1977, the government bumped up pro-
curement prices significantly to give farmers an 
incentive to produce more agricultural goods. In 
1979 alone, state procurement prices for major 
crops rose an average of 22 percent. After 1979, 
government purchasing prices for grain jumped 
by 100 percent and those for many other crops 
increased by 40–50 percent.10 
Moreover, from 1977 onward, farmers were 
allowed to trade grain on free markets once they 
fulfilled their delivery quotas to the state procure-
ment system. Bans that prohibited farmers from 
growing cash crops were eliminated. Farmers 
regained the right to grow vegetables or other 
non-quota cash crops and to sell their products in 
the open markets. 
One of the most distinctive features of the 
Chinese rural reforms of the 1980s is the manner 
in which these procurement and market reforms 
were managed. Whereas most post-communist 
countries have made a sudden, “big-bang” transi-
tion to market prices for agricultural production, 
China opted for a two-track approach, maintaining 
quotas and set prices for quota production while at 
the same time liberalizing markets for non-quota 
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prices for these above-quota crops. This approach 
provided the state with an assurance of sustained 
grain production and farmers with an assurance 
of a predictable if modest farm income during a 
period of great uncertainty. At the same time, it 
provided strong incentives for farmers to exceed 
quotas and to diversify into non-quota crops. 
More Food and Higher 
Incomes for Rural Chinese
Farmers responded to the rural reforms by 
producing bumper harvests. Crop production 
grew by 42.2 percent between 1978 and 1984. 
During those years, the three most important 
crops—grain, cotton, and oil-bearing crops—grew 
at annual average rates of 4.8, 17.7, and 13.8 
percent, respectively (see Figure 19.1). During the 
preceding 26 years, these crops had grown at only 
2.4, 1.0, and 0.8 percent a year, respectively. Even 
though farmers were cultivating fewer hectares of 
grain during this period, the gains in productivity 
led to more total output. National grain output 
rose from about 300 million tons in 1978 to about 
407 million tons in 1984. 
Although the increases in state procurement prices 
had some impact on production, the Household 
Responsibility System reform was the greatest 
impetus behind the production increases. Given 
the opportunity to sell part of their output at 
market prices, farm families responded by investing 
large amounts of labor and inputs to exceed their 
quotas, while at the same time diversifying their 
production into non-quota crops. Technological 
improvements like hybrid rice (see Chapter 11) and 
the practice of double cropping (growing two crops 
a year instead of just one) also helped. China’s prior 
decades of massive government investment in rural 
infrastructure, especially irrigation, helped lay the 
groundwork for jumps in productivity as well.
With agriculture growing at breakneck speed 
in the years following these reforms, the quality of 
life in rural China improved substantially. In just 
five years, from 1978 to 1983, rural people doubled 
their per capita incomes (see Figure 19.2). The 
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Source:  Zweig, D. 1997. Freeing China’s farmers: Rural restructuring in the reform era. Armonk and London: M. E. Sharp.
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76 percent in 1980 to 23 percent in 1985. The 
longstanding income gap between rural and urban 
households was reduced (although not nearly 
eliminated).
Both rural and urban households also acquired 
better access to food, and food became more 
affordable. In the first three years of the Household 
Responsibility System reforms (1978–81), calorie 
intake among people in rural China increased by 12 
percent. In 1978, rural people were consuming 122 
percent of the minimum daily requirement for a 
healthy life, and by 1979–81 they were consuming 
between 140 and 143 percent.11 As farmers 
began diversifying their crops and growing more 
non-quota crops, a wider array of foods found their 
way into markets and rural people rapidly boosted 
their consumption of foods other than grain. 
The transformation of agriculture, large as 
it was, was just part of an even larger transfor-
mation of the Chinese rural economy. Workers 
who had been underemployed in the commune 
system were released from the agricultural sector 
to find other local work. Taking advantage of this 
abundance of labor, townships and collectives 
used new revenue earned through the Household 
Responsibility System to develop township and 
village enterprises. These enterprises, building 
on the commune industries and the large public 
investments in infrastructure during the commune 
period, were public but produced for the mar-
ket—everything from clothing to farm tools to 
electronics. Like the household farms, they grew 
rapidly. From 1978 to 1994, the number of firms 
rose from 1.5 million to nearly 25 million, the 
number of employees increased by a factor of 4.5, 
and the total value of their output jumped by a 
factor of 80.12 
Unfinished Business
Not everyone benefited from the changes sweeping 
across China. The rural reforms held some 
disadvantages for women in particular. Under 
the commune system, women had in theory 
participated as equals in collective agriculture, 
even though they were typically employed in 
more menial positions and largely excluded from 
management. Under the Household Responsibility 
System, changing labor patterns, improved 
economic productivity, and higher living standards 
resulted in a revival of patriarchal values. The rural 
industrialization made possible by the shift to 
household responsibility also began to change the 
roles of women in their households, as men took 
on jobs in township and village enterprises and 
women became more responsible for agricultural 
production. The state allocated land to households 
based on household size, so in theory when a 
man married, his land allocation should rise, but 
for efficiency reasons, authorities discouraged 
too-frequent reallocations of land. Many villages 
ceased to provide for such reallocations altogether, 
leaving women at the risk of landlessness in cases 
of divorce and widowhood. Organizations such 
as the All-China Women’s Federation noted that 
as women took more and more responsibility in 
agriculture, they had less and less satisfactory 
access to land.13   
Property rights in rural areas remain a broader 
subject of concern as well. China’s extension of 
more secure property rights to rural people has 
been not simply gradual but painfully slow. People 
in rural areas thus find it much more difficult to 
acquire assets in the new market economy than do 
their urban counterparts. A consensus within both 
private and official circles is emerging that rural 
people in China should be granted fuller and more 
marketable land-use rights. At the same time, 
however, land as it is currently distributed serves 
as an important social safety net. This safety net 
has come into play recently, as a global economic 
recession has reduced the demand for China’s 
exports and factory workers have flowed back 
into their home rural areas. A debate continues 
on how to balance the efficiency of more market-
able farmer rights to land with the losses to social 
security that such a reform would entail. 
Learning from China
The Household Responsibility System reform and 
the other reforms it sparked have contributed 
greatly to China’s economic development and the 
welfare of its citizens. The Chinese reform experi-
ence suggests some lessons for other policymakers 
in developing countries who are thinking through 
their own reform programs.
First, the sequencing of economic reforms is 
critical. China began by providing new incentives to 
the mass of rural households—which had relatively 
egalitarian access to productive assets—thereby 
achieving broad benefits, gaining support for the 
reform process, and laying the foundation for an 
ever-widening reform agenda. During land reforms 
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like this one, it is important to maintain existing 
structures for input supply and output marketing 
while the large production units dismantle, and to 
provide reliable markets for land-reform beneficia-
ries in the early reform years. As such, in contrast 
to the beneficiaries of land reforms in many other 
countries, Chinese beneficiaries of reform faced 
virtually guaranteed markets for key economic 
crops during the critical reform years.
Second, where labor costs are low and alterna-
tive employment is limited, small household farms 
can be remarkably productive, provided they have 
access to input supply and marketing chains. 
Third, because rural resources like farmland 
were so broadly distributed, the poverty-reduction 
impacts of reform also reached broad swathes of 
the population, making poverty-reduction reforms 
in such a rural sector highly strategic. 
Fourth, impressive economic growth can take 
place under public ownership of land if solid land 
use rights are in place and farmers are operating 
within a generally supportive and remunerative 
economic environment. If farmers are confident 
of their access to land because of a credible social 
commitment to land access for all families, it 
may be feasible to phase in stronger property 
rights gradually, while building new mechanisms 
to provide social security otherwise provided by 
universal land access. 
Fifth, promoting the development of both 
agriculture and industry in rural areas can pay off 
handsomely if labor is plentiful and cheap and if 
funds are available for substantial public invest-
ments in rural infrastructure and facilities to 
support industry. 
Sixth, process is important. Governments need 
to create space for local experimentation and allow 
impartial evaluations, the results of which can be 
conveyed to people at the highest levels of power. 
Even incremental reform has important benefits: 
it allows for learning by doing and corrections as 
needed, as well as the use of existing organiza-
tional resources, an avoidance of social turbulence 
and waste of resources and, finally, a smoother 
transition to new institutions. 
Conclusion
The Household Responsibility System reform, 
as well as the other reforms that accompanied it, 
has had a profound positive influence on China’s 
growth and the livelihoods of its people. They have 
lifted millions of people out of poverty and averted 
famine. Rural reforms, conducted in a spirit of 
experimentation, careful evaluation, and adjust-
ment where necessary, have shown the potential 
for agricultural growth to take off on a massive 
scale under the right conditions.  n
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B   
y the mid-1980s, it became painfully clear
 that Vietnam’s system of collective 
   agriculture was not working. In 1987,  
 after several years of slow growth, food 
production actually declined by 4.4 percent and 
famine struck parts of the country. Making matters 
worse, inflation had risen from 92 percent in 1985 
to 775 percent in 1986, making food more and 
more expensive for the country’s population of 60 
million.
At the Sixth National Party Congress in 
December 1986, the Vietnamese Communist 
Party enacted a series of reforms that would 
ultimately transform Vietnam from a centrally 
planned economy to a market-oriented one. The 
reform process, known as Doi Moi, did not really 
take hold until 1988, but once the collectives 
were dismantled, land-use rights were assigned 
to farmers, agricultural markets were liberalized, 
and wider economic reforms were implemented. 
As a result, Vietnam’s economy took off. For about 
a decade starting in the early 1990s, the country’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual 
rate of 7.6 percent thanks in large part to the rapid 
increase in agricultural growth, which grew 4.9 
percent annually between 1996 and 2000, when 
the growth rate reached an all-time high.1
The reforms unleashed a new entrepreneurial 
spirit in Vietnam, both in agriculture and in other 
sectors. Farmers intensified rice production, 
diversified into new crops such as coffee and 
cashews, and improved the quality of the food they 
produced. By stimulating agricultural and overall 
economic growth, the reforms helped reduce rural 
poverty, hunger, and malnutrition. In just five 
years—from 1993 to 1998—the share of people 
living in poverty fell by 21 percent. Among children 
younger than five, the rate of stunting—meaning a 
low height for age, a symptom of poor nutrition—
declined from 53 to 33 percent during the same 
period.2 
Collective Agriculture in 
Vietnam
When Vietnam achieved independence from 
France in 1954, the Geneva Accords divided it 
into two countries with opposing ideologies—the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north 
adopted a socialist ideology influenced by China 
and the Soviet Union, and the Republic of Vietnam 
in the south pursued a capitalist ideology influ-
enced by the United States. Civil war soon followed. 
The rural economies of the two countries were 
very different. In North Vietnam’s collectivized 
agriculture, groups of households formed produc-
tion brigades, which were responsible for meeting 
government quotas for agricultural production. In 
South Vietnam, agriculture was highly commer-
cialized and more oriented to the export market, 
and tenant farmers or sharecroppers cultivated 
land owned by landlords. 
Following reunification in 1975, the Vietnamese 
Communist Party attempted to extend its centrally 
planned system—in particular, its large-scale 
agricultural collectivization—to the whole country. 
In the south, however, collectivization did not take 
hold. By 1980, only 24.5 percent of farm house-
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holds belonged to a collective, and in many cases, 
southern farms were collectives on paper only.3
Moreover, collective agriculture was per-
forming poorly. In 1976 and 1977, agricultural 
production contracted by 0.5 percent and 6.6 
percent, respectively. The amount of grain 
available in the country was falling, forcing the 
government to increase grain imports sharply. 
Government procurement of food also dropped, 
as farmers sought to avoid the state procurement 
system and instead sold their output through 
informal private markets, where prices were 
reported to be 10 times higher.4 
By the early 1980s, Vietnam faced an 
economic crisis. Western and Chinese aid to the 
country was declining, government food procure-
ments were falling, and a food crisis was emerging. 
The unpopular system of collective agriculture 
was on the verge of spontaneous breakdown. 
The Vietnamese Communist Party responded by 
issuing Directive 100 on January 13, 1981. This 
directive allowed collectives to contract with indi-
vidual households to produce a certain amount of 
agricultural goods and then sell any surplus they 
produced in the private market or to state trading 
agencies. In mid-1981, procurement prices of agri-
cultural goods were increased to the same level as 
market prices. 
At first, this partial reform seemed promising—
agricultural growth reached 10.6 percent in 1982. 
Success, however, was short lived. The reforms, 
designed to make collective agriculture more 
efficient, were not deep enough to give farmers real 
incentives to produce more. Agricultural growth 
started to slow in 1983 and became negative by 
1987. Inflation rose sharply, reaching 775 percent 
in 1986. The gap between free market and official 
prices was 10 times or more. Per capita food pro-
duction fell below the minimum needed level of 300 
kilograms a year. People were going hungry again.
Overturning Collectivization
Under the Doi Moi reform process adopted in 
December 1986, the collective agriculture system 
began to be dismantled. The reforms had sweeping 
goals: they sought to stabilize the economy, 
develop the private sector, increase and stabilize 
agricultural output, shift the focus of investment 
from heavy to light industry, focus on export-led 
growth, and attract foreign investment.
It was not until 1988, however, that the 
Communist Party issued Resolution 10, which 
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shifted the focus of rural development from col-
lectives to household production. Resolution 10 
obliged the agricultural collectives to contract 
land to households for 15 years for annual crops 
and 40 years for perennial crops. Households 
were allowed to buy and sell animals, equipment, 
and machinery. They still had to meet production 
quotas, but the production amounts and prices 
were fixed for five years, giving households a 
degree of certainty that they had previously lacked. 
The private sector was allowed to engage in food 
marketing. 
Further reforms followed. From 1987 to 1991, 
the government relinquished control over prices 
and opened markets for both domestic and inter-
national trade. In 1989, it sharply devalued the 
country’s currency, making Vietnamese exports 
much more competitive on international markets. 
The reforms unleashed a surge of entrepre-
neurship and productivity. Agricultural growth 
jumped, reaching 3.8 percent a year from 1989 to 
1992. As the government retreated from control-
ling markets and prices, farm households had new 
incentives to produce more and sell their surpluses. 
Vietnam, which had imported more than 460,000 
tons of food in 1987 and again in 1988 to meet 
shortfalls in national production, became the 
world’s third-largest exporter of rice in 1989, allevi-
ating national food shortages and generating large 
amounts of foreign exchange for the country. 
Success in agriculture became a key driver of 
overall economic growth. Inflation plummeted 
to 36 percent in 1989. Growth in the agricultural 
sector in turn increased demand for construction 
and services. Although Vietnam experienced cuts 
in foreign aid owing to the collapse of the Eastern 
European socialist system during 1990–91, 
economic growth in the country remained strong. 
By 1992, Vietnam had fully recovered from the 
shock caused by the collapse of the socialist 
system, and the economy’s growth rate climbed to 
8.7 percent.
Still, it was difficult for farmers to grow com-
mercial crops such as coffee, rubber, cashew nut, 
and pepper, in large part because they still did 
not have complete, long-term rights to their land. 
Financial institutions refused to accept existing 
land-use rights as collateral, preventing house-
holds from acquiring loan funds for agricultural 
investment. And local governments still played a 
dominant role in deciding crop patterns for specific 
types of land, requiring most land to be used for 
food production and discouraging agricultural 
diversification and further commercialization. In 
Source: Authors, based on data from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam, various years.



















addition, many rural households, especially poor 
and smallholding ones, had difficulty obtaining 
access to production technologies, inputs, and 
capital for production. In 1993, Vietnam passed a 
Land Law that extended land tenure to 20 years 
for annual crops and 50 years for perennial crops 
such as coffee and rubber.
The period from 1993 to 2000 was the “golden 
age” of the market economy in Vietnam. The agri-
cultural sector grew at 4.6 percent annually, and 
the nonagricultural sector grew by more than 8 
percent, thanks in large part to heavy foreign invest-
ment in Vietnamese industries. Even during the 
Asian financial crisis during 1997–2001, Vietnam 
maintained strong economic performance and the 
agricultural growth averaged 3.9 percent per year.
Dramatic Effects for 
Agriculture, Incomes, and 
Nutrition
Since the late 1980s, Vietnam’s economic reforms 
have generated powerful incentives to invest in 
agriculture. The resulting rural growth has raised 
households’ incomes and standards of living. 
Agricultural growth peaked at an average of  
4.9 percent per year during 1996–2000 (see 
Figure 20.1).5 
Reforms have led to greater food security and 
better nutrition, partly by increasing the produc-
tion of rice, by far the most important staple food 
in the Vietnamese diet. Rice is consumed by 99.9 
percent of Vietnamese households and accounts 
for about 75 percent of the total caloric intake of 
a typical household. From 1980 to 1984, farmers 
saw their rice yields rise by about 32 percent in 
the North and 24 percent in the South as a result 
of Directive 100 and subsequent complementary 
reforms, followed by similar gains as rice yields 
increased from 3.2 to 4.9 tons per hectare between 
1990 and 2006, as a result of Resolution 10 and 
other policy and economic changes.6 
The increase in per capita rice production 
provided people with enough to eat, thus increas-
ing national food security. Later on, the growth 
of food production played an important role in 
stabilizing food prices, increasing real wages, and 
creating opportunities for farmers to participate 
in more profitable, higher-value farming and 
nonfarm activities.7 Increased food production 
and higher incomes have also led to more diversi-
fied diets, with measurable benefits for nutrition. 
Between 1993 and 1998, the rates of underweight 
in children younger than age five fell slowly, but 
rates of stunting in children dropped dramatically, 
from 53 to 33 percent.8
The economic changes launched by the Doi 
Moi reforms also pulled many Vietnamese out 
of poverty. From 1993 to 2002, the incidence of 
poverty in Vietnam fell from 58 to 29 percent.9 
The number of people living in absolute poverty 
(regardless of how it is defined) is still high, but 
the poverty that persists today reflects the fact that 
some households still have poor access to land or 
have access only to poor-quality land. 
During the 1990s, rice prices increased sub-
stantially. Nearly three-quarters of Vietnamese 
households both produced and consumed rice, 
but households that produced more rice than they 
consumed benefited from the higher prices. On 
average, higher rice prices thus helped households 
in rural areas, where most of the poor live, at the 
expense of households in urban areas. 
Land Issues Remain 
Complicated
Vietnamese farmers now have much more secure 
rights to land than they did in the 1970s and 
1980s. From the 1990s on, land transactions 
increased considerably as a consequence of the 
tenure reforms, although with different intensi-
ties across the different regions of the country. 
Land reforms have led to an active market in land 
transactions: between 1993 and 1998, household 
participation in land rental markets more than 
quadrupled, from 3.8 to 15.5 percent. In particu-
lar, households with strong agricultural skills and 
abilities began renting and making productive use 
of available land, while those without such skills 
and abilities rented out their land and sought 
employment in growing sectors of the economy 
such as manufacturing.10 Although land sales are 
technically illegal—only rental is permitted—with 
more secure land rights, many farmers have diver-
sified their production, with some moving even 
more into activities like aquaculture and livestock 
breeding and with others investing in perennial 
tree and shrub crops, such as coffee and cashews. 
But land tenure is not always as secure as it 
might seem. From the beginning of the reforms, 
local authorities frequently reassigned land. In 
rural northern Vietnam, although households were 
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supposed to retain rights to their assigned land 
for 20 years, authorities reallocated land twice in 
a period of five years to accommodate new settlers 
in the villages, thus undermining incentives for 
long-term investment. 
Moreover, the new system does not necessar-
ily work to everyone’s benefit. When poor rural 
households experience an emergency, they may 
lease or sell their land to wealthier households, 
losing control of their land temporarily or perma-
nently and raising the specter of a growing group of 
landless people in rural areas. In addition, land-use 
certificates have space for only one name per 
family, and women’s names are normally left off. 
Women’s access to land thus often depends on their 
marital status, and unmarried and divorced women 
who devote large amounts of labor to the land 
are rarely named on titles. A revision of the Land 
Law in 2004 made an important contribution to 
gender balance by including the names of both the 
husband and the wife on land-use certificates, thus 
creating incentives for women to invest in land and 
reap its benefits in case of divorce or widowhood. 
Land-tenure arrangements have not increased 
rural people’s access to credit as much as may have 
been expected. Although having a land-use certifi-
cate should improve a rural household’s access to 
credit, in particular from formal banking institu-
tions like commercial or rural cooperative banks, 
banks seem reluctant to accept such certificates as 
collateral, believing that the land will be hard to 
seize in case of credit default.  
Finally, the reforms have had mixed results for 
the environment. On the one hand, more secure 
property rights have led many farmers to adopt 
agroforestry and rice terraces—practices that 
help maintain soil fertility and prevent erosion. 
On the other hand, strengthening people’s indi-
vidual rights to land can put fragile lands at risk. 
When land reform allocates a rural wetland to a 
household, for example, the household tends to 
convert the land to agricultural use or aquaculture.
Lessons on Land and Market 
Reforms
Land-tenure reforms designed to enable a smooth 
transition from a centrally planned economy to 
a market economy will achieve their objectives 
only if they are linked to reforms in markets for 
agricultural commodities (such as rice and coffee), 
inputs (such as fertilizer), and services (such as 
credit). Generating strong economic incentives 
for rural producers is crucial, and markets play an 
important role in every dimension of this process. 
Secure and long-term rights to land on 
which to grow annual and perennial crops are 
essential. Farmers are much more likely to invest 
in sustainable agricultural practices, such as soil 
conservation and agroforestry, if they have long-
term, inheritable tenure rights. Vietnam’s process 
of trial and error, with several adjustments made 
to the leasehold periods, is understandable politi-
cally, but it may have delayed the implementation 
of reforms in some places.
Nonetheless, a flexible, incremental approach 
in carrying out reforms has advantages over a 
“big-bang” approach because all steps must be 
legitimized not only at the national level, but also 
at the local level. A great deal of information and 
communication is needed to break resistance 
against reforms and to convince different stake-
holders of the benefits.
Conclusion
Through its Doi Moi reforms, Vietnam has 
achieved stunning success. After spending decades 
mired in civil war, poverty, and food insecurity, 




















Vietnam used policy reforms to build a vibrant and 
dynamic economy that plays a major role in global 
markets for rice and coffee, among other things. 
Economic growth, led by agricultural growth, has 
drastically reduced poverty and led to improved 
diets, with measurable results in child nutrition. 
To be sure, concerns remain. The income gap 
between rural and urban areas has widened, and 
more than 70 percent of the poor are concen-
trated in rural areas. Rules and regulations on 
land tenure and land markets could be improved 
to clarify and strengthen farmers’ rights. Yet 
Vietnam’s success proves just how powerful policy 
changes can be in stimulating food production and 
economic growth, thus improving the lives and 
livelihoods of millions.  n
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he health and lives of billions of people 
around the world are threatened by 
micronutrient deficiencies—a lack of 
essential vitamins and minerals such as 
iron, zinc, and vitamin A—resulting from poor 
dietary quality. Vitamin A deficiency, identified as 
a public health problem in nearly 80 developing 
countries, is one of the most serious. An estimated 
127 million preschool children in developing 
countries are vitamin A deficient, and nearly 5 
million preschoolers suffer from xerophthalmia, 
which causes irreversible eye damage and 
blindness in extreme cases. Vitamin A deficiency 
alone is responsible for 6 percent of all deaths 
among children under five years of age.
In the early-1980s, Bangladesh had a severe 
problem with vitamin A deficiency. At the 
beginning of the decade, more than 1 million 
children in Bangladesh showed visible signs of 
the condition. More than 3 percent of the rural 
population, including half a million children, 
suffered from night blindness, a condition in 
which one cannot see in dim lighting. Even worse, 
30,000 children were going completely blind each 
year.1 However, evidence indicated that children 
from homes with homestead gardens were less 
likely to suffer night blindness; it appeared that 
access to homegrown fruits and vegetables rich 
in certain forms of vitamin A could help combat 
vitamin A deficiency and prevent its dire health 
consequences. 
Helen Keller International, a nongovernmen-
tal organization that combats malnutrition and 
blindness around the world, seized on this finding 
to launch a comprehensive intervention promoting 
home gardening, small livestock production, and 
nutrition education. This homestead food produc-
tion program, implemented by more than 70 local 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the 
government of Bangladesh, succeeded in increas-
ing participants’ production and consumption of 
micronutrient-rich foods, empowering women, 
and promoting community development. In two 
decades of operation, homestead food produc-
tion in Bangladesh has improved food security 
for nearly 5 million vulnerable people—nearly 4 
percent of the population—in diverse agroecologi-
cal zones across much of the country.2 
Starting Small and  
Scaling Up 
The homestead food production program in 
Bangladesh started small. The effort began in 
1990 with a pilot program, targeting 1,000 house-
holds with a combination of home gardening 
and nutrition education. The pilot succeeded; 
results showed that participating women and 
children were consuming more vegetables and 
eating a more nutritious and varied diet. The 
next step was to scale it up, and in 1993, Helen 
Keller International and partnering organiza-
tions launched the NGO Gardening and Nutrition 
Education Surveillance Project (NGNESP), which 
broadened the reach of the package of home 
gardening, nutrition education, and other commu-
nity-development activities across Bangladesh. By 
2003, the project covered more than 4.7 million 
Diversifying into 
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individuals in 870,000 households, residing in 210 
of the country’s 460 subdistricts.3 
To encourage households to grow fruits and 
vegetables and eat more nutritiously, Helen Keller 
International and local NGOs provide households 
with the materials needed to get started, such 
as seeds and seedlings. Home gardens alone, 
however, do not necessarily improve nutrition: 
nutrition education is needed to translate 
greater food availability at the household level 
into healthier diets, particularly for vulnerable 
household members such as women and children. 
Homestead food production projects thus also 
supply nutrition information. For instance, project 
group leaders may hold meetings to discuss the 
need for regular consumption of foods rich in iron, 
zinc, and vitamin A, or they may conduct cooking 
demonstrations to show the importance of washing 
vegetables before preparing them, or adding meat 
or eggs to dishes to increase their nutritional value. 
The original model focused primarily on 
increasing consumption of vitamin A-rich veg-
etables and fruits, such as sweet gourd, black arum 
leaves, and bottle gourd leaves, from home gardens. 
New research in the 1990s, however, showed that 
pro-vitamin A or carotenoids from vegetables and 
fruits are less bioavailable (less easily absorbed 
and used by the body) than previously thought 
and significantly less bioavavilable than vitamin A 
from animal sources. Animal-source foods, such as 
chicken meat, are also a more efficient and bio-
available source of other essential micronutrients, 
including iron and zinc. 
Given this new evidence, a pilot animal-
production program was introduced to find out if 
the home gardening model could accommodate 
animal husbandry. The successful pilot project 
resulted in the integration of home gardening and 
animal husbandry into a broader homestead food 
production model. Other homestead food produc-
tion projects and programs have followed, focusing 
on different populations within Bangladesh and 
different agroecological regions, such as hilly 
terrains where tea estates are located, flood-prone 
areas, peri-urban and urban slums, and areas with 
high-salinity soil. For instance, homestead food 
production programs have been implemented 
in the chars (islands of silt within rivers) and 
other low-lying floodplain areas in Bangladesh to 
help the food-insecure population in these areas 
prevent and mitigate agricultural losses from 
flooding. 
A Chain of Impacts
Homestead food production programming 
launches a chain of impacts that ultimately leads 
to improved food security (see Table 21.1). This 
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chain begins with people’s adoption of improved 
or developed homestead gardens. Helen Keller 
International classifies gardens into three types—
traditional, improved, and developed. Traditional 
gardens are seasonal, found in scattered plots, 
and involve the production of gourds and tradi-
tional vegetables. Improved gardens are typically 
fixed plots involving the production of a wider 
variety of vegetables, but are not utilized year 
round. Developed gardens offer a wider range of 
vegetables produced in fixed plots all year long. In 
2002, a study showed that among active partici-
pants in the NGNESP, 78 percent were cultivating 
developed gardens—that is, growing fruits and 
vegetables year round—compared with 15 percent 
of nonparticipants.4 
Households participating in homestead food 
production also grew a greater quantity and 
variety of foods than nonparticipants. During a 
three-month period, the participants produced 
135 kilograms of fruits and vegetables, whereas 
the nonparticipants produced just 46 kilograms.5 
Homestead food production interventions have 
also succeeded in raising the production of ani-
Impact category Example of impact
Production
More home gardens Year-round gardening increased from 3 percent to 33 
percent
Increased varieties of foods Vegetable varieties increased by more than two-fold
Increased quantities of foods 135 kg instead of 46 kg of vegetables in 3 months
Consumption
Increased consumption of home grown vitamin 
A-rich foods
Egg consumption increased by 48 percentage points
Increased expenditures on non-cereal foods Lentils and animal products bought with income 
earned
Economic status
Employment opportunities More than 60,000 rural jobs
Women’s status
Garden management 73 percent of gardens are managed by women, and 
these women are the main decisionmakers for garden 
practices and use of the income earned from selling 
garden produce
Income decisionmakers At least 90 percent of target households are repre-
sented by women
Note: All impact data are for the NGNESP program, except for the data on egg consumption, which comes from another HFP program known 
as Char II.   
Source: Compiled by the authors with information drawn from the following: World Bank. 2007. Agriculture to nutrition: Pathways, syner-
gies, and outcomes. Washington, D.C.: World Bank; Sifri, Z. 2007. Large-scale home gardening programs: The Helen Keller International 
experience in Bangladesh. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute; Helen Keller International, Asia-Pacific. 2001. 
Homestead food production: a strategy to combat malnutrition and poverty. Jakarta, Indonesia; Bushamuka, V. N., S. de Pee, A. Talukder, L. 
Kiess, D. Panagides, A. Taher, and M. Bloem. 2005. Impact of a homestead gardening program on household food security and empowerment 
of women in Bangladesh. Food and Nutrition Bulletin 26 (1): 17–25; Taludker, A., L. Kiess, N. Huq, S. de Pee, I. Darnton-Hill, and M. W. 
Bloem. 2000. Increasing the production and consumption of vitamin A-rich fruits and vegetables: Lessons learned in taking the Bangladesh 
Homestead Gardening Programme to a national scale. Food and Nutrition Bulletin 21 (2): 165–72; Taher, A., D. Panagides, R. A. Karim, A. 
Habib, A. Baten, A. Uddin, N. Sultana, G. Stallkamp, and A. Talukder. 2004. Homestead food production in the Chars. Slide presentation. 
Bangladesh: Helen Keller International.
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mal-source foods. An evaluation of the animal 
production pilot in 2003 revealed that program 
participants produced 200 eggs during a three-
month period, compared with 21 eggs produced by 
nonparticipants.6
By combining greater food availability and 
access with nutrition education, homestead food 
production has led to increased consumption of 
higher-quality foods. What is more, homestead 
gardening programs in Bangladesh increased 
vitamin A intake, especially among women and 
children. One study shows that the percent-
age of children aged 6-59 months and mothers 
eating dark-green leafy vegetables containing 
carotenoids, for example, increased from approxi-
mately one-third to three-quarters (see Figure 
21.1). Research also shows that children living in 
households with developed gardens consume 1.6 
times more vegetables than children without such 
gardens. Homestead food production has also 
led to a 48-percent increase in the consumption 
of eggs, a rich source of bioavailable, pre-formed 
vitamin A. Although vitamin A consumption was 
the initial focus of home gardening and animal pro-
duction programs, it is likely that participants also 
consumed higher levels of other nutrients, given 
their increased consumption of vegetables, fruits, 
and animal-source foods. More research is needed, 
however, to test whether these improvements in 
diet quality led to a better nutritional status of indi-
viduals, especially among women and children. 
Homestead food production also empowers 
women by giving them greater decisionmaking 
power within the household and providing new 
opportunities for them. The program was designed 
to target households represented by women. 
Women perceive themselves as making greater 
contributions to household income because of 
home gardens, and greater proportions of women 
participants have reported full decision-making 
power on a range of issues compared with women 
who are not participating in the project. Moreover, 
when programs target women, the vegetables are 
more likely to be consumed (rather than sold), 
particularly by children. Also, in intervention areas 
in the chars, women participating in the program 
earn a greater income and use these funds to 
invest in their children’s education. 
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Source: Taher, A., A. Talukder, N. R. Sarkar, V. N. Bushamuka, A. Hall, S. de Pee, R. Moench-Pfanner, L. Kiess, and M. W. Bloem. 
2004. Homestead gardening for combating vitamin A deficiency: The Helen Keller International, Bangladesh, experience. In Alleviating 
malnutrition through agriculture in Bangladesh: Biofortification and diversification as sustainable solutions, ed. N. Roos, H. E. Bouis, N. 
Hassan, and K. A. Kabir. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Figure 21.1—Consumption patterns among NGNESP target households
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Overcoming Challenges and 
Promoting Sustainability
Homestead food production programming in 
Bangladesh faces several challenges. Changing 
people’s preferences for producing and consuming 
food can be quite difficult. Bangladeshi farmers, 
for example, are accustomed to growing rice, 
and have sometimes hesitated to devote greater 
time and attention to the production of fruits and 
vegetables because this new practice appears risky. 
Another challenge is to ensure that homestead 
food production not only increases the quantity 
of foods produced, but also improves the diets 
of vulnerable household members. Advancing 
sustainable changes in people’s dietary patterns 
requires an understanding of the potential barriers 
to change and effective communications to 
promote food choices, child-feeding practices, and 
the beneficial ways of allocating food and other 
resources among household members. 
The apparent low bioavailability of micronu-
trients in fruits and vegetables has raised other 
challenges. Skepticism about the potential of home 
gardens alone to reduce micronutrient deficien-
cies grew. This led to the expansion of homestead 
food production programs to include animal 
production. While this shift can greatly increase 
the potential for homestead food production 
to improve micronutrient nutrition, it also has 
added enormous complexity to the programs. For 
example, model poultry farms must be established 
in villages and the poultry require immuniza-
tion and caging. Cows must be dewormed and 
fed better fodder. In addition, animal production 
may increase the risk of zoonotic diseases and 
may reduce the cost effectiveness of programs by 
requiring more labor and capital. 
Despite these challenges, homestead 
gardening programs combined with nutrition 
education have proven to be a sustainable 
approach. In Bangladesh, less than 3 percent of 
participants drop out of homestead food produc-
tion projects annually.7 Homestead gardening is 
environmentally sustainable as well. Programs 
embrace environmentally friendly agricultural 
practices like tree planting, organic fertilizer and 
pesticide use, safe use of pesticides more generally, 
and live fencing (using trees and shrubs as fence 
lines) to enrich the soil with nitrogen. 
Homestead food production has also proven 
to be financially sustainable. Costs of homestead 
food production programs are shared among par-
ticipating households, partner organizations, and 
Helen Keller International; this joint ownership 
of homestead food production has ensured local 
buy in, which has played a role in the program’s 
financial sustainability. In addition, locally available 
materials (like fencing, home-generated manure, 
and indigenous pest control) can be used, and the 
multiple uses of garden products present many 
opportunities for households to earn returns.8
Finally, social and political sustainability 
impact homestead food production. The govern-
ment continues to invest in the programs, and each 
year hundreds of local NGOs voice their desire to 
participate. Planning workshops and information-
sharing practices offer regular opportunities for 
collaboration and capacity strengthening for 
NGOs. Homestead gardening is flexibly integrated 
into each local NGO’s existing community-based 
health and development programs.
Lessons for the Future
Homestead food production in Bangladesh began 
with the initial goal of increasing consumption of 
vitamin A-rich foods to reduce the health threats 
associated with vitamin A deficiency. However, by 
promoting the production of more and healthier 
foods, educating people on how to improve their 
diets and nutrition, and raising people’s incomes, 
the large-scale intervention has improved food 
security for millions of people. And while it has 
increased the production and consumption 
of foods rich in vitamin A, further research is 
needed on the role of homestead food produc-





























tion in addressing the health conditions resulting 
from micronutrient deficiencies. Nonetheless, 
the experience of homestead food production in 
Bangladesh points to various lessons for future 
projects in the country and elsewhere.
First, translating food production into 
improved dietary intakes involves making 
nutrition education and behavior-change com-
munication a high priority—including messages 
about allocation of resources among household 
members and optimal feeding and care practices 
for infants, young children, and women. Education 
raises participants’ awareness and helps ensure 
that they choose to grow foods rich in micronutri-
ents all year long. Homestead food production in 
Bangladesh has shown that dialogue and negotia-
tion with caregivers, households, and communities 
are more effective at changing behavior than 
lectures and top-down transfers of knowledge. 
Second, homestead food production pro-
gramming has also benefited from adopting a 
multifaceted, multidisciplinary approach that links 
agricultural activities to other health and develop-
ment activities in the community. These linkages 
between the agricultural sector and the health 
sector are particularly needed to help ensure that 
preventative and curative healthcare is available 
for mothers and children to address the well-
known interactions between nutrition and disease. 
Third, building on local practices and existing 
organizations also helps advance the adoption of 
homestead gardening and avoids paternalistic pro-
gramming. Rooted in local values, customs, and 
practices, homestead food production inherently 
emphasizes community participation at all stages 
of the program. Local NGOs have been instru-
mental in funding, designing, and implementing 
the programs. Helen Keller International collabo-
rates with these local NGOs on strategic planning, 
developing proposals and work plans, monitoring 
programs, managing finances, and organizing 
the involvement of government and other local 
authorities. 
Fourth, a standard but flexible design allows 
implementing organizations to maintain quality 
control while also ensuring that programs are 
responsive to their context. For each program, 
Helen Keller International is involved for an 
initial three-year period, and local NGOs continue 
to support beneficiaries for an additional two 
years.  Another advantage of using a standardized 
approach is the ease of replication and scaling up, 
as shown by the broad reach of homestead food 
production within Bangladesh.
Finally, Helen Keller International and 
others involved with homestead food production 
projects have invested in information systems that 
provide feedback and enable improvements in the 
interventions.  The history of homestead food pro-
duction in Bangladesh shows an active feedback 
process between information collected and pro-
gramming interventions. Information sources 
include national (or sometimes local) surveys 
that help determine where to locate the project; 
monitoring surveys every four months to identify 
problems; and longer-term evaluations to inform 
and improve programming and motivate greater 
investment and commitment of donors, govern-
ments, and other partners. 
At the end of the day, homestead food produc-
tion programming has gone well beyond its original 
objective to take on a range of goals designed to 
improve lives and livelihoods in rural Bangladesh. 
In addition to improving diet quality, this holistic 
package of interventions empowers women, 
households, and communities through economic 
and social development. It respects local customs 
and practices and gains longevity in return. It 
leaves a legacy of knowledge, awareness, and 
understanding with its many partners and benefi-
ciaries. If homestead food production continues 
to be responsive to new information and receptive 
to changes in the environment and sociopolitical 
landscape, it will continue to enhance food security 
for vulnerable populations for years to come.  n
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A study such as this one cannot be an exhaustive 
review of all policies, investments, and programs 
in agricultural development—five decades of rich 
and diverse experiences simply cannot be summed 
up in a single volume. So instead, this book focuses 
on relatively large-scale and long-term successes 
that were backed by strong evidence of positive 
impact. 
The methodology used to identify and analyze 
these successes is detailed below. This methodol-
ogy draws on several previous efforts to document 
successes in development, including studies by 
Gabre-Madhin and Haggblade (2004) and Levine 
(2004).1  Additional insights were extracted from 
studies by the World Bank (2008, 2006), Uphoff, 
Esman, and Krishna (1998), Krishna, Uphoff, and 
Esman (1997), and the Asia-Pacific Association of 
Agricultural Research Institutions (2009).2
The method for arriving at the 20 case studies 
of success found in this book involved four steps: 
(1) throwing the net out, (2) sorting the catch, (3) 
selecting the most appropriate cases, and (4) syn-
thesizing the evidence. 
1. Throwing the net out. A first step in identi-
fying these successes was to seek input from those 
who participate in or study agricultural policies, 
investments, and programs that aim to improve 
food security and reduce hunger—practitioners, 
scholars, policymakers, and many others. To this 
end, the project team circulated a global “Call 
for Nominations” on successes in agricultural 
development in late 2008 while it simultaneously 
compiled suggestions from experts in the field 
and from information garnered from scholarly 
literature, project documents, websites, and 
other sources. By early 2009, about 250 potential 
successes were identified. 
2. Sorting the catch. The project team sorted 
through these potential successes using two 
qualifying criteria that had to be met in order for 
a case to be considered further, and five evaluative 
criteria that focused on the specific attributes and 
impacts of the intervention. 
The first qualifying criterion was that the 
intervention must have been operational in at least 
one developing country. For the purposes of this 
project, developing countries are those classified 
as low-income, lower-middle-income, or higher-
middle-income countries according to the World 
Bank-defined income groups or the equivalent 
classification that was current when the inter-
vention was being implemented.3 Note that this 
criterion does not imply that interventions were 
chosen because they only benefited developing 
countries—if an intervention generates benefits 
that also accrue to high-income industrialized 
countries, it was still considered.
The second qualifying criterion was that 
the intervention must have engaged agricul-
ture directly—that is, it must have operated on 
constraints that are specific to agriculture. This 
criterion excludes certain types of interventions 
that operate on agriculture indirectly. For example, 
although there is strong evidence indicating that 
basic education, health, and sanitation programs 
targeting the rural poor contribute to increasing 
their labor productivity, and thus their incomes 
and nutritional status, these interventions were 
not considered here because their point of entry is 
not directly related to the production, distribution, 
or marketing of agricultural goods and services. 
Similarly, while rural school feeding programs, 
rural conditional cash transfer programs, rural 
safety net programs, and food aid are often viewed 
as important to increasing rural incomes, building 
rural assets, and improving nutrition, their indirect 
impact on agriculture means that they were ruled 
out from consideration here.4
Once these criteria were met, the potential 
success had to meet five evaluative criteria:
•  Importance—the intervention should have 
tackled an important food-security problem 
by addressing the needs of a vulnerable 
group;
•  Scale— the intervention should have 
operated at scale, measured in terms 
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of whether the number of beneficiaries 
exceeded several hundred thousand indi-
viduals or whether the intervention was, at a 
minimum, national in coverage; 
•  Time and Duration—the intervention should 
have been (1) fully operational at scale long 
enough to generate significant reductions 
in hunger or improvements in food security 
and (2) implemented in the past 50 years; 
•  Proven Impact—the intervention should 
have been supported by documented and 
rigorous evidence of a clear and measurable 
impact on individual or household hunger or 
nutritional status; and 
•  Sustainability—the intervention should have 
been sustainable, whether in financial terms 
(cost-effectiveness) or in broader social, 
political or environmental terms. 
3. Selecting the most appropriate cases. While 
efforts were initially made to apply each criterion 
as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
selection, it was recognized that no case study 
could meet all criteria. As such, the criteria were 
relaxed somewhat, although the qualifying criteria 
were maintained as necessary conditions, along 
with the following evaluative criteria: importance, 
scale, and time/duration.  
With respect to the proven impact and sus-
tainability criteria, very few case studies were 
supported by what may be termed “state-of-the-art” 
impact assessments that documented the effects of 
an intervention through randomized experiments 
that establish attribution by combining before-
and-after comparisons with treatment-and-control 
comparisons. In many cases, such experiments did 
not exist when the intervention was in operation; in 
other cases, neither the resources nor the expertise 
were available to undertake such data-intensive 
assessments. Relaxing these criteria meant that 
alternative forms of evidence were accepted. These 
alternative forms of evidence include: geospatial 
imagery documenting changes in agroecological 
landscapes over time; quantitative evidence using 
estimation techniques that were not necessarily the 
most up-to-date methods; and qualitative evidence 
gleaned from policy analyses and from surveys 
conducted among direct beneficiaries.
As a result of these criteria, this book does not 
feature several types of successes. First, the book 
does not cover nonagricultural interventions, such 
as rural health, rural education, or rural social 
protection programs, for example. These programs 
undoubtedly comprise an important class of 
intervention, but they do not directly address agri-
culture in its strictest sense. However, one success 
case that was included—improving micronutrient 
consumption in Bangladesh—does feature a rural 
nutrition program that promotes home-based 
production of fruits, vegetables, and livestock to 
improve nutrition and health among the poor.
Second, this book does not examine programs 
that integrate agriculture with health, education, 
microfinance, microenterprise, governance, and 
other development priorities. These too represent 
an important class of intervention, but because 
of the complex synergies between these many 
activities, it is hard to disentangle the evidence. 
However, several successes featured in this book, 
while primarily defined as agricultural develop-
ment programs, do examine the importance of 
integrated approaches. The study of community 
forestry in Nepal, which highlights the importance 
of integrating agricultural development with local 
governance, is one such success.
Third, this book does not cover cases of failure. 
Often, learning lessons is as much about observing 
the failures as it is about observing the successes. 
But while there are many failures in agricultural 
development from which to learn—and many 
studies that highlight the causes of their failure—
this book chooses to focus on the successes only, 
primarily because it is the absence of successes in 
agricultural development that has marginalized 
its importance in discussions of how to improve 
food security and reduce hunger in developing 
countries.
4. Synthesizing the evidence. Each success 
highlighted in this book is based on a synthesis of 
evidence from multiple sources that range from 
first-hand accounts by individual participants 
and beneficiaries to large-scale impact-evaluation 
studies that combine both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence at the highest levels of 
academic rigor. 
But few successes are evidenced by a common 
set of impact-assessment methodologies, indica-156  
tors, or conclusions—there is no one indicator that 
can appropriately describe the numbers of millions 
fed, or the quantitative improvement in food 
security, resulting from an intervention. 
This may not be a disadvantage to the present 
analysis when considered more closely. A glance at 
the chapters in this book indicates that the inter-
ventions vary so greatly—in terms of what they aim 
to achieve, how they do so, and what they actually 
end up accomplishing—that a single indicator runs 
the risk of reducing an intervention’s impacts to 
something entirely impractical. 
Moreover, the casual reader should not 
conclude that only those interventions that are 
backed by rigorous impact-assessment materials 
and definitive indicators are successes. For 
example, a program that was not rigorously 
evaluated by teams of independent scholars con-
ducting lengthy household surveys may nonetheless 
be a success. Or a program that was initially seen as 
a success may nonetheless fail in the long term.
In fact, there are many successes in agricul-
tural development that are not covered by this 
volume but that may have equal merit. Examples 
include smallholder cultivation of high-value 
export crops in Kenya and Guatemala; systems of 
rice intensification (SRI) that have become popular 
in several countries during the past two decades; 
New Rice for Africa (NERICA), which is being 
developed and disseminated for farmers in several 
Sub-Saharan African countries; or the Greenbelt 
Movement in Kenya that has encouraged commu-
nity-based tree planting on a massive scale.
But even with these caveats in mind, we know 
that there are clearly discernible pathways—
interventions that seek to improve crops, livestock, 
forestry, and fisheries, conserve natural resources, 
and strengthen the markets, institutions, and 
policies that relate to these social and economic 
activities— that link agricultural development with 
improvements in food security. These pathways, 
and the stepping stones along them, are the main 
focus of impact assessments, and thus the main 
focus in proving success.  n
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Whether, what, and how agricultural develop-
ment has had an impact on people’s lives have long 
been topics of inquiry by researchers, develop-
ment practitioners, investors, and beneficiaries 
of development interventions. As long as there 
have been interventions, people have formally or 
informally, systematically or haphazardly, sci-
entifically or unscientifically assessed, analyzed, 
measured, estimated, and evaluated their impacts. 
The motivation to assess impacts arises from the 
need for accountability (whether and what impacts 
development efforts have on people and their 
environment) and interest in institutional learning 
(how impacts are achieved or not achieved, and 
what lessons can be derived to improve programs). 
Assessment of impacts provides the “proof” that 
development does or does not work, in what 
contexts, and why.
There are several concepts and terminologies 
that are closely associated with the field of moni-
toring, evaluation, and impact assessment. Broadly 
speaking, these can be grouped into two catego-
ries: (1) assessments that occur before or during 
the project implementation, such as ex ante impact 
assessment, project appraisal, and monitoring 
and (2) those that occur retrospectively after an 
intervention ends or once project outputs have 
been scaled up. Each has evolved dramatically over 
the last 50 years in response to changing themes 
in development, methodological advancements, 
and demand for documenting rigorous evidence 
of impacts. The evolution and emerging trends in 
methodologies offer lessons for best practices to 
enhance the culture of impact assessment in agri-
cultural development.
Ex Ante Impact Assessment, 
Project Appraisal, and 
Monitoring
Ex ante impact assessments are used to predict 
the likely consequences of an intervention. The 
original approach, beginning in the 1950s, was 
primarily driven by multilateral and bilateral 
donors who used ex ante analyses of the social 
and economic costs and benefits to quantify the 
projected impacts of a project. These analyses were 
often used as a condition to approve, adjust, or 
reject funding for development projects. In agri-
culture, these assessments are still routine (and 
mandatory, in some instances) for large invest-
ments such as irrigation systems, dams, and rural 
roads. Over time, as a result of rapid increases 
in computing technologies, modeling tools have 
joined the ex ante impact assessment family. These 
models have the capacity to simulate a wide range 
of market conditions, technology scenarios, likely 
spillover effects, and alternative trade regimes 
in order to project the economic benefits of a 
proposed investment.1
In the 1970s, the toolkit for ex ante 
assessments was augmented by the introduction 
of logical framework analysis, a planning and 
appraising tool for development projects. Logical 
framework analysis provides a clear hierarchy 
of inputs, activities, and objectives alongside 
assumptions about the external environment 
in an effort to more effectively map out how an 
intervention will have an impact on its intended 
target population. This addition resulted from 
rising criticism that investments in large projects 
were neither involving nor benefitting the poor in 
any substantial way. 
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Continued concerns about the involvement 
and engagement of the poor in development, 
particularly rural development, acquired more 
attention in the 1980s with the introduction of  
new participatory development methods. Tools 
such as participatory rural appraisal, rapid rural 
appraisal, participatory action research, par-
ticipatory impact assessment, and participatory 
impact pathways analysis sought to make people 
and communities active participants in develop-
ment, rather than mere objects of it.2 Similar 
participatory tools applied to organizations and 
sectors known as institutional learning and change 
have added a further dimension to these types of 
assessments.3  
Retrospective Assessments
The focus of retrospective assessments is to 
document realized outputs, outcomes, and impacts 
of an intervention. These types of assessments 
come closest to providing the proof of develop-
ment effectiveness. Project evaluation, a type of 
retrospective assessment, usually occurs at the end 
of an intervention or soon after its conclusion. Its 
main objective is to track project inputs, outputs, 
and immediate outcomes, and to document the 
processes that led to these effects. These are often 
distinguished from retrospective assessments that 
focus on outcomes and impacts. The latter type of 
retrospective assessment, commonly referred to 
as simply “impact assessment,” is defined as the 
systematic analysis of the significant or lasting 
changes in people’s lives brought about by a given 
action or series of actions in relation to a coun-
terfactual, or what may have occurred had an 
intervention not been taken.
Three types of retrospective impact assess-
ments are distinguishable in the agricultural 
development literature: macro-level assessments 
that focus on the contribution of developmental 
efforts to an impact goal aggregated at the sector 
or system level; micro-level impact evaluations 
that focus on estimating the average effect of 
an intervention on outcomes at the beneficiary 
level; and micro-level ex post impact analysis 
and assessment that focus on the total effects of 
a development effort after the outputs are scaled 
up. In the context of programs that affect large 
numbers of people, it is the micro-level impact 
assessments that are particularly vital to demon-
strating what works and why. 
Micro-level ex post impact analysis and 
assessment have evolved and expanded over the 
decades in both breadth and depth in response to 
evolving development themes and methodological 
advancements. In the area of agricultural devel-
opment, the field of ex post impact assessments 
was pioneered by Zvi Griliches, who examined the 
social benefits of investing in hybrid corn technol-
ogy in the United States.4 This approach flourished 
during the Green Revolution (see Chapter 3) in the 
1970s, and, over the past five decades, hundreds 
of studies have documented economic returns on 
investment in agricultural research.5 In essence, 
the approach is to estimate returns on investments 
in an intervention, expressed as a ratio between 
the total values of the inputs and the effects 
generated from those inputs, which are based on a 
variety of methods and sources of data. In sub-
sequent decades, these methods expanded from 
their primary focus on assessing the impacts of 
crop-technology adoption to assessing the impact 
of interventions in areas such as gender, health, 
natural-resource management, policy research, 
and poverty reduction.
Since the 1990s, retrospective assessments 
(namely, micro-level impact evaluations) that 
focused on estimating a program’s effects have 
benefited from two mutually reinforcing develop-
ments: the introduction of qualitative methods 
and the improvement of quantitative methods. 
In qualitative assessments, the focus is on under-
standing processes, behaviors, and conditions as 
they are perceived by the individuals or groups 
being studied.6 Qualitative approaches use rela-
tively open-ended data collection and analysis 
tools, often rely on an evaluation of participants’ 
knowledge of the conditions surrounding the 
project or program, and bring participants into the 
assessment itself by having them determine the 
objectives of the study and participate in data col-
lection and analysis. 
Improvements in quantitative assessments 
revolve around efforts to improve the rigor with 
which impacts are identified and measured in 
relation to a counterfactual. Natural scientists have 
a long tradition of assessing impact through the     159
use of experiments that are typically performed 
under strictly controlled conditions in the labo-
ratory or field, for example, treating one plant 
with fertilizer and comparing the results against 
another plant that did not receive fertilizer 
treatment. But social scientists can rarely apply 
similar protocols to the study of people, technolo-
gies, and policies in a real-world setting. Recent 
applications in the development field of methods 
known as experimental and quasi-experimental 
designs, however, are helping researchers to better 
establish the causal link between an interven-
tion and its impact in ways that are conceptually 
similar to those used by natural scientists.7 There 
is still debate over these designs, including issues 
of whether they are relevant beyond the immediate 
individuals and locations of the investigation. 
Practical challenges of implementing the field 
experiments, their high costs, and ethical concerns 
over withholding an intervention from a control 
group prohibit the widespread use of these designs 
as an assessment tool.8
Conclusion
The portfolio of impact assessment has expanded 
over the last 50 years from measuring the proof of 
development effectiveness in terms of economic 
rates of return to measuring it across a range 
of dimensions using a wide array of tools. This 
broadening agenda is a result of not only meth-
odological advancements but also the evolution 
of development ideas that have shifted away from 
a one-dimensional (that is, economic), top-down 
view of development to a multi-dimensional, par-
ticipatory, people-focused development that also 
addresses the demand for donor, government, and 
beneficiary accountability. Despite these develop-
ments, it is rare for impact assessments to include 
an explicit indicator called “food security” that 
measures the impact of an intervention on this 
goal. Most studies measure food-security impacts 
through changes in outcome indicators related to 
consumption or imply this impact through changes 
in outcomes related to production, income, and 
prices.
The emerging concern is that despite billions 
of dollars being spent on development programs, 
there is relatively little knowledge about the net 
impact of most of these programs.9 The genera-
tion of robust knowledge that feeds into making 
developmental policies requires a hierarchi-
cal and cumulative approach to “improving the 
proof” through rigorous, varied impact assess-
ment methods applied at the project, program, 
and system level. A good practice guideline is 
to subject as many ongoing and new develop-
ment interventions as resources allow to rigorous 
impact evaluation based on a common framework. 
This can help build a critical body of evidence on 
impacts of development interventions and help 
build a knowledge base on what works and what 
does not. Until such a critical body of knowledge 
is developed, however, one way to move closer 
to both understanding and achieving impact on 
challenges such as food security, malnutrition, and 
poverty is to learn from past proven successes in 
agricultural development. By examining impact 
assessments of what worked and why, decision-
makers can equip themselves with the knowledge 
to make wise choices about where, when, and how 
to invest.  n160  
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